Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32exe execution of vbscript

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Id	d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0
Rulename	Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32.exe execution of vbscript
Description	This query idenifies when rundll32.exe executes a specific set of inline VBScript commands References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1547
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsForwardedEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/MidnightBlizzard_SuspiciousRundll32Exec.yaml
Version	1.1.6
Arm template	d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0.json

KQL

(union isfuzzy=true 
(SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe' 
| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount = Account, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, Process, ProcessId, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
),
(WindowsEvent
| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has 'rundll32.exe' and EventData has_any ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe' 
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| extend SubjectAccount =  strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,"\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)  
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName), SubjectUserSid = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserSid), Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex

YAML

kind: Scheduled
id: d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: SubjectAccount
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: SubjectUserName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: SubjectDomainName
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Sid
    columnName: SubjectUserSid
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: HostNameDomain
  entityType: Host
name: Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32.exe execution of vbscript
severity: Medium
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- Persistence
query: |
  (union isfuzzy=true 
  (SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe' 
  | where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount = Account, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, Process, ProcessId, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
  ),
  (WindowsEvent
  | where EventID == 4688 and EventData has 'rundll32.exe' and EventData has_any ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
  | extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
  | extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe' 
  | extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
  | where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
  | extend SubjectAccount =  strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,"\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)
  | extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)  
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName), SubjectUserSid = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserSid), Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
  )
  )
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | project-away DomainIndex  
triggerThreshold: 0
tags:
- Midnight Blizzard
description: |
  'This query idenifies when rundll32.exe executes a specific set of inline VBScript commands
   References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'  
metadata:
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Threat Intelligence
  support:
    tier: Community
  source:
    kind: Community
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
relevantTechniques:
- T1547
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/MidnightBlizzard_SuspiciousRundll32Exec.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
- connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
- connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvents
- connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
  dataTypes:
  - WindowsEvent
version: 1.1.6

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query idenifies when rundll32.exe executes a specific set of inline VBScript commands\n References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'\n",
        "displayName": "Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32.exe execution of vbscript",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectAccount",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectUserName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectDomainName",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SubjectUserSid",
                "identifier": "Sid"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostNameDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/MidnightBlizzard_SuspiciousRundll32Exec.yaml",
        "query": "(union isfuzzy=true \n(SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe' \n| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount = Account, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, Process, ProcessId, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId\n),\n(WindowsEvent\n| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has 'rundll32.exe' and EventData has_any ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')\n| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe' \n| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)\n| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')\n| extend SubjectAccount =  strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,\"\\\\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)\n| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)  \n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName), SubjectUserSid = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserSid), Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId\n)\n)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| project-away DomainIndex\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "Midnight Blizzard"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1547"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.1.6",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}