Dumping LSASS Process Into a File | Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules

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Id	a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020
Rulename	Dumping LSASS Process Into a File
Description	Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or system and used to conduct lateral movement using alternate authentication materials. As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
Severity	High
Tactics	CredentialAccess
Techniques	T1003.001
Required data connectors	SecurityEvents WindowsSecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint%20Threat%20Protection%20Essentials/Analytic%20Rules/DumpingLSASSProcessIntoaFile.yaml
Version	1.0.3
Arm template	a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020.json

KQL

Event
| where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==10
| parse EventData with * 'TargetImage">' TargetImage "<" * 'GrantedAccess">' GrantedAccess "<" * 'CallTrace">' CallTrace "<" * 
| where GrantedAccess =~ "0x1FFFFF" and TargetImage =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and CallTrace has_any ("dbghelp.dll","dbgcore.dll")
| parse EventData with * 'SourceProcessGUID">' SourceProcessGUID "<" * 'SourceImage">' SourceImage "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, SourceProcessGUID, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, CallTrace
| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')

YAML

requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
  connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint%20Threat%20Protection%20Essentials/Analytic%20Rules/DumpingLSASSProcessIntoaFile.yaml
version: 1.0.3
status: Available
queryFrequency: 1h
query: |
  Event
  | where EventLog =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==10
  | parse EventData with * 'TargetImage">' TargetImage "<" * 'GrantedAccess">' GrantedAccess "<" * 'CallTrace">' CallTrace "<" * 
  | where GrantedAccess =~ "0x1FFFFF" and TargetImage =~ "C:\\Windows\\System32\\lsass.exe" and CallTrace has_any ("dbghelp.dll","dbgcore.dll")
  | parse EventData with * 'SourceProcessGUID">' SourceProcessGUID "<" * 'SourceImage">' SourceImage "<" *
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, SourceProcessGUID, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, CallTrace
  | extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
- T1003.001
id: a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020
triggerThreshold: 0
triggerOperator: gt
name: Dumping LSASS Process Into a File
queryPeriod: 1h
severity: High
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Computer
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: HostName
    identifier: HostName
  - columnName: DnsDomain
    identifier: DnsDomain
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceImage
    identifier: CommandLine
  entityType: Process
kind: Scheduled
description: |
  'Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).
  After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory.
  These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or system and used to conduct lateral movement using alternate authentication materials.
  As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
  Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/'

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "a7b9df32-1367-402d-b385-882daf6e3020",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS).\nAfter a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory.\nThese credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or system and used to conduct lateral movement using alternate authentication materials.\nAs well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.\nRef: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/'\n",
        "displayName": "Dumping LSASS Process Into a File",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "HostName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "DnsDomain",
                "identifier": "DnsDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Process",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceImage",
                "identifier": "CommandLine"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Endpoint%20Threat%20Protection%20Essentials/Analytic%20Rules/DumpingLSASSProcessIntoaFile.yaml",
        "query": "Event\n| where EventLog =~ \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational\" and EventID==10\n| parse EventData with * 'TargetImage\">' TargetImage \"<\" * 'GrantedAccess\">' GrantedAccess \"<\" * 'CallTrace\">' CallTrace \"<\" * \n| where GrantedAccess =~ \"0x1FFFFF\" and TargetImage =~ \"C:\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\lsass.exe\" and CallTrace has_any (\"dbghelp.dll\",\"dbgcore.dll\")\n| parse EventData with * 'SourceProcessGUID\">' SourceProcessGUID \"<\" * 'SourceImage\">' SourceImage \"<\" *\n| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, SourceProcessGUID, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, CallTrace\n| extend HostName = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,0,indexof(Computer,'.')),Computer) , DnsDomain = iif(Computer has '.',substring(Computer,indexof(Computer,'.')+1),'')\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1003.001"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CredentialAccess"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1003"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.3",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}