Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
cloudbrothers.infoAzure Sentinel RepoToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeToggle Dark/Light/Auto modeBack to homepage

BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering

Back
Id9e6f4b2c-0d3e-5a8f-c9b7-2f5d8a1e4c6b
RulenameBTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering
DescriptionIdentifies changes to access policies in SAP Cloud Integration. Access policies control

authorization for integration artifacts, defining which users and roles can access specific

integration flows and related content.



Unauthorized access policy manipulation could indicate:

- Attacker granting themselves access to sensitive integration artifacts

- Removal of security controls to enable further malicious activity

- Defense evasion by modifying artifact references to hide unauthorized access
SeverityHigh
TacticsDefenseEvasion
PrivilegeEscalation
TechniquesT1548
T1222
Required data connectorsSAPBTPAuditEvents
KindScheduled
Query frequency15m
Query period15m
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/SAP BTP/Analytic Rules/BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering.yaml
Version1.0.0
Arm template9e6f4b2c-0d3e-5a8f-c9b7-2f5d8a1e4c6b.json
Deploy To Azure
let accessPolicyTypes = dynamic(["Access Policy", "Artifact Reference"]);
let monitoredActions = dynamic(["Create", "Change", "Delete"]);
SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
| where Category == "audit.security-events"
| extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
         ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
| extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
| extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
         objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
         objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId),
         policyMessage = tostring(parsedData.attributes.message)
| where objectType in (accessPolicyTypes)
| where action in (monitoredActions)
| extend normalizedAction = case(
    action == "Create", "created",
    action == "Change", "modified",
    action == "Delete", "deleted",
    action
)
| extend MessageText = case(
    objectType == "Access Policy", strcat("Access policy '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
    objectType == "Artifact Reference", strcat("Artifact reference '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
    strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
)
| project
    UpdatedOn,
    UserName,
    MessageText,
    ObjectType = objectType,
    ObjectId = objectId,
    Action = action,
    PolicyMessage = policyMessage,
    Tenant,
    ipAddress,
    CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
| extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  connectorId: SAPBTPAuditEvents
relevantTechniques:
- T1548
- T1222
triggerOperator: gt
customDetails:
  ObjectId: ObjectId
  PolicyMessage: PolicyMessage
  ObjectType: ObjectType
  Action: Action
  SourceIP: ipAddress
queryFrequency: 15m
severity: High
description: |
  Identifies changes to access policies in SAP Cloud Integration. Access policies control
  authorization for integration artifacts, defining which users and roles can access specific
  integration flows and related content.

  Unauthorized access policy manipulation could indicate:
  - Attacker granting themselves access to sensitive integration artifacts
  - Removal of security controls to enable further malicious activity
  - Defense evasion by modifying artifact references to hide unauthorized access  
triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: UPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: ipAddress
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: CloudApp
    identifier: Name
  entityType: CloudApplication
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    {{MessageText}} by {{UserName}} from IP {{ipAddress}}.

    This could indicate:
    - Legitimate access policy administration
    - Unauthorized privilege escalation attempt
    - Attacker modifying security controls to access sensitive integrations    
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'SAP Cloud Integration: {{MessageText}}'
name: BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering
query: |
  let accessPolicyTypes = dynamic(["Access Policy", "Artifact Reference"]);
  let monitoredActions = dynamic(["Create", "Change", "Delete"]);
  SAPBTPAuditLog_CL
  | where Category == "audit.security-events"
  | extend data_s = tostring(Message.data),
           ipAddress = tostring(Message.ip)
  | extend parsedData = parse_json(data_s)
  | extend action = tostring(parsedData.action),
           objectType = tostring(parsedData.objectType),
           objectId = tostring(parsedData.objectId),
           policyMessage = tostring(parsedData.attributes.message)
  | where objectType in (accessPolicyTypes)
  | where action in (monitoredActions)
  | extend normalizedAction = case(
      action == "Create", "created",
      action == "Change", "modified",
      action == "Delete", "deleted",
      action
  )
  | extend MessageText = case(
      objectType == "Access Policy", strcat("Access policy '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
      objectType == "Artifact Reference", strcat("Artifact reference '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction),
      strcat(objectType, " '", objectId, "' was ", normalizedAction)
  )
  | project
      UpdatedOn,
      UserName,
      MessageText,
      ObjectType = objectType,
      ObjectId = objectId,
      Action = action,
      PolicyMessage = policyMessage,
      Tenant,
      ipAddress,
      CloudApp = "SAP Cloud Integration"
  | extend AccountName = split(UserName, "@")[0], UPNSuffix = split(UserName, "@")[1]  
version: 1.0.0
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
queryPeriod: 15m
kind: Scheduled
id: 9e6f4b2c-0d3e-5a8f-c9b7-2f5d8a1e4c6b
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/SAP BTP/Analytic Rules/BTP - Cloud Integration access policy tampering.yaml
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
status: Available