Suspicious Powershell Commandlet Executed
Id | b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d |
Rulename | Suspicious Powershell Commandlet Executed |
Description | This analytic rule detects when a suspicious PowerShell commandlet is executed on a host. Threat actors often use PowerShell to execute commands and scripts to move laterally, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate data. |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | Execution |
Techniques | T1059 |
Required data connectors | MicrosoftThreatProtection |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1h |
Query period | 1h |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/SuspiciousPowerShellCommandExecuted.yaml |
Version | 1.0.1 |
Arm template | b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d.json |
// Adjust the list of suspicious commandlets as needed
let SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList = dynamic(["Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy",
"Get-DomainPolicy",
"Get-DomainUser",
"Get-DomainComputer",
"Get-DomainController",
"Get-DomainGroup",
"Get-DomainTrust",
"Get-ADTrust",
"Get-ForestTrust"
]);
DeviceEvents
| where ActionType == "PowerShellCommand"
| extend Commandlet = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).Command)
| where Commandlet has_any (SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend Username = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[1])
| extend DvcHostname = tostring(split(DeviceName, '.')[0]), DvcDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
id: b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/SuspiciousPowerShellCommandExecuted.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- DeviceEvents
connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
description: |
This analytic rule detects when a suspicious PowerShell commandlet is executed on a host. Threat actors often use PowerShell to execute commands and scripts to move laterally, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate data.
severity: Medium
queryPeriod: 1h
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- Execution
eventGroupingSettings:
aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
queryFrequency: 1h
query: |
// Adjust the list of suspicious commandlets as needed
let SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList = dynamic(["Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy",
"Get-DomainPolicy",
"Get-DomainUser",
"Get-DomainComputer",
"Get-DomainController",
"Get-DomainGroup",
"Get-DomainTrust",
"Get-ADTrust",
"Get-ForestTrust"
]);
DeviceEvents
| where ActionType == "PowerShellCommand"
| extend Commandlet = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).Command)
| where Commandlet has_any (SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| extend Username = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[1])
| extend DvcHostname = tostring(split(DeviceName, '.')[0]), DvcDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))
version: 1.0.1
triggerThreshold: 0
name: Suspicious Powershell Commandlet Executed
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- columnName: DeviceName
identifier: FullName
- columnName: DvcHostname
identifier: HostName
- columnName: DvcDomain
identifier: DnsDomain
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: LocalIP
identifier: Address
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: Username
identifier: Name
- columnName: UPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: Process
fieldMappings:
- columnName: InitiatingProcessId
identifier: ProcessId
- columnName: InitiatingProcessCommandLine
identifier: CommandLine
status: Available
relevantTechniques:
- T1059
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: Suspicious PowerShell Commandlet Executed on {{DvcHostname}} ({{LocalIP}}) by ({{InitiatingProcessAccountUpn}})
alertDescriptionFormat: "Suspicious PowerShell Commandlet by Process '{{InitiatingProcessFileName}}' ProcessId: '{{InitiatingProcessId}}' with commandline {{InitiatingProcessCommandLine}} was executed."
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d')]",
"properties": {
"alertDetailsOverride": {
"alertDescriptionFormat": "Suspicious PowerShell Commandlet by Process '{{InitiatingProcessFileName}}' ProcessId: '{{InitiatingProcessId}}' with commandline {{InitiatingProcessCommandLine}} was executed.",
"alertDisplayNameFormat": "Suspicious PowerShell Commandlet Executed on {{DvcHostname}} ({{LocalIP}}) by ({{InitiatingProcessAccountUpn}})"
},
"alertRuleTemplateName": "b5153fb3-ada9-4ce4-9131-79c771efb50d",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "This analytic rule detects when a suspicious PowerShell commandlet is executed on a host. Threat actors often use PowerShell to execute commands and scripts to move laterally, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate data.\n",
"displayName": "Suspicious Powershell Commandlet Executed",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "DeviceName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "DvcHostname",
"identifier": "HostName"
},
{
"columnName": "DvcDomain",
"identifier": "DnsDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "LocalIP",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Username",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "UPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Process",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "InitiatingProcessId",
"identifier": "ProcessId"
},
{
"columnName": "InitiatingProcessCommandLine",
"identifier": "CommandLine"
}
]
}
],
"eventGroupingSettings": {
"aggregationKind": "AlertPerResult"
},
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/SuspiciousPowerShellCommandExecuted.yaml",
"query": "// Adjust the list of suspicious commandlets as needed\nlet SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList = dynamic([\"Get-ADUserResultantPasswordPolicy\",\n \"Get-DomainPolicy\",\n \"Get-DomainUser\",\n \"Get-DomainComputer\",\n \"Get-DomainController\",\n \"Get-DomainGroup\",\n \"Get-DomainTrust\",\n \"Get-ADTrust\",\n \"Get-ForestTrust\"\n ]);\nDeviceEvents\n| where ActionType == \"PowerShellCommand\"\n| extend Commandlet = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalFields).Command)\n| where Commandlet has_any (SuspiciousPowerShellCommandList)\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, LocalIP, InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine\n| extend Username = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, '@')[1])\n| extend DvcHostname = tostring(split(DeviceName, '.')[0]), DvcDomain = tostring(strcat_array(array_slice(split(DeviceName, '.'), 1, -1), '.'))\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Execution"
],
"techniques": [
"T1059"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.1",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}