Registry Persistence via AppCert DLL Modification
| Id | c61ad0ac-ad68-4ebb-b41a-74296d3e0044 |
| Rulename | Registry Persistence via AppCert DLL Modification |
| Description | Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec. Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009/ |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | Persistence |
| Techniques | T1546.009 |
| Required data connectors | SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1h |
| Query period | 1h |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/RegistryPersistenceViaAppCertDLLModification.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.3 |
| Arm template | c61ad0ac-ad68-4ebb-b41a-74296d3e0044.json |
Event
| where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID in (13)
| parse EventData with * 'TargetObject">' TargetObject "<" * 'Details">' Details "<" *
| where TargetObject has ("\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDLLs\\")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, TargetObject, Details
| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')
id: c61ad0ac-ad68-4ebb-b41a-74296d3e0044
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
name: Registry Persistence via AppCert DLL Modification
version: 1.0.3
query: |
Event
| where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID in (13)
| parse EventData with * 'TargetObject">' TargetObject "<" * 'Details">' Details "<" *
| where TargetObject has ("\\Control\\Session Manager\\AppCertDLLs\\")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, TargetObject, Details
| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Key
columnName: TargetObject
entityType: RegistryKey
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: DnsDomain
entityType: Host
relevantTechniques:
- T1546.009
tactics:
- Persistence
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
queryFrequency: 1h
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
triggerOperator: gt
status: Available
description: |
'Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes.
Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\ are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLoginW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, or WinExec.
Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/009/'
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/RegistryPersistenceViaAppCertDLLModification.yaml