Password Spraying
Id | e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d |
Rulename | Password Spraying |
Description | This query detects a password spraying attack, where a single machine has performed a large number of failed login attempts, with a large number of different accounts. For each account, the attacker uses just a few attempts to prevent account lockout. This query uses the DeviceLogonEvents per machine to detect a password spraying attacks. The machine against which the password spraying is performed (can be DC, a server or even an endpoint) needs to be enrolled in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | CredentialAccess |
Techniques | T1110.003 |
Required data connectors | MicrosoftThreatProtection |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/PasswordSprayingWithMDE.yaml |
Version | 1.0.0 |
Arm template | e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d.json |
let thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts = 20;
let upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount = 10;
let ratioSuccessFailedLogons = 0.5;
let timeframe = 1d;
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(timeframe)
| where LogonType != "Unlock" and ActionType in ("LogonSuccess", "LogonFailed")
| where not(isempty( RemoteIP) and isempty( RemoteDeviceName))
| extend LocalLogon=parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| where RemoteIPType != "Loopback"
| summarize SuccessLogonCount = countif(ActionType == "LogonSuccess"), FailedLogonCount = countif(ActionType == "LogonFailed"),
UniqueAccountFailedLogons=dcountif(AccountName, ActionType == "LogonFailed"), FirstFailed=minif(Timestamp, ActionType == "LogonFailed"),
LastFailed=maxif(Timestamp, ActionType == "LogonFailed"), LastTimestamp=arg_max(Timestamp, tostring(ReportId)) by RemoteIP, DeviceName // RemoteIP is the source of the logon attempt.
| project-rename IPAddress=RemoteIP
| where UniqueAccountFailedLogons > thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts and SuccessLogonCount*ratioSuccessFailedLogons < FailedLogonCount and UniqueAccountFailedLogons*upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount > FailedLogonCount
status: Available
queryFrequency: 1d
description: |
This query detects a password spraying attack, where a single machine has performed a large number of failed login attempts, with a large number of different accounts.
For each account, the attacker uses just a few attempts to prevent account lockout. This query uses the DeviceLogonEvents per machine to detect a password spraying attacks.
The machine against which the password spraying is performed (can be DC, a server or even an endpoint) needs to be enrolled in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.
severity: Medium
version: 1.0.0
relevantTechniques:
- T1110.003
name: Password Spraying
triggerThreshold: 0
kind: Scheduled
query: |
let thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts = 20;
let upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount = 10;
let ratioSuccessFailedLogons = 0.5;
let timeframe = 1d;
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(timeframe)
| where LogonType != "Unlock" and ActionType in ("LogonSuccess", "LogonFailed")
| where not(isempty( RemoteIP) and isempty( RemoteDeviceName))
| extend LocalLogon=parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| where RemoteIPType != "Loopback"
| summarize SuccessLogonCount = countif(ActionType == "LogonSuccess"), FailedLogonCount = countif(ActionType == "LogonFailed"),
UniqueAccountFailedLogons=dcountif(AccountName, ActionType == "LogonFailed"), FirstFailed=minif(Timestamp, ActionType == "LogonFailed"),
LastFailed=maxif(Timestamp, ActionType == "LogonFailed"), LastTimestamp=arg_max(Timestamp, tostring(ReportId)) by RemoteIP, DeviceName // RemoteIP is the source of the logon attempt.
| project-rename IPAddress=RemoteIP
| where UniqueAccountFailedLogons > thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts and SuccessLogonCount*ratioSuccessFailedLogons < FailedLogonCount and UniqueAccountFailedLogons*upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount > FailedLogonCount
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/PasswordSprayingWithMDE.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- DeviceLogonEvents
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
id: e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d
queryPeriod: 1d
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: DeviceName
identifier: FullName
entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: IPAddress
identifier: Address
entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: ProcessCommandLine
identifier: CommandLine
entityType: Process
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "This query detects a password spraying attack, where a single machine has performed a large number of failed login attempts, with a large number of different accounts. \nFor each account, the attacker uses just a few attempts to prevent account lockout. This query uses the DeviceLogonEvents per machine to detect a password spraying attacks. \nThe machine against which the password spraying is performed (can be DC, a server or even an endpoint) needs to be enrolled in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.\n",
"displayName": "Password Spraying",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "DeviceName",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Process",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "ProcessCommandLine",
"identifier": "CommandLine"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/PasswordSprayingWithMDE.yaml",
"query": "let thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts = 20;\nlet upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount = 10;\nlet ratioSuccessFailedLogons = 0.5;\nlet timeframe = 1d;\nDeviceLogonEvents\n| where Timestamp >= ago(timeframe)\n| where LogonType != \"Unlock\" and ActionType in (\"LogonSuccess\", \"LogonFailed\")\n| where not(isempty( RemoteIP) and isempty( RemoteDeviceName))\n| extend LocalLogon=parse_json(AdditionalFields)\n| where RemoteIPType != \"Loopback\"\n| summarize SuccessLogonCount = countif(ActionType == \"LogonSuccess\"), FailedLogonCount = countif(ActionType == \"LogonFailed\"),\n UniqueAccountFailedLogons=dcountif(AccountName, ActionType == \"LogonFailed\"), FirstFailed=minif(Timestamp, ActionType == \"LogonFailed\"),\n LastFailed=maxif(Timestamp, ActionType == \"LogonFailed\"), LastTimestamp=arg_max(Timestamp, tostring(ReportId)) by RemoteIP, DeviceName // RemoteIP is the source of the logon attempt.\n| project-rename IPAddress=RemoteIP\n| where UniqueAccountFailedLogons > thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts and SuccessLogonCount*ratioSuccessFailedLogons < FailedLogonCount and UniqueAccountFailedLogons*upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount > FailedLogonCount \n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [
"T1110.003"
],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"CredentialAccess"
],
"techniques": [
"T1110"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.0",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}