Analytic rule catalog
Remote Desktop Protocol - SharpRDP
Back
| Id | cc46e76c-0d04-40b0-9c8b-929aa40513e7 |
| Rulename | Remote Desktop Protocol - SharpRDP |
| Description | This detection monitors for the behavior that SharpRDP exhibits on the target system. The most relevant is leveraging taskmgr.exe to gain elevated execution, which means that taskmgr.exe is creating unexpected child processes. |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | LateralMovement |
| Techniques | T1021.001 |
| Required data connectors | MicrosoftThreatProtection |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1h |
| Query period | 1h |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic%20Rules/RemoteDesktopProtocol.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.0 |
| Arm template | cc46e76c-0d04-40b0-9c8b-929aa40513e7.json |
let executions = DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "taskmgr" and AccountName !contains "_ladm" // Include your LAPS /RID500 admin naming convention here.
// Add the below filter to look for stock SharpRDP behavior. However, with minorchanges to the stock version of SharpRDP the filter below can be bypassed.
//| where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("/1","/2","/3","/4"))
| where not(FolderPath =~ @"c:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "-u -p")
| where not(FolderPath =~ @"c:\windows\system32\mmc.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains @"C:\WINDOWS\System32\services.msc")
| where not(FolderPath =~ @"c:\windows\system32\resmon.exe");
executions
| join kind=leftsemi (DeviceLogonEvents
| where LogonType in ('Unlock', 'RemoteInteractive') and not (LogonType == 'Unlock' and RemoteIP == '127.0.0.1') and RemoteIP != "" and ActionType == "LogonSuccess") on DeviceId, LogonId
name: Remote Desktop Protocol - SharpRDP
triggerOperator: gt
query: |
let executions = DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "taskmgr" and AccountName !contains "_ladm" // Include your LAPS /RID500 admin naming convention here.
// Add the below filter to look for stock SharpRDP behavior. However, with minorchanges to the stock version of SharpRDP the filter below can be bypassed.
//| where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("/1","/2","/3","/4"))
| where not(FolderPath =~ @"c:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains "-u -p")
| where not(FolderPath =~ @"c:\windows\system32\mmc.exe" and ProcessCommandLine contains @"C:\WINDOWS\System32\services.msc")
| where not(FolderPath =~ @"c:\windows\system32\resmon.exe");
executions
| join kind=leftsemi (DeviceLogonEvents
| where LogonType in ('Unlock', 'RemoteInteractive') and not (LogonType == 'Unlock' and RemoteIP == '127.0.0.1') and RemoteIP != "" and ActionType == "LogonSuccess") on DeviceId, LogonId
queryFrequency: 1h
description: |
This detection monitors for the behavior that SharpRDP exhibits on the target system. The most relevant is leveraging taskmgr.exe to gain elevated execution, which means that taskmgr.exe is creating unexpected child processes.
id: cc46e76c-0d04-40b0-9c8b-929aa40513e7
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled
status: Available
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- DeviceProcessEvents
- DeviceLogonEvents
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic%20Rules/RemoteDesktopProtocol.yaml
relevantTechniques:
- T1021.001
tactics:
- LateralMovement
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: DeviceName
entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Sid
columnName: AccountSid
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: AccountDomain
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: CommandLine
columnName: ProcessCommandLine
entityType: Process
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/cc46e76c-0d04-40b0-9c8b-929aa40513e7')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/cc46e76c-0d04-40b0-9c8b-929aa40513e7')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "cc46e76c-0d04-40b0-9c8b-929aa40513e7",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "This detection monitors for the behavior that SharpRDP exhibits on the target system. The most relevant is leveraging taskmgr.exe to gain elevated execution, which means that taskmgr.exe is creating unexpected child processes.\n",
"displayName": "Remote Desktop Protocol - SharpRDP",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "DeviceName",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountSid",
"identifier": "Sid"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Process",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "ProcessCommandLine",
"identifier": "CommandLine"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic%20Rules/RemoteDesktopProtocol.yaml",
"query": "let executions = DeviceProcessEvents\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName contains \"taskmgr\" and AccountName !contains \"_ladm\" // Include your LAPS /RID500 admin naming convention here. \n// Add the below filter to look for stock SharpRDP behavior. However, with minorchanges to the stock version of SharpRDP the filter below can be bypassed.\n//| where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (\"/1\",\"/2\",\"/3\",\"/4\"))\n| where not(FolderPath =~ @\"c:\\Windows\\system32\\WerFault.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine contains \"-u -p\")\n| where not(FolderPath =~ @\"c:\\windows\\system32\\mmc.exe\" and ProcessCommandLine contains @\"C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\services.msc\")\n| where not(FolderPath =~ @\"c:\\windows\\system32\\resmon.exe\");\nexecutions\n| join kind=leftsemi (DeviceLogonEvents\n| where LogonType in ('Unlock', 'RemoteInteractive') and not (LogonType == 'Unlock' and RemoteIP == '127.0.0.1') and RemoteIP != \"\" and ActionType == \"LogonSuccess\") on DeviceId, LogonId\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [
"T1021.001"
],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"LateralMovement"
],
"techniques": [
"T1021"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.0",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}