Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
cloudbrothers.infoAzure Sentinel RepoToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeBack to homepage

Dev-0530 File Extension Rename

Back
Idd82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef
RulenameDev-0530 File Extension Rename
DescriptionDev-0530 actors are known to encrypt the contents of the victims device as well as renaming the file extensions. This query looks for the creation of files with .h0lyenc extension or presence of ransom note.
SeverityHigh
TacticsImpact
TechniquesT1486
Required data connectorsMicrosoftThreatProtection
KindScheduled
Query frequency1d
Query period1d
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0530_FileExtRename.yaml
Version1.1.1
Arm templated82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef.json
Deploy To Azure
union isfuzzy=true
    (DeviceFileEvents
    | where ActionType == "FileCreated"
    | where FileName endswith ".h0lyenc" or FolderPath == "C:\\FOR_DECRYPT.html"
    | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
        by
        AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain,
        DeviceName,
        Type,
        InitiatingProcessId,
        FileName,
        FolderPath,
        EventType = ActionType,
        Commandline = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
        InitiatingProcessFileName,
        InitiatingProcessSHA256,
        FileHashCustomEntity = SHA256,
        AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
    | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
    | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
    ),
    (imFileEvent
    | where EventType == "FileCreated"
    | where TargetFilePath endswith ".h0lyenc" or TargetFilePath == "C:\\FOR_DECRYPT.html"
    | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
        by
        ActorUsername,
        DvcHostname,
        DvcDomain,
        DvcId,
        Type,
        EventType,
        FileHashCustomEntity = TargetFileSHA256,
        Hash,
        TargetFilePath,
        Commandline = ActingProcessCommandLine,
        AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
    | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[0])
    | extend HostName = DvcHostname, HostNameDomain = DvcDomain
    | extend DeviceName = strcat(DvcHostname, ".", DvcDomain )
    )
query: |
  union isfuzzy=true
      (DeviceFileEvents
      | where ActionType == "FileCreated"
      | where FileName endswith ".h0lyenc" or FolderPath == "C:\\FOR_DECRYPT.html"
      | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
          by
          AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain,
          DeviceName,
          Type,
          InitiatingProcessId,
          FileName,
          FolderPath,
          EventType = ActionType,
          Commandline = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessSHA256,
          FileHashCustomEntity = SHA256,
          AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
      | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
      | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
      ),
      (imFileEvent
      | where EventType == "FileCreated"
      | where TargetFilePath endswith ".h0lyenc" or TargetFilePath == "C:\\FOR_DECRYPT.html"
      | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
          by
          ActorUsername,
          DvcHostname,
          DvcDomain,
          DvcId,
          Type,
          EventType,
          FileHashCustomEntity = TargetFileSHA256,
          Hash,
          TargetFilePath,
          Commandline = ActingProcessCommandLine,
          AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
      | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[0])
      | extend HostName = DvcHostname, HostNameDomain = DvcDomain
      | extend DeviceName = strcat(DvcHostname, ".", DvcDomain )
      )  
triggerThreshold: 0
relevantTechniques:
- T1486
name: Dev-0530 File Extension Rename
severity: High
queryPeriod: 1d
tags:
- Dev-0530
- Schema: ASIMFileEvent
  SchemaVersion: 0.1.0
description: |
    'Dev-0530 actors are known to encrypt the contents of the victims device as well as renaming the file extensions. This query looks for the creation of files with .h0lyenc extension or presence of ransom note.'
triggerOperator: gt
id: d82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: ActorUserName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AlgorithmCustomEntity
    identifier: Algorithm
  - columnName: FileHashCustomEntity
    identifier: Value
  entityType: FileHash
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceFileEvents
metadata:
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  source:
    kind: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
  support:
    tier: Community
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- Impact
queryFrequency: 1d
version: 1.1.1
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0530_FileExtRename.yaml
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "d82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Dev-0530 actors are known to encrypt the contents of the victims device as well as renaming the file extensions. This query looks for the creation of files with .h0lyenc extension or presence of ransom note.'\n",
        "displayName": "Dev-0530 File Extension Rename",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "ActorUserName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "FileHash",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AlgorithmCustomEntity",
                "identifier": "Algorithm"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "FileHashCustomEntity",
                "identifier": "Value"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0530_FileExtRename.yaml",
        "query": "union isfuzzy=true\n    (DeviceFileEvents\n    | where ActionType == \"FileCreated\"\n    | where FileName endswith \".h0lyenc\" or FolderPath == \"C:\\\\FOR_DECRYPT.html\"\n    | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)\n        by\n        AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain,\n        DeviceName,\n        Type,\n        InitiatingProcessId,\n        FileName,\n        FolderPath,\n        EventType = ActionType,\n        Commandline = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n        InitiatingProcessFileName,\n        InitiatingProcessSHA256,\n        FileHashCustomEntity = SHA256,\n        AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n    | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))\n    | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)\n    ),\n    (imFileEvent\n    | where EventType == \"FileCreated\"\n    | where TargetFilePath endswith \".h0lyenc\" or TargetFilePath == \"C:\\\\FOR_DECRYPT.html\"\n    | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)\n        by\n        ActorUsername,\n        DvcHostname,\n        DvcDomain,\n        DvcId,\n        Type,\n        EventType,\n        FileHashCustomEntity = TargetFileSHA256,\n        Hash,\n        TargetFilePath,\n        Commandline = ActingProcessCommandLine,\n        AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n    | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\\')[0])\n    | extend HostName = DvcHostname, HostNameDomain = DvcDomain\n    | extend DeviceName = strcat(DvcHostname, \".\", DvcDomain )\n    )\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Impact"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "Dev-0530",
          {
            "Schema": "ASIMFileEvent",
            "SchemaVersion": "0.1.0"
          }
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1486"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.1.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}