Detecting Macro Invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects

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Id	e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7
Rulename	Detecting Macro Invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects
Description	This query detects a macro invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects evade naive parent/child Office detection rules. Ref: https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-doc-with-macro-invoking.html
Severity	Medium
Tactics	LateralMovement
Techniques	T1021.003
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/MacroInvokingShellBrowserWindowCOMObjects.yaml
Version	1.0.3
Arm template	e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7.json

KQL

Event
 | where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==1
 | parse EventData with * 'Image">' Image "<" * 'CommandLine">' CommandLine "<" * 'ParentImage">' ParentImage "<" *
 | where ParentImage has "svchost.exe" and Image has "rundll32.exe" and CommandLine has "{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}"
 | parse EventData with * 'ProcessGuid">' ProcessGuid "<" * 'Description">' Description "<" * 'CurrentDirectory">' CurrentDirectory "<" * 'User">' User "<" * 'LogonGuid">' LogonGuid "<" * 'ParentProcessGuid">' ParentProcessGuid "<" * 'ParentImage">' ParentImage "<" * 'ParentCommandLine">' ParentCommandLine "<" * 'ParentUser">' ParentUser "<" *
 | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, User, ParentImage, ParentProcessGuid, ParentCommandLine, ParentUser, Image, ProcessGuid, CommandLine, Description
 | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')

YAML

relevantTechniques:
- T1021.003
name: Detecting Macro Invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: CommandLine
    columnName: CommandLine
  entityType: Process
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: User
  entityType: Account
triggerThreshold: 0
id: e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7
tactics:
- LateralMovement
version: 1.0.3
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/MacroInvokingShellBrowserWindowCOMObjects.yaml
queryPeriod: 1h
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: Medium
status: Available
description: |
  'This query detects a macro invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects evade naive parent/child Office detection rules.
  Ref: https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-doc-with-macro-invoking.html'  
query: |
  Event
   | where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==1
   | parse EventData with * 'Image">' Image "<" * 'CommandLine">' CommandLine "<" * 'ParentImage">' ParentImage "<" *
   | where ParentImage has "svchost.exe" and Image has "rundll32.exe" and CommandLine has "{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}"
   | parse EventData with * 'ProcessGuid">' ProcessGuid "<" * 'Description">' Description "<" * 'CurrentDirectory">' CurrentDirectory "<" * 'User">' User "<" * 'LogonGuid">' LogonGuid "<" * 'ParentProcessGuid">' ParentProcessGuid "<" * 'ParentImage">' ParentImage "<" * 'ParentCommandLine">' ParentCommandLine "<" * 'ParentUser">' ParentUser "<" *
   | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, User, ParentImage, ParentProcessGuid, ParentCommandLine, ParentUser, Image, ProcessGuid, CommandLine, Description
   | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')  
triggerOperator: gt

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "e7470b35-0128-4508-bfc9-e01cfb3c2eb7",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query detects a macro invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects evade naive parent/child Office detection rules.\nRef: https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-doc-with-macro-invoking.html'\n",
        "displayName": "Detecting Macro Invoking ShellBrowserWindow COM Objects",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Process",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "CommandLine",
                "identifier": "CommandLine"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "DnsDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "User",
                "identifier": "Name"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/MacroInvokingShellBrowserWindowCOMObjects.yaml",
        "query": "Event\n | where EventLog =~ \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" and EventID==1\n | parse EventData with * 'Image\">' Image \"<\" * 'CommandLine\">' CommandLine \"<\" * 'ParentImage\">' ParentImage \"<\" *\n | where ParentImage has \"svchost.exe\" and Image has \"rundll32.exe\" and CommandLine has \"{c08afd90-f2a1-11d1-8455-00a0c91f3880}\"\n | parse EventData with * 'ProcessGuid\">' ProcessGuid \"<\" * 'Description\">' Description \"<\" * 'CurrentDirectory\">' CurrentDirectory \"<\" * 'User\">' User \"<\" * 'LogonGuid\">' LogonGuid \"<\" * 'ParentProcessGuid\">' ParentProcessGuid \"<\" * 'ParentImage\">' ParentImage \"<\" * 'ParentCommandLine\">' ParentCommandLine \"<\" * 'ParentUser\">' ParentUser \"<\" *\n | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, User, ParentImage, ParentProcessGuid, ParentCommandLine, ParentUser, Image, ProcessGuid, CommandLine, Description\n | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1021.003"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "LateralMovement"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1021"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.3",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}