Addition of a Temporary Access Pass to a Privileged Account

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Id	d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13
Rulename	Addition of a Temporary Access Pass to a Privileged Account
Description	Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account. A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello. A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account. Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately. Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
Severity	High
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1078.004
Required data connectors	AzureActiveDirectory BehaviorAnalytics
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/AdditionofaTemporaryAccessPasstoaPrivilegedAccount.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13.json

KQL

let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
  | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
  | where AssignedRoles contains "admin"
  | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
  AuditLogs
  | where OperationName =~ "Admin registered security info"
  | where ResultReason =~ "Admin registered temporary access pass method for user"
  | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
  | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
  | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
  | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
  | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
  | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])

YAML

version: 1.0.4
severity: High
tags:
- AADSecOpsGuide
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
triggerOperator: gt
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
  connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
- dataTypes:
  - IdentityInfo
  connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: TargetUserPrincipalName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: TargetAccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: TargetAccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: InitiatingAccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: TargetAadUserId
    identifier: AadUserId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
    identifier: AadUserId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingIPAddress
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
metadata:
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Threat Protection
    - Identity
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  support:
    tier: Community
  source:
    kind: Community
id: d7feb859-f03e-4e8d-8b21-617be0213b13
description: |
  'Detects when a Temporary Access Pass (TAP) is created for a Privileged Account.
    A Temporary Access Pass is a time-limited passcode issued by an admin that satisfies strong authentication requirements and can be used to onboard other authentication methods, including Passwordless ones such as Microsoft Authenticator or even Windows Hello.
    A threat actor could use a TAP to register a new authentication method to maintain persistance to an account.
    Review any TAP creations to ensure they were used legitimately.
    Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'  
name: Addition of a Temporary Access Pass to a Privileged Account
query: |
  let admin_users = (IdentityInfo
    | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountUPN
    | where AssignedRoles contains "admin"
    | summarize by tolower(AccountUPN));
    AuditLogs
    | where OperationName =~ "Admin registered security info"
    | where ResultReason =~ "Admin registered temporary access pass method for user"
    | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName)
    | where tolower(TargetUserPrincipalName) in (admin_users)
    | extend TargetAadUserId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
    | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
    | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
    | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
    | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
    | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])  
queryPeriod: 1d
tactics:
- Persistence
kind: Scheduled
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/AuditLogs/AdditionofaTemporaryAccessPasstoaPrivilegedAccount.yaml

ARM