Detecting Macro Invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects

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Id	e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7
Rulename	Detecting Macro Invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects
Description	This query detects a macro invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects evade naive parent/child Office detection rules.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	LateralMovement
Techniques	T1021.003
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/MacroInvokingShellBrowserWindowCOMObjects.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7.json

KQL

Event
 | where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==1
 | parse EventData with * 'Image">' Image "<" * 'CommandLine">' CommandLine "<" * 'ParentImage">' ParentImage "<" *
 | where ParentImage has "svchost.exe" and Image has "rundll32.exe" and CommandLine has "{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}"
 | parse EventData with * 'ProcessGuid">' ProcessGuid "<" * 'Description">' Description "<" * 'CurrentDirectory">' CurrentDirectory "<" * 'User">' User "<" * 'LogonGuid">' LogonGuid "<" * 'ParentProcessGuid">' ParentProcessGuid "<" * 'ParentImage">' ParentImage "<" * 'ParentCommandLine">' ParentCommandLine "<" * 'ParentUser">' ParentUser "<" *
 | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, User, ParentImage, ParentProcessGuid, ParentCommandLine, ParentUser, Image, ProcessGuid, CommandLine, Description
 | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')

YAML

query: |
  Event
   | where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==1
   | parse EventData with * 'Image">' Image "<" * 'CommandLine">' CommandLine "<" * 'ParentImage">' ParentImage "<" *
   | where ParentImage has "svchost.exe" and Image has "rundll32.exe" and CommandLine has "{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}"
   | parse EventData with * 'ProcessGuid">' ProcessGuid "<" * 'Description">' Description "<" * 'CurrentDirectory">' CurrentDirectory "<" * 'User">' User "<" * 'LogonGuid">' LogonGuid "<" * 'ParentProcessGuid">' ParentProcessGuid "<" * 'ParentImage">' ParentImage "<" * 'ParentCommandLine">' ParentCommandLine "<" * 'ParentUser">' ParentUser "<" *
   | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, User, ParentImage, ParentProcessGuid, ParentCommandLine, ParentUser, Image, ProcessGuid, CommandLine, Description
   | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')  
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
status: Available
name: Detecting Macro Invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: CommandLine
    columnName: CommandLine
  entityType: Process
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: User
  entityType: Account
kind: Scheduled
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
description: |
    'This query detects a macro invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects evade naive parent/child Office detection rules.'
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/MacroInvokingShellBrowserWindowCOMObjects.yaml
version: 1.0.4
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: Medium
tactics:
- LateralMovement
id: e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7
relevantTechniques:
- T1021.003

ARM