Suspicious Process Injection from Office application

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Id	a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0
Rulename	Suspicious Process Injection from Office application
Description	This query detects process injections using CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC or SetThread context APIs, originating from an Office process (only Word/Excel/PowerPoint) that might contains macros. Performing process injection from a macro is a common technique by attackers to escape out of the Office process into something longer running.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1204
Required data connectors	MicrosoftThreatProtection
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/OfficeProcessInjection.yaml
Version	1.0.0
Arm template	a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0.json

KQL

DeviceEvents 
| where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains "/dde"
| where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".docx", "dotx",".xlsx", ".xltx", ".pptx")) // These files can't contain macros.
// Enable the line below if the results are too noisy.
//| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".doc", ".wbk", ".docm", ".dot", ".dotm" ".xls", ".xlsm", ".xltm", ".xla",".xll", ".xlam", ".ppt", ".pptm", ".pot", ".potm", ".ppsm", ".sldm")

YAML

relevantTechniques:
- T1204
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/OfficeProcessInjection.yaml
triggerOperator: gt
kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountSid
    identifier: Sid
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessCommandLine
    identifier: CommandLine
  entityType: Process
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - DeviceEvents
  connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
queryPeriod: 1h
query: |
  DeviceEvents 
  | where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall")
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe")
  | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains "/dde"
  | where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".docx", "dotx",".xlsx", ".xltx", ".pptx")) // These files can't contain macros.
  // Enable the line below if the results are too noisy.
  //| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".doc", ".wbk", ".docm", ".dot", ".dotm" ".xls", ".xlsm", ".xltm", ".xla",".xll", ".xlam", ".ppt", ".pptm", ".pot", ".potm", ".ppsm", ".sldm")   
version: 1.0.0
description: |
  This query detects process injections using CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC or SetThread context APIs, originating from an Office process (only Word/Excel/PowerPoint)
  that might contains macros. Performing process injection from a macro is a common technique by attackers to escape out of the Office process into something
  longer running.   
tactics:
- Execution
severity: Medium
name: Suspicious Process Injection from Office application
queryFrequency: 1h
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
id: a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "This query detects process injections using CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC or SetThread context APIs, originating from an Office process (only Word/Excel/PowerPoint)\nthat might contains macros. Performing process injection from a macro is a common technique by attackers to escape out of the Office process into something\nlonger running. \n",
        "displayName": "Suspicious Process Injection from Office application",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccountSid",
                "identifier": "Sid"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessAccountDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Process",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "InitiatingProcessCommandLine",
                "identifier": "CommandLine"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/OfficeProcessInjection.yaml",
        "query": "DeviceEvents \n| where ActionType in (\"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\", \"QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall\", \"SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall\")\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (\"winword.exe\", \"excel.exe\", \"powerpnt.exe\")\n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains \"/dde\"\n| where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (\".docx\", \"dotx\",\".xlsx\", \".xltx\", \".pptx\")) // These files can't contain macros.\n// Enable the line below if the results are too noisy.\n//| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (\".doc\", \".wbk\", \".docm\", \".dot\", \".dotm\" \".xls\", \".xlsm\", \".xltm\", \".xla\",\".xll\", \".xlam\", \".ppt\", \".pptm\", \".pot\", \".potm\", \".ppsm\", \".sldm\") \n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1204"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.0",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}