Match Legitimate Name or Location - 2
Id | dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31 |
Rulename | Match Legitimate Name or Location - 2 |
Description | Attackers often match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files to avoid detection rules that are based trust of on certain operating system processes. This query detects mismatches in the parent-child relationship of core operating system processes to uncover different masquerading attempts. |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | DefenseEvasion |
Techniques | T1036.005 |
Required data connectors | MicrosoftThreatProtection |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1h |
Query period | 1h |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/MatchLegitimateNameOrLocation.yaml |
Version | 1.0.1 |
Arm template | dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31.json |
let ProcessRelations=datatable(ImageFile:string,ExpectedParent:dynamic) [
"smss.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe", "ntoskrnl.exe", ""]),
"crmss.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"wininit.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"winlogon.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"services.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"lsaiso.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"lsass.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"spoolsv.exe", dynamic(["services.exe"]),
"dllhost.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe", "services.exe"]),
"lsm.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"svchost.exe", dynamic(["services.exe", "msmpeng.exe"]),
"runtimebroker.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe"]),
"taskhostw.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe"]),
"userinit.exe", dynamic(["winlogon.exe"])
// Explorer can have a lot of parents in some environments
//,"explorer.exe", dynamic(["userinit.exe"])
];
DeviceProcessEvents
| extend ImageFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(FolderPath)).Filename))
| extend ParentFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(InitiatingProcessFolderPath)).Filename))
| lookup kind=inner ProcessRelations on ImageFile
| where not(set_has_element(ExpectedParent,ParentFile))
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
- T1036.005
id: dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31
severity: Medium
status: Available
name: Match Legitimate Name or Location - 2
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- DeviceProcessEvents
query: |
let ProcessRelations=datatable(ImageFile:string,ExpectedParent:dynamic) [
"smss.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe", "ntoskrnl.exe", ""]),
"crmss.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"wininit.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"winlogon.exe", dynamic(["smss.exe"]),
"services.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"lsaiso.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"lsass.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"spoolsv.exe", dynamic(["services.exe"]),
"dllhost.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe", "services.exe"]),
"lsm.exe", dynamic(["wininit.exe"]),
"svchost.exe", dynamic(["services.exe", "msmpeng.exe"]),
"runtimebroker.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe"]),
"taskhostw.exe", dynamic(["svchost.exe"]),
"userinit.exe", dynamic(["winlogon.exe"])
// Explorer can have a lot of parents in some environments
//,"explorer.exe", dynamic(["userinit.exe"])
];
DeviceProcessEvents
| extend ImageFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(FolderPath)).Filename))
| extend ParentFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(InitiatingProcessFolderPath)).Filename))
| lookup kind=inner ProcessRelations on ImageFile
| where not(set_has_element(ExpectedParent,ParentFile))
queryPeriod: 1h
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: DeviceName
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Sid
columnName: AccountSid
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: AccountDomain
- entityType: Process
fieldMappings:
- identifier: CommandLine
columnName: ProcessCommandLine
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
description: |
Attackers often match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files to avoid detection rules that are based trust of on certain operating system processes.
This query detects mismatches in the parent-child relationship of core operating system processes to uncover different masquerading attempts.
version: 1.0.1
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/MatchLegitimateNameOrLocation.yaml
queryFrequency: 1h
kind: Scheduled
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "dd22dc4f-ab7c-4d0a-84ad-cc393638ba31",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "Attackers often match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files to avoid detection rules that are based trust of on certain operating system processes.\nThis query detects mismatches in the parent-child relationship of core operating system processes to uncover different masquerading attempts.\n",
"displayName": "Match Legitimate Name or Location - 2",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "DeviceName",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountSid",
"identifier": "Sid"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Process",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "ProcessCommandLine",
"identifier": "CommandLine"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/MatchLegitimateNameOrLocation.yaml",
"query": "let ProcessRelations=datatable(ImageFile:string,ExpectedParent:dynamic) [\n \"smss.exe\", dynamic([\"smss.exe\", \"ntoskrnl.exe\", \"\"]),\n \"crmss.exe\", dynamic([\"smss.exe\"]),\n \"wininit.exe\", dynamic([\"smss.exe\"]),\n \"winlogon.exe\", dynamic([\"smss.exe\"]),\n \"services.exe\", dynamic([\"wininit.exe\"]),\n \"lsaiso.exe\", dynamic([\"wininit.exe\"]),\n \"lsass.exe\", dynamic([\"wininit.exe\"]),\n \"spoolsv.exe\", dynamic([\"services.exe\"]),\n \"dllhost.exe\", dynamic([\"svchost.exe\", \"services.exe\"]),\n \"lsm.exe\", dynamic([\"wininit.exe\"]),\n \"svchost.exe\", dynamic([\"services.exe\", \"msmpeng.exe\"]),\n \"runtimebroker.exe\", dynamic([\"svchost.exe\"]),\n \"taskhostw.exe\", dynamic([\"svchost.exe\"]),\n \"userinit.exe\", dynamic([\"winlogon.exe\"])\n // Explorer can have a lot of parents in some environments\n //,\"explorer.exe\", dynamic([\"userinit.exe\"])\n];\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| extend ImageFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(FolderPath)).Filename))\n| extend ParentFile = tostring(tolower(parse_path(tostring(InitiatingProcessFolderPath)).Filename))\n| lookup kind=inner ProcessRelations on ImageFile\n| where not(set_has_element(ExpectedParent,ParentFile))\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [
"T1036.005"
],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"DefenseEvasion"
],
"techniques": [
"T1036"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.1",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}