Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32exe execution of vbscript
| Id | d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0 |
| Rulename | Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32.exe execution of vbscript |
| Description | This query idenifies when rundll32.exe executes a specific set of inline VBScript commands References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | Persistence |
| Techniques | T1547 |
| Required data connectors | SecurityEvents WindowsForwardedEvents WindowsSecurityEvents |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1d |
| Query period | 1d |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/MidnightBlizzard_SuspiciousRundll32Exec.yaml |
| Version | 1.1.6 |
| Arm template | d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0.json |
(union isfuzzy=true
(SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe'
| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount = Account, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, Process, ProcessId, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
),
(WindowsEvent
| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has 'rundll32.exe' and EventData has_any ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe'
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| extend SubjectAccount = strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,"\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName), SubjectUserSid = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserSid), Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex
relevantTechniques:
- T1547
name: Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32.exe execution of vbscript
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvents
connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- WindowsEvent
connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: SubjectAccount
- identifier: Name
columnName: SubjectUserName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: SubjectDomainName
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Sid
columnName: SubjectUserSid
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
entityType: Host
triggerThreshold: 0
id: d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0
tactics:
- Persistence
version: 1.1.6
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/MidnightBlizzard_SuspiciousRundll32Exec.yaml
queryPeriod: 1d
kind: Scheduled
tags:
- Midnight Blizzard
metadata:
categories:
domains:
- Security - Threat Intelligence
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
support:
tier: Community
source:
kind: Community
queryFrequency: 1d
severity: Medium
description: |
'This query idenifies when rundll32.exe executes a specific set of inline VBScript commands
References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'
query: |
(union isfuzzy=true
(SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe'
| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount = Account, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, Process, ProcessId, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
),
(WindowsEvent
| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has 'rundll32.exe' and EventData has_any ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe'
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')
| extend SubjectAccount = strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,"\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName), SubjectUserSid = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserSid), Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId
)
)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex
triggerOperator: gt
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "d82e1987-4356-4a7b-bc5e-064f29b143c0",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This query idenifies when rundll32.exe executes a specific set of inline VBScript commands\n References: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/'\n",
"displayName": "Midnight Blizzard - suspicious rundll32.exe execution of vbscript",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SubjectAccount",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "SubjectUserName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "SubjectDomainName",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SubjectUserSid",
"identifier": "Sid"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Computer",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostName",
"identifier": "HostName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostNameDomain",
"identifier": "DnsDomain"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/MidnightBlizzard_SuspiciousRundll32Exec.yaml",
"query": "(union isfuzzy=true \n(SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4688\n| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe' \n| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount = Account, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid, Process, ProcessId, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId\n),\n(WindowsEvent\n| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has 'rundll32.exe' and EventData has_any ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')\n| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)\n| extend Process=tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\\\')[-1])\n| where Process =~ 'rundll32.exe' \n| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)\n| where CommandLine has_all ('Execute','RegRead','window.close')\n| extend SubjectAccount = strcat(EventData.SubjectDomainName,\"\\\\\", EventData.SubjectUserName)\n| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName) \n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectAccount, SubjectUserName = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName), SubjectDomainName = tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName), SubjectUserSid = tostring(EventData.SubjectUserSid), Process, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName, _ResourceId\n)\n)\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| project-away DomainIndex\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "Medium",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Persistence"
],
"tags": [
"Midnight Blizzard"
],
"techniques": [
"T1547"
],
"templateVersion": "1.1.6",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}