SAML update identity provider

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Id	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
Rulename	SAML update identity provider
Description	Attackers could update the SAML provider in order to create unauthorized but valid tokens and represent them to services that trust SAML tokens from the environment. These tokens can then be used to access resources. More about this API at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateSAMLProvider.html
Severity	High
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1078
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

YAML

queryFrequency: 1d
tactics:
- Persistence
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
id: bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
name: SAML update identity provider
triggerOperator: gt
status: Available
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.1
description: |
    'Attackers could update the SAML provider in order to create unauthorized but valid tokens and represent them to services that trust SAML tokens from the environment. These tokens can then be used to access resources. More about this API at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateSAMLProvider.html '
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
queryPeriod: 1d
severity: High
triggerThreshold: 0
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

ARM