Suspicious Process Injection from Office application

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Id	a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0
Rulename	Suspicious Process Injection from Office application
Description	This query detects process injections using CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC or SetThread context APIs, originating from an Office process (only Word/Excel/PowerPoint)that might contains macros. Performing process injection from a macro is a common technique by attackers to escape out of the Office process into something longer running.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1204
Required data connectors	MicrosoftThreatProtection
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/OfficeProcessInjection.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0.json

KQL

DeviceEvents 
| where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains "/dde"
| where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".docx", "dotx",".xlsx", ".xltx", ".pptx")) // These files can't contain macros.
// Enable the line below if the results are too noisy.
//| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".doc", ".wbk", ".docm", ".dot", ".dotm" ".xls", ".xlsm", ".xltm", ".xla",".xll", ".xlam", ".ppt", ".pptm", ".pot", ".potm", ".ppsm", ".sldm")

YAML

tactics:
- Execution
triggerOperator: gt
queryPeriod: 1h
queryFrequency: 1h
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - DeviceEvents
  connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
status: Available
id: a4d8e681-6f30-440a-a2f3-c312bc1389d0
relevantTechniques:
- T1204
triggerThreshold: 0
kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Sid
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountSid
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: DeviceName
  entityType: Host
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: CommandLine
    columnName: InitiatingProcessCommandLine
  entityType: Process
query: |
  DeviceEvents 
  | where ActionType in ("CreateRemoteThreadApiCall", "QueueUserApcRemoteApiCall", "SetThreadContextRemoteApiCall")
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe")
  | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine !contains "/dde"
  | where not(InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".docx", "dotx",".xlsx", ".xltx", ".pptx")) // These files can't contain macros.
  // Enable the line below if the results are too noisy.
  //| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (".doc", ".wbk", ".docm", ".dot", ".dotm" ".xls", ".xlsm", ".xltm", ".xla",".xll", ".xlam", ".ppt", ".pptm", ".pot", ".potm", ".ppsm", ".sldm")   
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/OfficeProcessInjection.yaml
name: Suspicious Process Injection from Office application
version: 1.0.1
severity: Medium
description: |
    This query detects process injections using CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC or SetThread context APIs, originating from an Office process (only Word/Excel/PowerPoint)that might contains macros. Performing process injection from a macro is a common technique by attackers to escape out of the Office process into something longer running.

ARM