Privilege escalation via EC2 policy

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Id	a2b2a984-c820-4d93-830e-139bffd81fa3
Rulename	Privilege escalation via EC2 policy
Description	Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on EC2 policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1484
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaEC2Policy.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	a2b2a984-c820-4d93-830e-139bffd81fa3.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:RunInstances") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:Run*")) or (Action contains "ec2:*") or (Action contains "ec2:ListInstances" and Action contains "ec2:StartInstance" and Action contains "ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute") or (Action contains "ec2:List*" and Action contains "ec2:Start*" and Action contains "ec2:Modify*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

YAML

queryPeriod: 1d
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
    | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
    | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
    | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
    | mvexpand Statement
    | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
    | extend Action = tostring(Action)
    | where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:RunInstances") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "ec2:Run*")) or (Action contains "ec2:*") or (Action contains "ec2:ListInstances" and Action contains "ec2:StartInstance" and Action contains "ec2:ModifyInstanceAttribute") or (Action contains "ec2:List*" and Action contains "ec2:Start*" and Action contains "ec2:Modify*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
    | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
    | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
    | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
    | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
      AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
    | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
    | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
name: Privilege escalation via EC2 policy
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
queryFrequency: 1d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaEC2Policy.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
description: |
    'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on EC2 policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.1
status: Available
severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
id: a2b2a984-c820-4d93-830e-139bffd81fa3

ARM