SAML update identity provider

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName == "UpdateSAMLProvider" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
description: |
    'Attackers could update the SAML provider in order to create unauthorized but valid tokens and represent them to services that trust SAML tokens from the environment. These tokens can then be used to access resources. More about this API at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateSAMLProvider.html '
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
name: SAML update identity provider
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Persistence
version: 1.0.1
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
triggerOperator: gt
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
id: bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496
status: Available
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "bce1dcba-4948-414d-8838-6385afb9d496",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Attackers could update the SAML provider in order to create unauthorized but valid tokens and represent them to services that trust SAML tokens from the environment. These tokens can then be used to access resources. More about this API at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateSAMLProvider.html '\n",
        "displayName": "SAML update identity provider",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_SAMLUpdateIdentity.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName == \"UpdateSAMLProvider\" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Persistence"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}