Addition of a Temporary Access Pass to a Privileged Account
| Id | d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13 |
| Rulename | Addition of a Temporary Access Pass to a Privileged Account |
| Description | Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account. A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello. A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account. Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately. Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts |
| Severity | High |
| Tactics | Persistence |
| Techniques | T1078.004 |
| Required data connectors | AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1d |
| Query period | 1d |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/AdditionofaTemporaryAccessPasstoaPrivilegedAccount.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.4 |
| Arm template | d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13.json |
let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
| where AssignedRoles contains "admin"
| summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
AuditLogs
| where OperationName =~ "Admin registered security info"
| where ResultReason =~ "Admin registered temporary access pass method for user"
| extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
| where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
| extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/AdditionofaTemporaryAccessPasstoaPrivilegedAccount.yaml
metadata:
categories:
domains:
- Security - Threat Protection
- Identity
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
source:
kind: Community
support:
tier: Community
id: d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13
query: |
let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
| summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
| where AssignedRoles contains "admin"
| summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
AuditLogs
| where OperationName =~ "Admin registered security info"
| where ResultReason =~ "Admin registered temporary access pass method for user"
| extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
| where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
| extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
tags:
- AADSecOpsGuide
description: |
'Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account.
A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
name: Addition of a Temporary Access Pass to a Privileged Account
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: TargetUserPrincipalName
- identifier: Name
columnName: TargetAccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: TargetAccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
- identifier: Name
columnName: InitiatingAccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: AadUserId
columnName: TargetAadUserId
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: AadUserId
columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: InitiatingIPAddress
triggerThreshold: 0
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AuditLogs
connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
- dataTypes:
- IdentityInfo
connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- Persistence
triggerOperator: gt
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account.\n A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.\n A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.\n Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.\n Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'\n",
"displayName": "Addition of a Temporary Access Pass to a Privileged Account",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "TargetUserPrincipalName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "TargetAccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "TargetAccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingUserPrincipalName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "TargetAadUserId",
"identifier": "AadUserId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingAadUserId",
"identifier": "AadUserId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingIPAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/AdditionofaTemporaryAccessPasstoaPrivilegedAccount.yaml",
"query": "let admin_users = (IdentityInfo\n | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN\n | where AssignedRoles contains \"admin\"\n | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));\n AuditLogs\n | where OperationName =~ \"Admin registered security info\"\n | where ResultReason =~ \"Admin registered temporary access pass method for user\"\n | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)\n | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)\n | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)\n | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)\n | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)\n | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[1])\n | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[1])\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "High",
"subTechniques": [
"T1078.004"
],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Persistence"
],
"tags": [
"AADSecOpsGuide"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.4",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}