Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
cloudbrothers.infoAzure Sentinel RepoToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeBack to homepage

Suspicious Process Injection from Office application

Back
Ida4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0
RulenameSuspicious Process Injection from Office application
DescriptionThis query detects process injections using CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC or SetThread context APIs, originating from an Office process (only Word/Excel/PowerPoint)that might contains macros. Performing process injection from a macro is a common technique by attackers to escape out of the Office process into something longer running.
SeverityMedium
TacticsExecution
TechniquesT1204
Required data connectorsMicrosoftThreatProtection
KindScheduled
Query frequency1h
Query period1h
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/OfficeProcessInjection.yaml
Version1.0.1
Arm templatea4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0.json
Deploy To Azure
DeviceEvents 
| where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains "/dde"
| where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".docx", "dotx",".xlsx", ".xltx", ".pptx")) // These files can't contain macros.
// Enable the line below if the results are too noisy.
//| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".doc", ".wbk", ".docm", ".dot", ".dotm" ".xls", ".xlsm", ".xltm", ".xla",".xll", ".xlam", ".ppt", ".pptm", ".pot", ".potm", ".ppsm", ".sldm") 
status: Available
description: |
    This query detects process injections using CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC or SetThread context APIs, originating from an Office process (only Word/Excel/PowerPoint)that might contains macros. Performing process injection from a macro is a common technique by attackers to escape out of the Office process into something longer running. 
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/OfficeProcessInjection.yaml
version: 1.0.1
triggerThreshold: 0
kind: Scheduled
queryPeriod: 1h
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountSid
    identifier: Sid
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
- entityType: Process
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessCommandLine
    identifier: CommandLine
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceEvents
triggerOperator: gt
id: a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0
name: Suspicious Process Injection from Office application
query: |
  DeviceEvents 
  | where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall")
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe")
  | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains "/dde"
  | where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".docx", "dotx",".xlsx", ".xltx", ".pptx")) // These files can't contain macros.
  // Enable the line below if the results are too noisy.
  //| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".doc", ".wbk", ".docm", ".dot", ".dotm" ".xls", ".xlsm", ".xltm", ".xla",".xll", ".xlam", ".ppt", ".pptm", ".pot", ".potm", ".ppsm", ".sldm")   
tactics:
- Execution
queryFrequency: 1h
relevantTechniques:
- T1204
severity: Medium
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "This query detects process injections using CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC or SetThread context APIs, originating from an Office process (only Word/Excel/PowerPoint)that might contains macros. Performing process injection from a macro is a common technique by attackers to escape out of the Office process into something longer running. \n",
        "displayName": "Suspicious Process Injection from Office application",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccountSid",
                "identifier": "Sid"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccountDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Process",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessCommandLine",
                "identifier": "CommandLine"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/OfficeProcessInjection.yaml",
        "query": "DeviceEvents \n| where ActionType in (\"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\", \"QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall\", \"SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall\")\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"winword.exe\", \"excel.exe\", \"powerpnt.exe\")\n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains \"/dde\"\n| where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (\".docx\", \"dotx\",\".xlsx\", \".xltx\", \".pptx\")) // These files can't contain macros.\n// Enable the line below if the results are too noisy.\n//| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (\".doc\", \".wbk\", \".docm\", \".dot\", \".dotm\" \".xls\", \".xlsm\", \".xltm\", \".xla\",\".xll\", \".xlam\", \".ppt\", \".pptm\", \".pot\", \".potm\", \".ppsm\", \".sldm\") \n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1204"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}