Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
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Account Elevated to New Role

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Idc1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730
RulenameAccount Elevated to New Role
DescriptionDetects an account that is elevated to a new role where that account has not had that role in the last 14 days.

Role elevations are a key mechanism for gaining permissions, monitoring which users have which roles, and for anomalies in those roles is useful for finding suspicious activity.

Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts
SeverityMedium
TacticsPersistence
TechniquesT1078.004
Required data connectorsAzureActiveDirectory
KindScheduled
Query frequency1d
Query period14d
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/AccountElevatedtoNewRole.yaml
Version1.1.2
Arm templatec1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730.json
Deploy To Azure
let auditList =
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where OperationName =~ "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)"
| where Result =~ "success"
| extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)
| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)
| extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ "Member", displayName2, displayName)
;
let lookbackList = auditList
| where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
;
let recentList = auditList
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
;
let newlyElevated = recentList
| join kind = leftanti lookbackList on ElevatedRole, TargetUserPrincipalName
;
newlyElevated | project Id, AdditionalDetails
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array AdditionalDetails
| evaluate bag_unpack(AdditionalDetails)
| extend key = column_ifexists("key", ''), value = column_ifexists("value", '')
| evaluate pivot(key, make_set(value))
| extend ipaddr = todynamic(column_ifexists("ipaddr", ""))
| mv-expand ipaddr
| project Id, InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(ipaddr)
| join kind=rightouter newlyElevated on Id
| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
| extend InitiatingIPAddress = iff(isnotempty(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), InitiatingIPAddress)
| extend ElevatedBy = iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName), InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName)
| extend ElevatedUser = TargetUserPrincipalName
| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
| project-reorder ElevatedUser, ElevatedRole, ResultReason, ElevatedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingIPAddress, TargetUserPrincipalName
description: |
  'Detects an account that is elevated to a new role where that account has not had that role in the last 14 days.
    Role elevations are a key mechanism for gaining permissions, monitoring which users have which roles, and for anomalies in those roles is useful for finding suspicious activity.
    Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'  
tags:
- AADSecOpsGuide
queryPeriod: 14d
name: Account Elevated to New Role
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Persistence
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatingAccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: AadUserId
    columnName: InitiatingAadUserId
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: TargetUserPrincipalName
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: TargetAccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: TargetAccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: InitiatingIPAddress
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
id: c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/AccountElevatedtoNewRole.yaml
version: 1.1.2
query: |
  let auditList =
  AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
  | where OperationName =~ "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)"
  | where Result =~ "success"
  | extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)
  | extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
  | extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)
  | extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ "Member", displayName2, displayName)
  ;
  let lookbackList = auditList
  | where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
  ;
  let recentList = auditList
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
  ;
  let newlyElevated = recentList
  | join kind = leftanti lookbackList on ElevatedRole, TargetUserPrincipalName
  ;
  newlyElevated | project Id, AdditionalDetails
  | mv-expand bagexpansion=array AdditionalDetails
  | evaluate bag_unpack(AdditionalDetails)
  | extend key = column_ifexists("key", ''), value = column_ifexists("value", '')
  | evaluate pivot(key, make_set(value))
  | extend ipaddr = todynamic(column_ifexists("ipaddr", ""))
  | mv-expand ipaddr
  | project Id, InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(ipaddr)
  | join kind=rightouter newlyElevated on Id
  | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
  | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
  | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
  | extend InitiatingIPAddress = iff(isnotempty(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), InitiatingIPAddress)
  | extend ElevatedBy = iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName), InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName)
  | extend ElevatedUser = TargetUserPrincipalName
  | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  | extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  | project-reorder ElevatedUser, ElevatedRole, ResultReason, ElevatedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingIPAddress, TargetUserPrincipalName  
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
  dataTypes:
  - AuditLogs
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detects an account that is elevated to a new role where that account has not had that role in the last 14 days.\n  Role elevations are a key mechanism for gaining permissions, monitoring which users have which roles, and for anomalies in those roles is useful for finding suspicious activity.\n  Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'\n",
        "displayName": "Account Elevated to New Role",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingUserPrincipalName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingAccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingAadUserId",
                "identifier": "AadUserId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "TargetUserPrincipalName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "TargetAccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "TargetAccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingIPAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/AccountElevatedtoNewRole.yaml",
        "query": "let auditList =\nAuditLogs\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)\n| where OperationName =~ \"Add member to role completed (PIM activation)\"\n| where Result =~ \"success\"\n| extend TargetUserPrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)\n| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n| extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)\n| extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ \"Member\", displayName2, displayName)\n;\nlet lookbackList = auditList\n| where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))\n;\nlet recentList = auditList\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n;\nlet newlyElevated = recentList\n| join kind = leftanti lookbackList on ElevatedRole, TargetUserPrincipalName\n;\nnewlyElevated | project Id, AdditionalDetails\n| mv-expand bagexpansion=array AdditionalDetails\n| evaluate bag_unpack(AdditionalDetails)\n| extend key = column_ifexists(\"key\", ''), value = column_ifexists(\"value\", '')\n| evaluate pivot(key, make_set(value))\n| extend ipaddr = todynamic(column_ifexists(\"ipaddr\", \"\"))\n| mv-expand ipaddr\n| project Id, InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(ipaddr)\n| join kind=rightouter newlyElevated on Id\n| extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)\n| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)\n| extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)\n| extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)\n| extend InitiatingIPAddress = iff(isnotempty(tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)), tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), InitiatingIPAddress)\n| extend ElevatedBy = iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName), InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName)\n| extend ElevatedUser = TargetUserPrincipalName\n| extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[1])\n| extend TargetAccountName = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[0]), TargetAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(TargetUserPrincipalName, \"@\")[1])\n| project-reorder ElevatedUser, ElevatedRole, ResultReason, ElevatedBy, InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAadUserId, InitiatingIPAddress, TargetUserPrincipalName\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P14D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1078.004"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "AADSecOpsGuide"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.1.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}