AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider

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Id	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
Rulename	AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider
Description	Detects updates to AWS SAML identity provider configuration. Unauthorized changes can allow adversaries to issue trusted federation tokens and gain persistent or privileged access.
Severity	High
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1078
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
Version	1.0.2
Arm template	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

YAML

status: Available
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")  
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
tactics:
- Persistence
triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected UpdateSAMLProvider from {{SourceIpAddress}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
  alertDisplayNameFormat: AWS SAML identity provider updated by {{AccountName}}
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
customDetails:
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
  EventName: EventName
  EventSource: EventSource
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
description: |
  Detects updates to AWS SAML identity provider configuration. Unauthorized changes can allow adversaries to
  issue trusted federation tokens and gain persistent or privileged access.  
name: AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled
id: bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
severity: High

ARM