Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
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DCOM Lateral Movement

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Idd58035ff-0bac-4c61-a7f4-f58939ff9764
RulenameDCOM Lateral Movement
DescriptionThis detection looks for cases of close-time proximity between incoming network traffic on RPC/TCP, followed by the creation of a DCOM object, followed by the creation of a child process of the DCOM object.

The query first identifies incoming network traffic over RPC/TCP, followed by the creation of a DCOM object (process) within 2 seconds, followed by the creation of a child process of this DCOM object.
SeverityMedium
TacticsLateralMovement
TechniquesT1021.003
Required data connectorsMicrosoftThreatProtection
KindScheduled
Query frequency1h
Query period1h
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/DCOMLateralMovement.yaml
Version1.0.0
Arm templated58035ff-0bac-4c61-a7f4-f58939ff9764.json
Deploy To Azure
let allowListedExecs = dynamic(["TiWorker.exe", "dllhost.exe", "backgroundTaskHost.exe", "mobsync.exe", "WmiPrvSE.exe", "RuntimeBroker.exe", "smartscreen.exe", "SppExtComObj.Exe", "usocoreworker.exe", "browser_broker.exe", "ssoncom.exe"]);
let rpcNetwEvents = materialize(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "rpcss" and LocalPort == 135
| where LocalIP !~ RemoteIP and ActionType != "ListeningConnectionCreated"
| project TimestampNetwEvent=bin(Timestamp, 5s),TimestampNetwEventExact=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RPCHostID=InitiatingProcessId, RPCHostFileName=InitiatingProcessFileName, LocalIP, RemoteIP);
let dcomProcEvents = materialize (DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "dcomlaunch"
| project TimestampProcEvent=bin(Timestamp, 5s),TimestampProcEventExact=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, DCOMHostPID=InitiatingProcessId, DCOMHostFileName=InitiatingProcessFileName, DCOMPID=ProcessId, DCOMFileName=FileName, DCOMCmdLine=ProcessCommandLine);
let lastBootTime = materialize(DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "services.exe"
| summarize LastBootTime=max(Timestamp) by DeviceId);
let RemoteDcomProcs = materialize(rpcNetwEvents
| join kind=inner dcomProcEvents on DeviceId 
| join kind=leftouter lastBootTime on DeviceId
| where TimestampProcEvent > LastBootTime+5m // Ignore first 5 min after boot.
// Avoiding < 2 since if the time between netw and proc creation is negative, they can't be related. Network event must come first. 
| where datetime_diff("second", TimestampProcEventExact, TimestampNetwEventExact) between (0 .. 2) 
// Allow-listing some usual suspects which create lot of noise. This is dangerous though...huge gap for bypass. 
| where DCOMFileName  !in~ (allowListedExecs));
RemoteDcomProcs
| join kind=inner hint.strategy=broadcast (
    DeviceProcessEvents 
    | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessFileName in ((RemoteDcomProcs | project DCOMFileName))) 
on $left.DCOMHostPID == $right.InitiatingProcessParentId, DeviceId, $left.DCOMPID == $right.InitiatingProcessId
| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ DCOMFileName 
// Allow-listing the magic of Defender.
| where FileName !in~ ("csc.exe") 
| summarize make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by TimestampNetwEventExact, TimestampProcEventExact, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId, LocalIP, RemoteIP, LastBootTime, DCOMCmdLine
query: |
  let allowListedExecs = dynamic(["TiWorker.exe", "dllhost.exe", "backgroundTaskHost.exe", "mobsync.exe", "WmiPrvSE.exe", "RuntimeBroker.exe", "smartscreen.exe", "SppExtComObj.Exe", "usocoreworker.exe", "browser_broker.exe", "ssoncom.exe"]);
  let rpcNetwEvents = materialize(DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "rpcss" and LocalPort == 135
  | where LocalIP !~ RemoteIP and ActionType != "ListeningConnectionCreated"
  | project TimestampNetwEvent=bin(Timestamp, 5s),TimestampNetwEventExact=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, RPCHostID=InitiatingProcessId, RPCHostFileName=InitiatingProcessFileName, LocalIP, RemoteIP);
  let dcomProcEvents = materialize (DeviceProcessEvents
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "dcomlaunch"
  | project TimestampProcEvent=bin(Timestamp, 5s),TimestampProcEventExact=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, DCOMHostPID=InitiatingProcessId, DCOMHostFileName=InitiatingProcessFileName, DCOMPID=ProcessId, DCOMFileName=FileName, DCOMCmdLine=ProcessCommandLine);
  let lastBootTime = materialize(DeviceProcessEvents
  | where FileName =~ "services.exe"
  | summarize LastBootTime=max(Timestamp) by DeviceId);
  let RemoteDcomProcs = materialize(rpcNetwEvents
  | join kind=inner dcomProcEvents on DeviceId 
  | join kind=leftouter lastBootTime on DeviceId
  | where TimestampProcEvent > LastBootTime+5m // Ignore first 5 min after boot.
  // Avoiding < 2 since if the time between netw and proc creation is negative, they can't be related. Network event must come first. 
  | where datetime_diff("second", TimestampProcEventExact, TimestampNetwEventExact) between (0 .. 2) 
  // Allow-listing some usual suspects which create lot of noise. This is dangerous though...huge gap for bypass. 
  | where DCOMFileName  !in~ (allowListedExecs));
  RemoteDcomProcs
  | join kind=inner hint.strategy=broadcast (
      DeviceProcessEvents 
      | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessFileName in ((RemoteDcomProcs | project DCOMFileName))) 
  on $left.DCOMHostPID == $right.InitiatingProcessParentId, DeviceId, $left.DCOMPID == $right.InitiatingProcessId
  | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName =~ "svchost.exe" and InitiatingProcessFileName =~ DCOMFileName 
  // Allow-listing the magic of Defender.
  | where FileName !in~ ("csc.exe") 
  | summarize make_set(ProcessCommandLine) by TimestampNetwEventExact, TimestampProcEventExact, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessId, LocalIP, RemoteIP, LastBootTime, DCOMCmdLine  
description: |
  This detection looks for cases of close-time proximity between incoming network traffic on RPC/TCP, followed by the creation of a DCOM object, followed by the creation of a child process of the DCOM object. 
  The query first identifies incoming network traffic over RPC/TCP, followed by the creation of a DCOM object (process) within 2 seconds, followed by the creation of a child process of this DCOM object.   
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
queryFrequency: 1h
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: RemoteIP
    identifier: Address
- entityType: Process
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DCOMCmdLine
    identifier: CommandLine
name: DCOM Lateral Movement
status: Available
id: d58035ff-0bac-4c61-a7f4-f58939ff9764
tactics:
- LateralMovement
kind: Scheduled
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
  - DeviceNetworkEvents
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/DCOMLateralMovement.yaml
version: 1.0.0
severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1021.003