GCP Audit Logs - Data Access Logging Exemption Added for Principal
| Id | b7da45ce-fcc8-43c7-a37c-c08454579d26 |
| Rulename | GCP Audit Logs - Data Access Logging Exemption Added for Principal |
| Description | Detects when a principal (user or service account) is exempted from GCP data access audit logging. This is a critical security event as it reduces visibility into privileged operations and may indicate an attempt to hide malicious activity. Adversaries may exempt their accounts from audit logging to evade detection while performing reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. This rule monitors SetIamPolicy operations that add audit log exemptions for ADMIN_READ, DATA_READ, or DATA_WRITE log types. |
| Severity | High |
| Tactics | DefenseEvasion PrivilegeEscalation |
| Techniques | T1562.008 T1078.004 |
| Required data connectors | GCPAuditLogsDefinition |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1h |
| Query period | 1h |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Google Cloud Platform Audit Logs/Analytic Rules/GCPDataAccessLoggingExemption.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.0 |
| Arm template | b7da45ce-fcc8-43c7-a37c-c08454579d26.json |
GCPAuditLogs
| where ServiceName == "cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com"
| where MethodName == "SetIamPolicy"
| where GCPResourceType == "project" and Severity == "NOTICE"
| where isnotempty(ServiceData)
| extend ServiceDataJson = parse_json(ServiceData)
| extend PolicyDelta = ServiceDataJson.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas
| where isnotempty(PolicyDelta)
| mv-expand ConfigDelta = PolicyDelta
| where ConfigDelta.action == "ADD"
| extend LogType = tostring(ConfigDelta.logType)
| where LogType in ("ADMIN_READ", "DATA_READ", "DATA_WRITE")
| extend
ExemptedMember = tostring(ConfigDelta.exemptedMember),
ServiceAffected = tostring(ConfigDelta.service),
RequestMetadataJson = parse_json(RequestMetadata),
AuthInfoJson = parse_json(AuthenticationInfo)
| where isnotempty(ExemptedMember)
| extend
CallerIpAddress = tostring(RequestMetadataJson.callerIp),
UserAgent = tostring(RequestMetadataJson.callerSuppliedUserAgent),
AuthEmail = tostring(AuthInfoJson.principalEmail),
ExemptedAccountName = tostring(split(ExemptedMember, ":")[1])
| summarize
ExemptedLogTypes = make_set(LogType, 10),
ExemptedServices = make_set(ServiceAffected, 50),
FirstExemption = min(TimeGenerated),
LastExemption = max(TimeGenerated)
by PrincipalEmail, ProjectId, GCPResourceName, ExemptedMember,
CallerIpAddress, UserAgent, LogName, ExemptedAccountName, MethodName, ServiceName, AuthEmail
| extend
AccountName = tostring(split(PrincipalEmail, "@")[0]),
AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(PrincipalEmail, "@")[1])
| project TimeGenerated = LastExemption,
PrincipalEmail,
ProjectId,
ResourceName = GCPResourceName,
ExemptedMember,
ExemptedAccountName,
ExemptedLogTypes,
ExemptedServices,
FirstExemption,
LastExemption,
CallerIpAddress,
UserAgent,
AuthEmail,
MethodName,
ServiceName,
LogName,
AccountName,
AccountUPNSuffix
name: GCP Audit Logs - Data Access Logging Exemption Added for Principal
query: |
GCPAuditLogs
| where ServiceName == "cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com"
| where MethodName == "SetIamPolicy"
| where GCPResourceType == "project" and Severity == "NOTICE"
| where isnotempty(ServiceData)
| extend ServiceDataJson = parse_json(ServiceData)
| extend PolicyDelta = ServiceDataJson.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas
| where isnotempty(PolicyDelta)
| mv-expand ConfigDelta = PolicyDelta
| where ConfigDelta.action == "ADD"
| extend LogType = tostring(ConfigDelta.logType)
| where LogType in ("ADMIN_READ", "DATA_READ", "DATA_WRITE")
| extend
ExemptedMember = tostring(ConfigDelta.exemptedMember),
ServiceAffected = tostring(ConfigDelta.service),
RequestMetadataJson = parse_json(RequestMetadata),
AuthInfoJson = parse_json(AuthenticationInfo)
| where isnotempty(ExemptedMember)
| extend
CallerIpAddress = tostring(RequestMetadataJson.callerIp),
UserAgent = tostring(RequestMetadataJson.callerSuppliedUserAgent),
AuthEmail = tostring(AuthInfoJson.principalEmail),
ExemptedAccountName = tostring(split(ExemptedMember, ":")[1])
| summarize
ExemptedLogTypes = make_set(LogType, 10),
ExemptedServices = make_set(ServiceAffected, 50),
FirstExemption = min(TimeGenerated),
LastExemption = max(TimeGenerated)
by PrincipalEmail, ProjectId, GCPResourceName, ExemptedMember,
CallerIpAddress, UserAgent, LogName, ExemptedAccountName, MethodName, ServiceName, AuthEmail
| extend
AccountName = tostring(split(PrincipalEmail, "@")[0]),
AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(PrincipalEmail, "@")[1])
| project TimeGenerated = LastExemption,
PrincipalEmail,
ProjectId,
ResourceName = GCPResourceName,
ExemptedMember,
ExemptedAccountName,
ExemptedLogTypes,
ExemptedServices,
FirstExemption,
LastExemption,
CallerIpAddress,
UserAgent,
AuthEmail,
MethodName,
ServiceName,
LogName,
AccountName,
AccountUPNSuffix
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: PrincipalEmail
identifier: FullName
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: CallerIpAddress
identifier: Address
- entityType: CloudApplication
fieldMappings:
- columnName: ProjectId
identifier: Name
- columnName: ResourceName
identifier: InstanceName
queryPeriod: 1h
version: 1.0.0
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
triggerOperator: gt
kind: Scheduled
triggerThreshold: 0
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Google Cloud Platform Audit Logs/Analytic Rules/GCPDataAccessLoggingExemption.yaml
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDescriptionFormat: |-
Principal {{ExemptedAccountName}} added as exception from Data Access logging in project {{ProjectId}} for Service {{ExemptedServices}}.
This action reduces audit visibility and may indicate an attempt to evade detection. Verify this change was authorized and investigate any suspicious activity performed by the exempted principal.
alertDisplayNameFormat: GCP Data Access Logging Exemption Added for {{ExemptedAccountName}} by {{PrincipalEmail}} in Service {{ExemptedServices}}
relevantTechniques:
- T1562.008
- T1078.004
id: b7da45ce-fcc8-43c7-a37c-c08454579d26
tags:
- Cloud Security
- Audit Logging
- Defense Evasion
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: GCPAuditLogsDefinition
dataTypes:
- GCPAuditLogs
status: Available
description: |
'Detects when a principal (user or service account) is exempted from GCP data access audit logging.
This is a critical security event as it reduces visibility into privileged operations and may indicate an attempt to hide malicious activity.
Adversaries may exempt their accounts from audit logging to evade detection while performing reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration.
This rule monitors SetIamPolicy operations that add audit log exemptions for ADMIN_READ, DATA_READ, or DATA_WRITE log types.'
customDetails:
ExemptedMember: ExemptedMember
ExemptedServices: ExemptedServices
ExemptedLogTypes: ExemptedLogTypes
UserAgent: UserAgent
ProjectId: ProjectId
ExemptedAccountName: ExemptedAccountName
queryFrequency: 1h