GCP Audit Logs - Data Access Logging Exemption Added for Principal
| Id | b7da45ce-fcc8-43c7-a37c-c08454579d26 |
| Rulename | GCP Audit Logs - Data Access Logging Exemption Added for Principal |
| Description | Detects when a principal (user or service account) is exempted from GCP data access audit logging. This is a critical security event as it reduces visibility into privileged operations and may indicate an attempt to hide malicious activity. Adversaries may exempt their accounts from audit logging to evade detection while performing reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. This rule monitors SetIamPolicy operations that add audit log exemptions for ADMIN_READ, DATA_READ, or DATA_WRITE log types. |
| Severity | High |
| Tactics | DefenseEvasion PrivilegeEscalation |
| Techniques | T1562.008 T1078.004 |
| Required data connectors | GCPAuditLogsDefinition |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1h |
| Query period | 1h |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Google Cloud Platform Audit Logs/Analytic Rules/GCPDataAccessLoggingExemption.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.0 |
| Arm template | b7da45ce-fcc8-43c7-a37c-c08454579d26.json |
GCPAuditLogs
| where ServiceName == "cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com"
| where MethodName == "SetIamPolicy"
| where GCPResourceType == "project" and Severity == "NOTICE"
| where isnotempty(ServiceData)
| extend ServiceDataJson = parse_json(ServiceData)
| extend PolicyDelta = ServiceDataJson.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas
| where isnotempty(PolicyDelta)
| mv-expand ConfigDelta = PolicyDelta
| where ConfigDelta.action == "ADD"
| extend LogType = tostring(ConfigDelta.logType)
| where LogType in ("ADMIN_READ", "DATA_READ", "DATA_WRITE")
| extend
ExemptedMember = tostring(ConfigDelta.exemptedMember),
ServiceAffected = tostring(ConfigDelta.service),
RequestMetadataJson = parse_json(RequestMetadata),
AuthInfoJson = parse_json(AuthenticationInfo)
| where isnotempty(ExemptedMember)
| extend
CallerIpAddress = tostring(RequestMetadataJson.callerIp),
UserAgent = tostring(RequestMetadataJson.callerSuppliedUserAgent),
AuthEmail = tostring(AuthInfoJson.principalEmail),
ExemptedAccountName = tostring(split(ExemptedMember, ":")[1])
| summarize
ExemptedLogTypes = make_set(LogType, 10),
ExemptedServices = make_set(ServiceAffected, 50),
FirstExemption = min(TimeGenerated),
LastExemption = max(TimeGenerated)
by PrincipalEmail, ProjectId, GCPResourceName, ExemptedMember,
CallerIpAddress, UserAgent, LogName, ExemptedAccountName, MethodName, ServiceName, AuthEmail
| extend
AccountName = tostring(split(PrincipalEmail, "@")[0]),
AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(PrincipalEmail, "@")[1])
| project TimeGenerated = LastExemption,
PrincipalEmail,
ProjectId,
ResourceName = GCPResourceName,
ExemptedMember,
ExemptedAccountName,
ExemptedLogTypes,
ExemptedServices,
FirstExemption,
LastExemption,
CallerIpAddress,
UserAgent,
AuthEmail,
MethodName,
ServiceName,
LogName,
AccountName,
AccountUPNSuffix
tags:
- Cloud Security
- Audit Logging
- Defense Evasion
queryFrequency: 1h
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.0
relevantTechniques:
- T1562.008
- T1078.004
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: GCP Data Access Logging Exemption Added for {{ExemptedAccountName}} by {{PrincipalEmail}} in Service {{ExemptedServices}}
alertDescriptionFormat: |-
Principal {{ExemptedAccountName}} added as exception from Data Access logging in project {{ProjectId}} for Service {{ExemptedServices}}.
This action reduces audit visibility and may indicate an attempt to evade detection. Verify this change was authorized and investigate any suspicious activity performed by the exempted principal.
triggerOperator: gt
customDetails:
ExemptedServices: ExemptedServices
ExemptedLogTypes: ExemptedLogTypes
ProjectId: ProjectId
UserAgent: UserAgent
ExemptedAccountName: ExemptedAccountName
ExemptedMember: ExemptedMember
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: GCPAuditLogsDefinition
dataTypes:
- GCPAuditLogs
id: b7da45ce-fcc8-43c7-a37c-c08454579d26
name: GCP Audit Logs - Data Access Logging Exemption Added for Principal
query: |
GCPAuditLogs
| where ServiceName == "cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com"
| where MethodName == "SetIamPolicy"
| where GCPResourceType == "project" and Severity == "NOTICE"
| where isnotempty(ServiceData)
| extend ServiceDataJson = parse_json(ServiceData)
| extend PolicyDelta = ServiceDataJson.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas
| where isnotempty(PolicyDelta)
| mv-expand ConfigDelta = PolicyDelta
| where ConfigDelta.action == "ADD"
| extend LogType = tostring(ConfigDelta.logType)
| where LogType in ("ADMIN_READ", "DATA_READ", "DATA_WRITE")
| extend
ExemptedMember = tostring(ConfigDelta.exemptedMember),
ServiceAffected = tostring(ConfigDelta.service),
RequestMetadataJson = parse_json(RequestMetadata),
AuthInfoJson = parse_json(AuthenticationInfo)
| where isnotempty(ExemptedMember)
| extend
CallerIpAddress = tostring(RequestMetadataJson.callerIp),
UserAgent = tostring(RequestMetadataJson.callerSuppliedUserAgent),
AuthEmail = tostring(AuthInfoJson.principalEmail),
ExemptedAccountName = tostring(split(ExemptedMember, ":")[1])
| summarize
ExemptedLogTypes = make_set(LogType, 10),
ExemptedServices = make_set(ServiceAffected, 50),
FirstExemption = min(TimeGenerated),
LastExemption = max(TimeGenerated)
by PrincipalEmail, ProjectId, GCPResourceName, ExemptedMember,
CallerIpAddress, UserAgent, LogName, ExemptedAccountName, MethodName, ServiceName, AuthEmail
| extend
AccountName = tostring(split(PrincipalEmail, "@")[0]),
AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(PrincipalEmail, "@")[1])
| project TimeGenerated = LastExemption,
PrincipalEmail,
ProjectId,
ResourceName = GCPResourceName,
ExemptedMember,
ExemptedAccountName,
ExemptedLogTypes,
ExemptedServices,
FirstExemption,
LastExemption,
CallerIpAddress,
UserAgent,
AuthEmail,
MethodName,
ServiceName,
LogName,
AccountName,
AccountUPNSuffix
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerThreshold: 0
description: |
'Detects when a principal (user or service account) is exempted from GCP data access audit logging.
This is a critical security event as it reduces visibility into privileged operations and may indicate an attempt to hide malicious activity.
Adversaries may exempt their accounts from audit logging to evade detection while performing reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration.
This rule monitors SetIamPolicy operations that add audit log exemptions for ADMIN_READ, DATA_READ, or DATA_WRITE log types.'
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: PrincipalEmail
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: CallerIpAddress
- entityType: CloudApplication
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: ProjectId
- identifier: InstanceName
columnName: ResourceName
severity: High
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Google Cloud Platform Audit Logs/Analytic Rules/GCPDataAccessLoggingExemption.yaml