Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling
Id | d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002 |
Rulename | Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling |
Description | This query detects remote desktop authentication attempts with a localhost source address, which can indicate a tunneled login. Ref: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | CommandAndControl |
Techniques | T1572 |
Required data connectors | SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1h |
Query period | 1h |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/PotentialRemoteDesktopTunneling.yaml |
Version | 1.0.4 |
Arm template | d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002.json |
SecurityEvent
| where EventID in (4624,4625) and LogonType in (10) and IpAddress in ("::1","127.0.0.1")
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, TargetUserName, TargetLogonId, LogonType, IpAddress
| extend Name=tostring(split(TargetUserName, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(TargetUserName, "@")[1])
| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')
severity: Medium
id: d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
relevantTechniques:
- T1572
triggerOperator: gt
status: Available
tactics:
- CommandAndControl
kind: Scheduled
description: |
'This query detects remote desktop authentication attempts with a localhost source address, which can indicate a tunneled login.
Ref: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling'
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/PotentialRemoteDesktopTunneling.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: Name
identifier: Name
- columnName: UPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- columnName: Computer
identifier: FullName
- columnName: HostName
identifier: HostName
- columnName: DnsDomain
identifier: DnsDomain
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: IpAddress
identifier: Address
query: |
SecurityEvent
| where EventID in (4624,4625) and LogonType in (10) and IpAddress in ("::1","127.0.0.1")
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, TargetUserName, TargetLogonId, LogonType, IpAddress
| extend Name=tostring(split(TargetUserName, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(TargetUserName, "@")[1])
| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')
version: 1.0.4
name: Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling
triggerThreshold: 0
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This query detects remote desktop authentication attempts with a localhost source address, which can indicate a tunneled login.\nRef: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling'\n",
"displayName": "Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Name",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "UPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Computer",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostName",
"identifier": "HostName"
},
{
"columnName": "DnsDomain",
"identifier": "DnsDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IpAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/PotentialRemoteDesktopTunneling.yaml",
"query": "SecurityEvent\n | where EventID in (4624,4625) and LogonType in (10) and IpAddress in (\"::1\",\"127.0.0.1\")\n | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, TargetUserName, TargetLogonId, LogonType, IpAddress\n | extend Name=tostring(split(TargetUserName, \"@\")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(TargetUserName, \"@\")[1])\n | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"CommandAndControl"
],
"techniques": [
"T1572"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.4",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}