Dumping LSASS Process Into a File

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Id	a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020
Rulename	Dumping LSASS Process Into a File
Description	Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or system and used to conduct lateral movement using alternate authentication materials. As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
Severity	High
Tactics	CredentialAccess
Techniques	T1003.001
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/DumpingLSASSProcessIntoaFile.yaml
Version	1.0.3
Arm template	a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020.json

KQL

Event
| where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==10
| parse EventData with * 'TargetImage">' TargetImage "<" * 'GrantedAccess">' GrantedAccess "<" * 'CallTrace">' CallTrace "<" * 
| where GrantedAccess =~ "0x1FFFFF" and TargetImage =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and CallTrace has_any ("dbghelp.dll","dbgcore.dll")
| parse EventData with * 'SourceProcessGUID">' SourceProcessGUID "<" * 'SourceImage">' SourceImage "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, SourceProcessGUID, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, CallTrace
| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')

YAML

id: a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint Threat Protection Essentials/Analytic Rules/DumpingLSASSProcessIntoaFile.yaml
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Computer
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: HostName
  - identifier: DnsDomain
    columnName: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: CommandLine
    columnName: SourceImage
  entityType: Process
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
status: Available
query: |
  Event
  | where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==10
  | parse EventData with * 'TargetImage">' TargetImage "<" * 'GrantedAccess">' GrantedAccess "<" * 'CallTrace">' CallTrace "<" * 
  | where GrantedAccess =~ "0x1FFFFF" and TargetImage =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and CallTrace has_any ("dbghelp.dll","dbgcore.dll")
  | parse EventData with * 'SourceProcessGUID">' SourceProcessGUID "<" * 'SourceImage">' SourceImage "<" *
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, SourceProcessGUID, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, CallTrace
  | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')  
name: Dumping LSASS Process Into a File
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
severity: High
relevantTechniques:
- T1003.001
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 1.0.3
description: |
  'Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).
  After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory.
  These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or system and used to conduct lateral movement using alternate authentication materials.
  As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
  Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/'

ARM