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Dev-0530 File Extension Rename

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Idd82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef
RulenameDev-0530 File Extension Rename
DescriptionDev-0530 actors are known to encrypt the contents of the victims device as well as renaming the file extensions. This query looks for the creation of files with .h0lyenc extension or presence of ransom note.
SeverityHigh
TacticsImpact
TechniquesT1486
Required data connectorsMicrosoftThreatProtection
KindScheduled
Query frequency1d
Query period1d
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0530_FileExtRename.yaml
Version1.1.1
Arm templated82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef.json
Deploy To Azure
union isfuzzy=true
    (DeviceFileEvents
    | where ActionType == "FileCreated"
    | where FileName endswith ".h0lyenc" or FolderPath == "C:\\FOR_DECRYPT.html"
    | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
        by
        AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain,
        DeviceName,
        Type,
        InitiatingProcessId,
        FileName,
        FolderPath,
        EventType = ActionType,
        Commandline = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
        InitiatingProcessFileName,
        InitiatingProcessSHA256,
        FileHashCustomEntity = SHA256,
        AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
    | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
    | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
    ),
    (imFileEvent
    | where EventType == "FileCreated"
    | where TargetFilePath endswith ".h0lyenc" or TargetFilePath == "C:\\FOR_DECRYPT.html"
    | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
        by
        ActorUsername,
        DvcHostname,
        DvcDomain,
        DvcId,
        Type,
        EventType,
        FileHashCustomEntity = TargetFileSHA256,
        Hash,
        TargetFilePath,
        Commandline = ActingProcessCommandLine,
        AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
    | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[0])
    | extend HostName = DvcHostname, HostNameDomain = DvcDomain
    | extend DeviceName = strcat(DvcHostname, ".", DvcDomain )
    )
id: d82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef
tactics:
- Impact
queryPeriod: 1d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0530_FileExtRename.yaml
metadata:
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
  source:
    kind: Community
  support:
    tier: Community
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
triggerThreshold: 0
name: Dev-0530 File Extension Rename
query: |
  union isfuzzy=true
      (DeviceFileEvents
      | where ActionType == "FileCreated"
      | where FileName endswith ".h0lyenc" or FolderPath == "C:\\FOR_DECRYPT.html"
      | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
          by
          AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain,
          DeviceName,
          Type,
          InitiatingProcessId,
          FileName,
          FolderPath,
          EventType = ActionType,
          Commandline = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessSHA256,
          FileHashCustomEntity = SHA256,
          AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
      | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
      | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
      ),
      (imFileEvent
      | where EventType == "FileCreated"
      | where TargetFilePath endswith ".h0lyenc" or TargetFilePath == "C:\\FOR_DECRYPT.html"
      | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
          by
          ActorUsername,
          DvcHostname,
          DvcDomain,
          DvcId,
          Type,
          EventType,
          FileHashCustomEntity = TargetFileSHA256,
          Hash,
          TargetFilePath,
          Commandline = ActingProcessCommandLine,
          AlgorithmCustomEntity = "SHA256"
      | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\')[0])
      | extend HostName = DvcHostname, HostNameDomain = DvcDomain
      | extend DeviceName = strcat(DvcHostname, ".", DvcDomain )
      )  
severity: High
triggerOperator: gt
kind: Scheduled
relevantTechniques:
- T1486
tags:
- Dev-0530
- SchemaVersion: 0.1.0
  Schema: ASIMFileEvent
queryFrequency: 1d
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceFileEvents
description: |
    'Dev-0530 actors are known to encrypt the contents of the victims device as well as renaming the file extensions. This query looks for the creation of files with .h0lyenc extension or presence of ransom note.'
version: 1.1.1
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: ActorUserName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: HostNameDomain
    identifier: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AlgorithmCustomEntity
    identifier: Algorithm
  - columnName: FileHashCustomEntity
    identifier: Value
  entityType: FileHash
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "d82eb796-d1eb-43c8-a813-325ce3417cef",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Dev-0530 actors are known to encrypt the contents of the victims device as well as renaming the file extensions. This query looks for the creation of files with .h0lyenc extension or presence of ransom note.'\n",
        "displayName": "Dev-0530 File Extension Rename",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "ActorUserName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "FileHash",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AlgorithmCustomEntity",
                "identifier": "Algorithm"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "FileHashCustomEntity",
                "identifier": "Value"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/Dev-0530_FileExtRename.yaml",
        "query": "union isfuzzy=true\n    (DeviceFileEvents\n    | where ActionType == \"FileCreated\"\n    | where FileName endswith \".h0lyenc\" or FolderPath == \"C:\\\\FOR_DECRYPT.html\"\n    | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)\n        by\n        AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain,\n        DeviceName,\n        Type,\n        InitiatingProcessId,\n        FileName,\n        FolderPath,\n        EventType = ActionType,\n        Commandline = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n        InitiatingProcessFileName,\n        InitiatingProcessSHA256,\n        FileHashCustomEntity = SHA256,\n        AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n    | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))\n    | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)\n    ),\n    (imFileEvent\n    | where EventType == \"FileCreated\"\n    | where TargetFilePath endswith \".h0lyenc\" or TargetFilePath == \"C:\\\\FOR_DECRYPT.html\"\n    | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)\n        by\n        ActorUsername,\n        DvcHostname,\n        DvcDomain,\n        DvcId,\n        Type,\n        EventType,\n        FileHashCustomEntity = TargetFileSHA256,\n        Hash,\n        TargetFilePath,\n        Commandline = ActingProcessCommandLine,\n        AlgorithmCustomEntity = \"SHA256\"\n    | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, @'\\')[0])\n    | extend HostName = DvcHostname, HostNameDomain = DvcDomain\n    | extend DeviceName = strcat(DvcHostname, \".\", DvcDomain )\n    )\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Impact"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "Dev-0530",
          {
            "Schema": "ASIMFileEvent",
            "SchemaVersion": "0.1.0"
          }
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1486"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.1.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}