Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling

SecurityEvent
   | where EventID in (4624,4625) and LogonType in (10) and IpAddress in ("::1","127.0.0.1")
   | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, TargetUserName, TargetLogonId, LogonType, IpAddress
   | extend Name=tostring(split(TargetUserName, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(TargetUserName, "@")[1])
   | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')

relevantTechniques:
- T1572
name: Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: Name
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IpAddress
  entityType: IP
triggerThreshold: 0
id: d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002
tactics:
- CommandAndControl
version: 1.0.4
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/PotentialRemoteDesktopTunneling.yaml
queryPeriod: 1h
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: Medium
status: Available
description: |
  'This query detects remote desktop authentication attempts with a localhost source address, which can indicate a tunneled login.
  Ref: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling'  
query: |
  SecurityEvent
     | where EventID in (4624,4625) and LogonType in (10) and IpAddress in ("::1","127.0.0.1")
     | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, TargetUserName, TargetLogonId, LogonType, IpAddress
     | extend Name=tostring(split(TargetUserName, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(TargetUserName, "@")[1])
     | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')  
triggerOperator: gt

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "d2e8fd50-8d66-11ec-b909-0242ac120002",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query detects remote desktop authentication attempts with a localhost source address, which can indicate a tunneled login.\nRef: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling'\n",
        "displayName": "Potential Remote Desktop Tunneling",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Name",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "UPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "DnsDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/PotentialRemoteDesktopTunneling.yaml",
        "query": "SecurityEvent\n   | where EventID in (4624,4625) and LogonType in (10) and IpAddress in (\"::1\",\"127.0.0.1\")\n   | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, TargetUserName, TargetLogonId, LogonType, IpAddress\n   | extend Name=tostring(split(TargetUserName, \"@\")[0]), UPNSuffix=tostring(split(TargetUserName, \"@\")[1])\n   | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CommandAndControl"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1572"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.4",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}