Password Spraying

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Id	e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d
Rulename	Password Spraying
Description	This query detects a password spraying attack, where a single machine has performed a large number of failed login attempts, with a large number of different accounts. For each account, the attacker uses just a few attempts to prevent account lockout. This query uses the DeviceLogonEvents per machine to detect a password spraying attacks. The machine against which the password spraying is performed (can be DC, a server or even an endpoint) needs to be enrolled in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	CredentialAccess
Techniques	T1110.003
Required data connectors	MicrosoftThreatProtection
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/PasswordSprayingWithMDE.yaml
Version	1.0.0
Arm template	e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d.json

KQL

let thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts = 20;
let upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount = 10;
let ratioSuccessFailedLogons = 0.5;
let timeframe = 1d;
DeviceLogonEvents
| where Timestamp >= ago(timeframe)
| where LogonType != "Unlock" and ActionType in ("LogonSuccess", "LogonFailed")
| where not(isempty( RemoteIP) and isempty( RemoteDeviceName))
| extend LocalLogon=parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| where RemoteIPType != "Loopback"
| summarize SuccessLogonCount = countif(ActionType == "LogonSuccess"), FailedLogonCount = countif(ActionType == "LogonFailed"),
    UniqueAccountFailedLogons=dcountif(AccountName, ActionType == "LogonFailed"), FirstFailed=minif(Timestamp, ActionType == "LogonFailed"),
    LastFailed=maxif(Timestamp, ActionType == "LogonFailed"), LastTimestamp=arg_max(Timestamp, tostring(ReportId)) by RemoteIP, DeviceName // RemoteIP is the source of the logon attempt.
| project-rename IPAddress=RemoteIP
| where UniqueAccountFailedLogons > thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts and SuccessLogonCount*ratioSuccessFailedLogons < FailedLogonCount and UniqueAccountFailedLogons*upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount > FailedLogonCount

YAML

entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: DeviceName
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IPAddress
- entityType: Process
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: CommandLine
    columnName: ProcessCommandLine
name: Password Spraying
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
relevantTechniques:
- T1110.003
id: e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d
version: 1.0.0
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/PasswordSprayingWithMDE.yaml
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
query: |
  let thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts = 20;
  let upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount = 10;
  let ratioSuccessFailedLogons = 0.5;
  let timeframe = 1d;
  DeviceLogonEvents
  | where Timestamp >= ago(timeframe)
  | where LogonType != "Unlock" and ActionType in ("LogonSuccess", "LogonFailed")
  | where not(isempty( RemoteIP) and isempty( RemoteDeviceName))
  | extend LocalLogon=parse_json(AdditionalFields)
  | where RemoteIPType != "Loopback"
  | summarize SuccessLogonCount = countif(ActionType == "LogonSuccess"), FailedLogonCount = countif(ActionType == "LogonFailed"),
      UniqueAccountFailedLogons=dcountif(AccountName, ActionType == "LogonFailed"), FirstFailed=minif(Timestamp, ActionType == "LogonFailed"),
      LastFailed=maxif(Timestamp, ActionType == "LogonFailed"), LastTimestamp=arg_max(Timestamp, tostring(ReportId)) by RemoteIP, DeviceName // RemoteIP is the source of the logon attempt.
  | project-rename IPAddress=RemoteIP
  | where UniqueAccountFailedLogons > thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts and SuccessLogonCount*ratioSuccessFailedLogons < FailedLogonCount and UniqueAccountFailedLogons*upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount > FailedLogonCount   
description: |
  This query detects a password spraying attack, where a single machine has performed a large number of failed login attempts, with a large number of different accounts. 
  For each account, the attacker uses just a few attempts to prevent account lockout. This query uses the DeviceLogonEvents per machine to detect a password spraying attacks. 
  The machine against which the password spraying is performed (can be DC, a server or even an endpoint) needs to be enrolled in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.  
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceLogonEvents
status: Available
queryPeriod: 1d
kind: Scheduled

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "e00f72ab-fea1-4a31-9ecc-eea6397cd38d",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "This query detects a password spraying attack, where a single machine has performed a large number of failed login attempts, with a large number of different accounts. \nFor each account, the attacker uses just a few attempts to prevent account lockout. This query uses the DeviceLogonEvents per machine to detect a password spraying attacks. \nThe machine against which the password spraying is performed (can be DC, a server or even an endpoint) needs to be enrolled in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.\n",
        "displayName": "Password Spraying",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IPAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Process",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "ProcessCommandLine",
                "identifier": "CommandLine"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/PasswordSprayingWithMDE.yaml",
        "query": "let thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts = 20;\nlet upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount = 10;\nlet ratioSuccessFailedLogons = 0.5;\nlet timeframe = 1d;\nDeviceLogonEvents\n| where Timestamp >= ago(timeframe)\n| where LogonType != \"Unlock\" and ActionType in (\"LogonSuccess\", \"LogonFailed\")\n| where not(isempty( RemoteIP) and isempty( RemoteDeviceName))\n| extend LocalLogon=parse_json(AdditionalFields)\n| where RemoteIPType != \"Loopback\"\n| summarize SuccessLogonCount = countif(ActionType == \"LogonSuccess\"), FailedLogonCount = countif(ActionType == \"LogonFailed\"),\n    UniqueAccountFailedLogons=dcountif(AccountName, ActionType == \"LogonFailed\"), FirstFailed=minif(Timestamp, ActionType == \"LogonFailed\"),\n    LastFailed=maxif(Timestamp, ActionType == \"LogonFailed\"), LastTimestamp=arg_max(Timestamp, tostring(ReportId)) by RemoteIP, DeviceName // RemoteIP is the source of the logon attempt.\n| project-rename IPAddress=RemoteIP\n| where UniqueAccountFailedLogons > thresholdForUniqueFailedAccounts and SuccessLogonCount*ratioSuccessFailedLogons < FailedLogonCount and UniqueAccountFailedLogons*upperBoundOfFailedLogonsPerAccount > FailedLogonCount \n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1110.003"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CredentialAccess"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1110"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.0",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}