BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering

let accessPolicyTypes = dynamic(["Access Policy", "Artifact Reference"]);
let monitoredActions = dynamic(["Create", "Change", "Delete"]);
SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
| where Category == "audit.security-events"
| extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
         ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
| extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
| extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
         objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
         objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId),
         policyMessage = tostring(parsedData.attributes.message)
| where objectType in (accessPolicyTypes)
| where action in (monitoredActions)
| extend normalizedAction = case(
    action == "Create", "created",
    action == "Change", "modified",
    action == "Delete", "deleted",
    action
)
| extend MessageText = case(
    objectType == "Access Policy", strcat("Access policy '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
    objectType == "Artifact Reference", strcat("Artifact reference '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
    strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
)
| project
    UpdatedOn,
    UserName,
    MessageText,
    ObjectType = objectType,
    ObjectId = objectId,
    Action = action,
    PolicyMessage = policyMessage,
    Tenant,
    ipAddress,
    CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
| extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]

query: |
  let accessPolicyTypes = dynamic(["Access Policy", "Artifact Reference"]);
  let monitoredActions = dynamic(["Create", "Change", "Delete"]);
  SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  | where Category == "audit.security-events"
  | extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
           ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
  | extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
  | extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
           objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
           objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId),
           policyMessage = tostring(parsedData.attributes.message)
  | where objectType in (accessPolicyTypes)
  | where action in (monitoredActions)
  | extend normalizedAction = case(
      action == "Create", "created",
      action == "Change", "modified",
      action == "Delete", "deleted",
      action
  )
  | extend MessageText = case(
      objectType == "Access Policy", strcat("Access policy '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
      objectType == "Artifact Reference", strcat("Artifact reference '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
      strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
  )
  | project
      UpdatedOn,
      UserName,
      MessageText,
      ObjectType = objectType,
      ObjectId = objectId,
      Action = action,
      PolicyMessage = policyMessage,
      Tenant,
      ipAddress,
      CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
  | extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]  
kind: Scheduled
id: 9e6f4b2c-0d3e-5a8f-c9b7-2f5d8a1e4c6b
triggerOperator: gt
severity: High
queryPeriod: 15m
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: UPNSuffix
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: ipAddress
- entityType: CloudApplication
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: CloudApp
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/SAP BTP/Analytic Rules/BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering.yaml
description: |
  Identifies changes to access policies in SAP Cloud Integration. Access policies control
  authorization for integration artifacts, defining which users and roles can access specific
  integration flows and related content.

  Unauthorized access policy manipulation could indicate:
  - Attacker granting themselves access to sensitive integration artifacts
  - Removal of security controls to enable further malicious activity
  - Defense evasion by modifying artifact references to hide unauthorized access  
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'SAP Cloud Integration: {{MessageText}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    {{MessageText}} by {{UserName}} from IP {{ipAddress}}.

    This could indicate:
    - Legitimate access policy administration
    - Unauthorized privilege escalation attempt
    - Attacker modifying security controls to access sensitive integrations    
version: 1.0.0
customDetails:
  SourceIP: ipAddress
  ObjectId: ObjectId
  Action: Action
  PolicyMessage: PolicyMessage
  ObjectType: ObjectType
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  connectorId: SAPBTPAuditEvents
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
name: BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering
queryFrequency: 15m
relevantTechniques:
- T1548
- T1222