Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
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Privilege escalation via CRUD Lambda policy

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Idd0953d50-3dc1-4fa3-80fa-4d3e973a0959
RulenamePrivilege escalation via CRUD Lambda policy
DescriptionDetected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy by CRUD Lambda policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.
SeverityMedium
TacticsPrivilegeEscalation
TechniquesT1484
Required data connectorsAWS
KindScheduled
Query frequency1d
Query period1d
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaCRUDLambdaPolicy.yaml
Version1.0.0
Arm templated0953d50-3dc1-4fa3-80fa-4d3e973a0959.json
Deploy To Azure
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
| mvexpand Statement
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "lambda:Create" and Action contains "lambda:Get" and Action contains "lambda:Update" and Action contains "kms:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
| extend UserIdentityUserName = iff(isnotempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserIdentityUserName, tostring(split(UserIdentityArn,'/')[-1]))
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = SourceIpAddress, AccountCustomEntity = UserIdentityUserName
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaCRUDLambdaPolicy.yaml
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: AccountCustomEntity
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IPCustomEntity
  entityType: IP
kind: Scheduled
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "lambda:Create" and Action contains "lambda:Get" and Action contains "lambda:Update" and Action contains "kms:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
  | extend UserIdentityUserName = iff(isnotempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserIdentityUserName, tostring(split(UserIdentityArn,'/')[-1]))
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = SourceIpAddress, AccountCustomEntity = UserIdentityUserName  
triggerOperator: gt
version: 1.0.0
queryPeriod: 1d
name: Privilege escalation via CRUD Lambda policy
severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
queryFrequency: 1d
id: d0953d50-3dc1-4fa3-80fa-4d3e973a0959
status: Available
description: |
    'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy by CRUD Lambda policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/d0953d50-3dc1-4fa3-80fa-4d3e973a0959')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/d0953d50-3dc1-4fa3-80fa-4d3e973a0959')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "d0953d50-3dc1-4fa3-80fa-4d3e973a0959",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy by CRUD Lambda policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'\n",
        "displayName": "Privilege escalation via CRUD Lambda policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountCustomEntity",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "IPCustomEntity",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaCRUDLambdaPolicy.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName in (\"PutUserPolicy\",\"PutRolePolicy\",\"PutGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)\n| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement\n| mvexpand Statement\n| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)\n| extend Action = tostring(Action)\n| where Effect =~ \"Allow\" and (Action contains \"lambda:Create\" and Action contains \"lambda:Get\" and Action contains \"lambda:Update\" and Action contains \"kms:Delete\") and Resource == \"*\" and Condition == \"\"\n| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName\n| extend UserIdentityUserName = iff(isnotempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserIdentityUserName, tostring(split(UserIdentityArn,'/')[-1]))\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPCustomEntity = SourceIpAddress, AccountCustomEntity = UserIdentityUserName\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.0",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}