Suspicious AWS console logins by credential access alerts

SecurityAlert 
// Filtering alerts based on Microsoft product names
  | where ProductName in ("Microsoft 365 Defender", "Azure Active Directory", "Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection", "Microsoft Cloud App Security","Azure Active Directory Identity Protection", "Microsoft Defender ATP")
// Narrowing down alerts to specific tactics
  | where Tactics in("CredentialAccess", "InitialAccess")
// Focusing on high-severity alerts
  | where AlertSeverity == "High"
// Parsing and extending the 'Entities' column as JSON objects
  | extend Entities = parse_json(Entities) 
// Exploring IP entities within the alert entities
  | mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
      ( 
      where Entity.Type == 'ip' 
      | extend EntityIp = tostring(Entity.Address) 
      ) 
// Exploring account entities within the alert entities
  | mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
      ( 
      where Entity.Type == 'account' 
      | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(Entity.AadUserId)
      )
// Filtering out alerts with missing IP or account information
  | where isnotempty(EntityIp) and isnotempty(AccountObjectId)
// Summarizing relevant fields for further analysis
  | summarize 
      by 
      AlertName,
      ProductName,
      ProviderName,
      AlertSeverity,
      EntityIp,
      Tactics,
      Techniques,
      AlertTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min),
      AccountObjectId,
      AlertTimeGenerated=TimeGenerated
// Joining with IdentityInfo to obtain additional account details
  | join kind=inner (
      IdentityInfo
      | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
      | distinct AccountObjectId, AccountUPN=tolower(AccountUPN)
      )
      on AccountObjectId 
      |extend Name = tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[0]), UPNSuffix =tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[1])
// Joining with AWSCloudTrail data to correlate AWS console logins
  | join kind=inner (
      AWSCloudTrail
      | where EventName == "ConsoleLogin"
      | extend CTUPN= tolower(tostring(tolower(split(UserIdentityArn, "/", 2)[0])))
      | extend ActionType= tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)  
      | where ActionType == "Success"
      | extend AWSTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min)
      | project
          EventName,
          EventSource,
          EventTypeName,
          RecipientAccountId,
          ResponseElements,
          SessionMfaAuthenticated,
          SourceIpAddress,
          TimeGenerated,
          UserAgent,
          UserIdentityArn,
          UserIdentityType,
          CTUPN,
          AWSTime,
          UserIdentityUserName
      )
      on $left.EntityIp == $right.SourceIpAddress 
// Filtering login event after the Alert generation time
  | where AlertTimeGenerated >= AWSTime
// Calculating the time difference between alert generation and AWS login
  | extend timediff = datetime_diff('minute', AlertTimeGenerated, TimeGenerated) 
// Filtering alerts with a time difference of up to 60 minutes
  | where timediff between ((-60)..(60))

triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Multi%20Cloud%20Attack%20Coverage%20Essentials%20-%20Resource%20Abuse/Analytic%20Rules/SuspiciousAWSConsolLoginByCredentialAceessAlerts.yaml
triggerThreshold: 0
query: |
  SecurityAlert 
  // Filtering alerts based on Microsoft product names
    | where ProductName in ("Microsoft 365 Defender", "Azure Active Directory", "Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection", "Microsoft Cloud App Security","Azure Active Directory Identity Protection", "Microsoft Defender ATP")
  // Narrowing down alerts to specific tactics
    | where Tactics in("CredentialAccess", "InitialAccess")
  // Focusing on high-severity alerts
    | where AlertSeverity == "High"
  // Parsing and extending the 'Entities' column as JSON objects
    | extend Entities = parse_json(Entities) 
  // Exploring IP entities within the alert entities
    | mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
        ( 
        where Entity.Type == 'ip' 
        | extend EntityIp = tostring(Entity.Address) 
        ) 
  // Exploring account entities within the alert entities
    | mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
        ( 
        where Entity.Type == 'account' 
        | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(Entity.AadUserId)
        )
  // Filtering out alerts with missing IP or account information
    | where isnotempty(EntityIp) and isnotempty(AccountObjectId)
  // Summarizing relevant fields for further analysis
    | summarize 
        by 
        AlertName,
        ProductName,
        ProviderName,
        AlertSeverity,
        EntityIp,
        Tactics,
        Techniques,
        AlertTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min),
        AccountObjectId,
        AlertTimeGenerated=TimeGenerated
  // Joining with IdentityInfo to obtain additional account details
    | join kind=inner (
        IdentityInfo
        | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
        | distinct AccountObjectId, AccountUPN=tolower(AccountUPN)
        )
        on AccountObjectId 
        |extend Name = tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[0]), UPNSuffix =tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[1])
  // Joining with AWSCloudTrail data to correlate AWS console logins
    | join kind=inner (
        AWSCloudTrail
        | where EventName == "ConsoleLogin"
        | extend CTUPN= tolower(tostring(tolower(split(UserIdentityArn, "/", 2)[0])))
        | extend ActionType= tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)  
        | where ActionType == "Success"
        | extend AWSTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min)
        | project
            EventName,
            EventSource,
            EventTypeName,
            RecipientAccountId,
            ResponseElements,
            SessionMfaAuthenticated,
            SourceIpAddress,
            TimeGenerated,
            UserAgent,
            UserIdentityArn,
            UserIdentityType,
            CTUPN,
            AWSTime,
            UserIdentityUserName
        )
        on $left.EntityIp == $right.SourceIpAddress 
  // Filtering login event after the Alert generation time
    | where AlertTimeGenerated >= AWSTime
  // Calculating the time difference between alert generation and AWS login
    | extend timediff = datetime_diff('minute', AlertTimeGenerated, TimeGenerated) 
  // Filtering alerts with a time difference of up to 60 minutes
    | where timediff between ((-60)..(60))
kind: Scheduled
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
version: 1.0.1
tactics:
- InitialAccess
- CredentialAccess
id: b51fe620-62ad-4ed2-9d40-5c97c0a8231f
queryPeriod: 1d
queryFrequency: 1d
severity: Medium
name: Suspicious AWS console logins by credential access alerts
customDetails:
  ComonIp: SourceIpAddress
  AzureUserUPN: AccountUPN
  AWSUSerUPN: CTUPN
  UserAgent: UserAgent
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: OfficeATP
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityAlert
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
- connectorId: MicrosoftDefenderAdvancedThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityAlert
- connectorId: AzureActiveDirectoryIdentityProtection
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityAlert (IPC)
- connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
  dataTypes:
  - IdentityInfo
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityAlert
description: |
  'This query aims to detect instances of successful AWS console logins that align with high-severity credential access or Initial Access alerts generated by Defender Products.
   Specifically, it focuses on scenarios where the successful login takes place within a 60-minute timeframe of the high-severity alert. The login is considered relevant if it originates from an IP address associated with potential attackers.'
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: AccountUPN
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: Name
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/b51fe620-62ad-4ed2-9d40-5c97c0a8231f')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/b51fe620-62ad-4ed2-9d40-5c97c0a8231f')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "b51fe620-62ad-4ed2-9d40-5c97c0a8231f",
        "customDetails": {
          "AWSUSerUPN": "CTUPN",
          "AzureUserUPN": "AccountUPN",
          "ComonIp": "SourceIpAddress",
          "UserAgent": "UserAgent"
        },
        "description": "'This query aims to detect instances of successful AWS console logins that align with high-severity credential access or Initial Access alerts generated by Defender Products.\n Specifically, it focuses on scenarios where the successful login takes place within a 60-minute timeframe of the high-severity alert. The login is considered relevant if it originates from an IP address associated with potential attackers.'\n",
        "displayName": "Suspicious AWS console logins by credential access alerts",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPN",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "Name",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "UPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Multi%20Cloud%20Attack%20Coverage%20Essentials%20-%20Resource%20Abuse/Analytic%20Rules/SuspiciousAWSConsolLoginByCredentialAceessAlerts.yaml",
        "query": "SecurityAlert \n// Filtering alerts based on Microsoft product names\n  | where ProductName in (\"Microsoft 365 Defender\", \"Azure Active Directory\", \"Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection\", \"Microsoft Cloud App Security\",\"Azure Active Directory Identity Protection\", \"Microsoft Defender ATP\")\n// Narrowing down alerts to specific tactics\n  | where Tactics in(\"CredentialAccess\", \"InitialAccess\")\n// Focusing on high-severity alerts\n  | where AlertSeverity == \"High\"\n// Parsing and extending the 'Entities' column as JSON objects\n  | extend Entities = parse_json(Entities) \n// Exploring IP entities within the alert entities\n  | mv-apply Entity = Entities on \n      ( \n      where Entity.Type == 'ip' \n      | extend EntityIp = tostring(Entity.Address) \n      ) \n// Exploring account entities within the alert entities\n  | mv-apply Entity = Entities on \n      ( \n      where Entity.Type == 'account' \n      | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(Entity.AadUserId)\n      )\n// Filtering out alerts with missing IP or account information\n  | where isnotempty(EntityIp) and isnotempty(AccountObjectId)\n// Summarizing relevant fields for further analysis\n  | summarize \n      by \n      AlertName,\n      ProductName,\n      ProviderName,\n      AlertSeverity,\n      EntityIp,\n      Tactics,\n      Techniques,\n      AlertTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min),\n      AccountObjectId,\n      AlertTimeGenerated=TimeGenerated\n// Joining with IdentityInfo to obtain additional account details\n  | join kind=inner (\n      IdentityInfo\n      | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)\n      | distinct AccountObjectId, AccountUPN=tolower(AccountUPN)\n      )\n      on AccountObjectId \n      |extend Name = tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[0]), UPNSuffix =tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[1])\n// Joining with AWSCloudTrail data to correlate AWS console logins\n  | join kind=inner (\n      AWSCloudTrail\n      | where EventName == \"ConsoleLogin\"\n      | extend CTUPN= tolower(tostring(tolower(split(UserIdentityArn, \"/\", 2)[0])))\n      | extend ActionType= tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)  \n      | where ActionType == \"Success\"\n      | extend AWSTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min)\n      | project\n          EventName,\n          EventSource,\n          EventTypeName,\n          RecipientAccountId,\n          ResponseElements,\n          SessionMfaAuthenticated,\n          SourceIpAddress,\n          TimeGenerated,\n          UserAgent,\n          UserIdentityArn,\n          UserIdentityType,\n          CTUPN,\n          AWSTime,\n          UserIdentityUserName\n      )\n      on $left.EntityIp == $right.SourceIpAddress \n// Filtering login event after the Alert generation time\n  | where AlertTimeGenerated >= AWSTime\n// Calculating the time difference between alert generation and AWS login\n  | extend timediff = datetime_diff('minute', AlertTimeGenerated, TimeGenerated) \n// Filtering alerts with a time difference of up to 60 minutes\n  | where timediff between ((-60)..(60))\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CredentialAccess",
          "InitialAccess"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1078"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}