BTP - Cloud Integration JDBC data source changes

SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
| where Category == "audit.security-events"
| extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
         ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
| extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
| extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
         objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
         objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId)
| where objectType == "Data Source"
| where action in ("PasswordStore", "PasswordDelete")
| extend normalizedAction = case(
    action == "PasswordStore", "deployed",
    action == "PasswordDelete", "undeployed",
    action
)
| extend MessageText = strcat("JDBC data source '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
| project
    UpdatedOn,
    UserName,
    MessageText,
    DataSourceName = objectId,
    Action = action,
    Tenant,
    ipAddress,
    CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
| extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]

customDetails:
  DataSourceName: DataSourceName
  Action: Action
  SourceIP: ipAddress
kind: Scheduled
severity: High
description: |
  Identifies deployment and undeployment of JDBC data source configurations in SAP Cloud Integration.
  JDBC data sources contain database connection credentials and configuration that enable
  integration flows to access backend databases.

  Unauthorized JDBC data source manipulation could indicate:
  - Attacker adding rogue database connections for data exfiltration
  - Credential theft by accessing stored database passwords
  - Modification of connection strings to redirect traffic to attacker-controlled systems  
triggerThreshold: 0
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'SAP Cloud Integration: {{MessageText}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    {{MessageText}} by {{UserName}} from IP {{ipAddress}}.

    JDBC data sources contain database connection credentials. Changes to these configurations
    should be carefully reviewed.

    This could indicate:
    - Legitimate database configuration management
    - Unauthorized database connection configuration
    - Attacker establishing lateral movement paths to backend systems    
status: Available
query: |
  SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  | where Category == "audit.security-events"
  | extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
           ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
  | extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
  | extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
           objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
           objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId)
  | where objectType == "Data Source"
  | where action in ("PasswordStore", "PasswordDelete")
  | extend normalizedAction = case(
      action == "PasswordStore", "deployed",
      action == "PasswordDelete", "undeployed",
      action
  )
  | extend MessageText = strcat("JDBC data source '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
  | project
      UpdatedOn,
      UserName,
      MessageText,
      DataSourceName = objectId,
      Action = action,
      Tenant,
      ipAddress,
      CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
  | extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]  
relevantTechniques:
- T1552
- T1021
version: 1.0.0
triggerOperator: gt
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: ipAddress
  entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: CloudApp
  entityType: CloudApplication
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SAPBTPAuditEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
queryPeriod: 15m
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
- LateralMovement
name: BTP - Cloud Integration JDBC data source changes
queryFrequency: 15m
id: b2c3d4e5-6f7a-8b9c-0d1e-2f3a4b5c6d7e
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/SAP BTP/Analytic Rules/BTP - Cloud Integration JDBC data source changes.yaml