Account Elevated to New Role
Id | c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730 |
Rulename | Account Elevated to New Role |
Description | Detects an account that is elevated to a new role where that account has not had that role in the last 14 days. Role elevations are a key mechanism for gaining permissions, monitoring which users have which roles, and for anomalies in those roles is useful for finding suspicious activity. Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | Persistence |
Techniques | T1078.004 |
Required data connectors | AzureActiveDirectory |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 14d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/AccountElevatedtoNewRole.yaml |
Version | 1.0.1 |
Arm template | c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730.json |
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
| where OperationName =~ "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)"
| where Result =~ "success"
| extend ElevatedUser = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)
| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)
| extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ "Member", displayName2, displayName)
| join kind = rightanti (AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where OperationName =~ "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)"
| where Result =~ "success"
| extend ElevatedUser = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)
| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)
| extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ "Member", displayName2, displayName)
| extend ElevatedBy = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user)).userPrincipalName)) on ElevatedRole, ElevatedUser
| project-reorder ElevatedUser, ElevatedRole, ResultReason,ElevatedBy
queryPeriod: 14d
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: ElevatedUser
identifier: FullName
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: ElevatedBy
identifier: FullName
entityType: Account
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/AccountElevatedtoNewRole.yaml
tactics:
- Persistence
query: |
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
| where OperationName =~ "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)"
| where Result =~ "success"
| extend ElevatedUser = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)
| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)
| extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ "Member", displayName2, displayName)
| join kind = rightanti (AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where OperationName =~ "Add member to role completed (PIM activation)"
| where Result =~ "success"
| extend ElevatedUser = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)
| extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)
| extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ "Member", displayName2, displayName)
| extend ElevatedBy = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user)).userPrincipalName)) on ElevatedRole, ElevatedUser
| project-reorder ElevatedUser, ElevatedRole, ResultReason,ElevatedBy
description: |
'Detects an account that is elevated to a new role where that account has not had that role in the last 14 days.
Role elevations are a key mechanism for gaining permissions, monitoring which users have which roles, and for anomalies in those roles is useful for finding suspicious activity.
Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
queryFrequency: 1d
id: c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730
tags:
- AADSecOpsGuide
relevantTechniques:
- T1078.004
severity: Medium
version: 1.0.1
triggerThreshold: 0
kind: Scheduled
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
dataTypes:
- AuditLogs
name: Account Elevated to New Role
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730')]",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730')]",
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"apiVersion": "2022-11-01-preview",
"properties": {
"displayName": "Account Elevated to New Role",
"description": "'Detects an account that is elevated to a new role where that account has not had that role in the last 14 days.\n Role elevations are a key mechanism for gaining permissions, monitoring which users have which roles, and for anomalies in those roles is useful for finding suspicious activity.\n Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'\n",
"severity": "Medium",
"enabled": true,
"query": "AuditLogs\n | where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))\n | where OperationName =~ \"Add member to role completed (PIM activation)\"\n | where Result =~ \"success\"\n | extend ElevatedUser = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)\n | extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n | extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)\n | extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ \"Member\", displayName2, displayName)\n | join kind = rightanti (AuditLogs\n | where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)\n | where OperationName =~ \"Add member to role completed (PIM activation)\"\n | where Result =~ \"success\"\n | extend ElevatedUser = tostring(TargetResources[2].userPrincipalName)\n | extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)\n | extend displayName2 = tostring(TargetResources[3].displayName)\n | extend ElevatedRole = iif(displayName =~ \"Member\", displayName2, displayName)\n | extend ElevatedBy = tostring(parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user)).userPrincipalName)) on ElevatedRole, ElevatedUser\n | project-reorder ElevatedUser, ElevatedRole, ResultReason,ElevatedBy\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P14D",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0,
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Persistence"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078.004"
],
"alertRuleTemplateName": "c1c66f0b-5531-4a3e-a619-9d2f770ef730",
"customDetails": null,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"identifier": "FullName",
"columnName": "ElevatedUser"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"identifier": "FullName",
"columnName": "ElevatedBy"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Business Email Compromise - Financial Fraud/Analytic Rules/AccountElevatedtoNewRole.yaml",
"templateVersion": "1.0.1",
"tags": [
"AADSecOpsGuide"
]
}
}
]
}