AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider | Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules

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Id	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
Rulename	AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider
Description	Detects updates to AWS SAML identity provider configuration. Unauthorized changes can allow adversaries to issue trusted federation tokens and gain persistent or privileged access.
Severity	High
Tactics	Persistence
Techniques	T1078
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
Version	1.0.2
Arm template	bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

YAML

name: AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Persistence
queryFrequency: 1d
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected UpdateSAMLProvider from {{SourceIpAddress}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
  alertDisplayNameFormat: AWS SAML identity provider updated by {{AccountName}}
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
customDetails:
  EventSource: EventSource
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
  EventName: EventName
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
id: bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
kind: Scheduled
description: |
  Detects updates to AWS SAML identity provider configuration. Unauthorized changes can allow adversaries to
  issue trusted federation tokens and gain persistent or privileged access.
severity: High
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
status: Available
version: 1.0.2
queryPeriod: 1d

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected UpdateSAMLProvider from {{SourceIpAddress}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS SAML identity provider updated by {{AccountName}}"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496",
        "customDetails": {
          "AWSRegion": "AWSRegion",
          "EventName": "EventName",
          "EventSource": "EventSource",
          "UserIdentityArn": "UserIdentityArn"
        },
        "description": "Detects updates to AWS SAML identity provider configuration. Unauthorized changes can allow adversaries to\nissue trusted federation tokens and gain persistent or privileged access.\n",
        "displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - SAML update identity provider",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName == \"UpdateSAMLProvider\" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}