Non Domain Controller Active Directory Replication

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Id	b9d2eebc-5dcb-4888-8165-900db44443ab
Rulename	Non Domain Controller Active Directory Replication
Description	This query detects potential attempts by non-computer accounts (non domain controllers) to retrieve/synchronize an active directory object leveraging directory replication services (DRS). A Domain Controller (computer account) would usually be performing these actions in a domain environment. Another detection rule can be created to cover domain controllers accounts doing at rare times. A domain user with privileged permissions to use directory replication services is rare.
Severity	High
Tactics	CredentialAccess
Techniques	T1003
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	7d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/NonDCActiveDirectoryReplication.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	b9d2eebc-5dcb-4888-8165-900db44443ab.json

KQL

// Enter a reference list of hostnames for your DC servers
//let DCServersList = dynamic (["DC01.simulandlabs.com","DC02.simulandlabs.com"]);
SecurityEvent
//| where Computer in (DCServersList)
| where EventID == 4662 and ObjectServer == 'DS'
| where AccountType != 'Machine'
| where Properties has '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' //DS-Replication-Get-Changes
    or Properties has '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' //DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
    or Properties has '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c' //DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set
| project TimeGenerated, Account, Activity, Properties, SubjectLogonId, Computer
| join kind=leftouter
(
    SecurityEvent
    //| where Computer in (DCServersList)
    | where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 3
    | where AccountType != 'Machine'
    | project TargetLogonId, IpAddress
)
on $left.SubjectLogonId == $right.TargetLogonId
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IpAddress
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])

YAML

queryFrequency: 1d
version: 1.0.4
queryPeriod: 7d
id: b9d2eebc-5dcb-4888-8165-900db44443ab
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
query: |
  // Enter a reference list of hostnames for your DC servers
  //let DCServersList = dynamic (["DC01.simulandlabs.com","DC02.simulandlabs.com"]);
  SecurityEvent
  //| where Computer in (DCServersList)
  | where EventID == 4662 and ObjectServer == 'DS'
  | where AccountType != 'Machine'
  | where Properties has '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' //DS-Replication-Get-Changes
      or Properties has '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2' //DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
      or Properties has '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c' //DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set
  | project TimeGenerated, Account, Activity, Properties, SubjectLogonId, Computer
  | join kind=leftouter
  (
      SecurityEvent
      //| where Computer in (DCServersList)
      | where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 3
      | where AccountType != 'Machine'
      | project TargetLogonId, IpAddress
  )
  on $left.SubjectLogonId == $right.TargetLogonId
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IpAddress
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])  
severity: High
kind: Scheduled
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
- connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Account
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: AccountNTDomain
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: HostNameDomain
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: IpAddress
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Windows Security Events/Analytic Rules/NonDCActiveDirectoryReplication.yaml
name: Non Domain Controller Active Directory Replication
description: |
  'This query detects potential attempts by non-computer accounts (non domain controllers) to retrieve/synchronize an active directory object leveraging directory replication services (DRS).
  A Domain Controller (computer account) would usually be performing these actions in a domain environment. Another detection rule can be created to cover domain controllers accounts doing at rare times.
  A domain user with privileged permissions to use directory replication services is rare.'  
status: Available
relevantTechniques:
- T1003

ARM