SMBWindows Admin Shares

// This rule is fairly complex, hence this documentation.
// The rule tries to detect network activity from services.exe followed by the start of a new childvprocess of services.exe (i.e. a service start).
// The rule tries to filter false positives as much as possible. 
// Since the FileProfile info is currently super-unreliable (unsure why), we have to work around it.
// 
// The following list of LOLBINs is used to include all results which have a high reputation, but are LOLBINs.
let lolbins = dynamic(["At.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Bash.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "CertReq.exe", "Certutil.exe", "Cmd.exe", "Cmdkey.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Control.exe", "Csc.exe", "Cscript.exe", "Desktopimgdownldr.exe", "Dfsvc.exe", "Diantz.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "Esentutl.exe", "Eventvwr.exe", "Expand.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Extrac32.exe", "Findstr.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Ftp.exe", "GfxDownloadWrapper.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Hh.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Ilasm.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Jsc.exe", "Makecab.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Mmc.exe", "MpCmdRun.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Msconfig.exe", "Msdt.exe", "Mshta.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Pktmon.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Print.exe", "Psr.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Reg.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Regedit.exe", "Regini.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Regsvcs.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Replace.exe", "Rpcping.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Sc.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe", "Ttdinject.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "vbc.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Wab.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Wscript.exe", "Wsreset.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "AgentExecutor.exe", "Appvlp.exe", "Bginfo.exe", "Cdb.exe", "csi.exe", "Devtoolslauncher.exe", "dnx.exe", "Dotnet.exe", "Dxcap.exe", "Excel.exe", "Mftrace.exe", "Msdeploy.exe", "msxsl.exe", "ntdsutil.exe", "Powerpnt.exe", "rcsi.exe", "Sqldumper.exe", "Sqlps.exe", "SQLToolsPS.exe", "Squirrel.exe", "te.exe", "Tracker.exe", "Update.exe", "vsjitdebugger.exe", "Winword.exe", "Wsl.exe"]);
// First, we want to get all the network events triggered by services.exe.
let networkEvents = materialize(DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("services.exe")
| where ActionType == "InboundConnectionAccepted"
| project-rename TimestampNetworkAct=Timestamp);
// Next, we want to get the list of child processes created by services.exe. 
let allServices = materialize ((
DeviceProcessEvents 
// This is for optimization purposes, as filtering is way faster than joins.
| where DeviceId in ((networkEvents | project DeviceId))
//svchost and sppsvc are created very often as child processes of services.exe
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "services.exe" 
| project TimestampChild=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA1, 
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessId, TimestampServicesExe=InitiatingProcessCreationTime));
// Now we are going to join the process creations and network events 
// and filter out all the tables _after_ the join where the child process 
// of svchost is not created shortly after the network activity (between 0 and 10 seconds). 
let serviceNetworkEvents = materialize(
(networkEvents 
    | join kind=inner hint.strategy=shuffle allServices on DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName
) 
| where datetime_diff("Second", TimestampChild, TimestampNetworkAct) between (0 .. 10)
// Only get the results where the network activity occured more than 1 minute after services.exe has started (i.e. system boot).
| where datetime_diff("Second", TimestampNetworkAct, TimestampServicesExe) > 60);
// Next, we want to check the reputation of all procssess.
// Since FileProfile is not properly working, we use the built-in DeviceFileCertificateInfo for the AntiJoin.
// The goal is to create a list of SHA1 hashes of the spawned processess 
// which have a low prevelance and are not in de DeviceFileCertificateInfo.
let serviceNetworkEventsWithSHA1 = materialize(serviceNetworkEvents
| summarize count() by SHA1
| join kind=leftanti hint.strategy=broadcast DeviceFileCertificateInfo on SHA1
| where count_ < 100);
// Finally, we need to bring everything together.
// We take our subset of the child processess created by services.exe (serviceNetworkEvents).
// Everything which is on our deny-list of SHA1 processess OR are LOLBINs, are filtered out.
// Additionally, we filter out msiexec, since that appears to come very often.
serviceNetworkEvents
| where SHA1 in ((serviceNetworkEventsWithSHA1 | project SHA1)) or FileName in~ (lolbins) 
| where ProcessCommandLine !~ "msiexec.exe /V" 
// This summarize is optional if you want to group similar stuff.
//| summarize ActionType=make_set(ActionType), RemoteIPs=make_set(strcat(RemoteIP, ":", RemotePort, " (", RemoteUrl, ")")), LocalPort=make_set(LocalPort) by bin(TimestampNetworkAct, 1m), DeviceId, DeviceName, LocalIP, Protocol, AdditionalFields, bin(TimestampChild, 1m), FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine1, bin(TimestampServicesExe, 1m) 

query: |
  // This rule is fairly complex, hence this documentation.
  // The rule tries to detect network activity from services.exe followed by the start of a new childvprocess of services.exe (i.e. a service start).
  // The rule tries to filter false positives as much as possible. 
  // Since the FileProfile info is currently super-unreliable (unsure why), we have to work around it.
  // 
  // The following list of LOLBINs is used to include all results which have a high reputation, but are LOLBINs.
  let lolbins = dynamic(["At.exe", "Atbroker.exe", "Bash.exe", "Bitsadmin.exe", "CertReq.exe", "Certutil.exe", "Cmd.exe", "Cmdkey.exe", "Cmstp.exe", "Control.exe", "Csc.exe", "Cscript.exe", "Desktopimgdownldr.exe", "Dfsvc.exe", "Diantz.exe", "Diskshadow.exe", "Dnscmd.exe", "Esentutl.exe", "Eventvwr.exe", "Expand.exe", "Extexport.exe", "Extrac32.exe", "Findstr.exe", "Forfiles.exe", "Ftp.exe", "GfxDownloadWrapper.exe", "Gpscript.exe", "Hh.exe", "Ie4uinit.exe", "Ieexec.exe", "Ilasm.exe", "Infdefaultinstall.exe", "Installutil.exe", "Jsc.exe", "Makecab.exe", "Mavinject.exe", "Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe", "Mmc.exe", "MpCmdRun.exe", "Msbuild.exe", "Msconfig.exe", "Msdt.exe", "Mshta.exe", "Msiexec.exe", "Netsh.exe", "Odbcconf.exe", "Pcalua.exe", "Pcwrun.exe", "Pktmon.exe", "Presentationhost.exe", "Print.exe", "Psr.exe", "Rasautou.exe", "Reg.exe", "Regasm.exe", "Regedit.exe", "Regini.exe", "Register-cimprovider.exe", "Regsvcs.exe", "Regsvr32.exe", "Replace.exe", "Rpcping.exe", "Rundll32.exe", "Runonce.exe", "Runscripthelper.exe", "Sc.exe", "Schtasks.exe", "Scriptrunner.exe", "SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe", "Ttdinject.exe", "Tttracer.exe", "vbc.exe", "Verclsid.exe", "Wab.exe", "Wmic.exe", "Wscript.exe", "Wsreset.exe", "Xwizard.exe", "AgentExecutor.exe", "Appvlp.exe", "Bginfo.exe", "Cdb.exe", "csi.exe", "Devtoolslauncher.exe", "dnx.exe", "Dotnet.exe", "Dxcap.exe", "Excel.exe", "Mftrace.exe", "Msdeploy.exe", "msxsl.exe", "ntdsutil.exe", "Powerpnt.exe", "rcsi.exe", "Sqldumper.exe", "Sqlps.exe", "SQLToolsPS.exe", "Squirrel.exe", "te.exe", "Tracker.exe", "Update.exe", "vsjitdebugger.exe", "Winword.exe", "Wsl.exe"]);
  // First, we want to get all the network events triggered by services.exe.
  let networkEvents = materialize(DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("services.exe")
  | where ActionType == "InboundConnectionAccepted"
  | project-rename TimestampNetworkAct=Timestamp);
  // Next, we want to get the list of child processes created by services.exe. 
  let allServices = materialize ((
  DeviceProcessEvents 
  // This is for optimization purposes, as filtering is way faster than joins.
  | where DeviceId in ((networkEvents | project DeviceId))
  //svchost and sppsvc are created very often as child processes of services.exe
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "services.exe" 
  | project TimestampChild=Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA1, 
  InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessId, TimestampServicesExe=InitiatingProcessCreationTime));
  // Now we are going to join the process creations and network events 
  // and filter out all the tables _after_ the join where the child process 
  // of svchost is not created shortly after the network activity (between 0 and 10 seconds). 
  let serviceNetworkEvents = materialize(
  (networkEvents 
      | join kind=inner hint.strategy=shuffle allServices on DeviceId, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName
  ) 
  | where datetime_diff("Second", TimestampChild, TimestampNetworkAct) between (0 .. 10)
  // Only get the results where the network activity occured more than 1 minute after services.exe has started (i.e. system boot).
  | where datetime_diff("Second", TimestampNetworkAct, TimestampServicesExe) > 60);
  // Next, we want to check the reputation of all procssess.
  // Since FileProfile is not properly working, we use the built-in DeviceFileCertificateInfo for the AntiJoin.
  // The goal is to create a list of SHA1 hashes of the spawned processess 
  // which have a low prevelance and are not in de DeviceFileCertificateInfo.
  let serviceNetworkEventsWithSHA1 = materialize(serviceNetworkEvents
  | summarize count() by SHA1
  | join kind=leftanti hint.strategy=broadcast DeviceFileCertificateInfo on SHA1
  | where count_ < 100);
  // Finally, we need to bring everything together.
  // We take our subset of the child processess created by services.exe (serviceNetworkEvents).
  // Everything which is on our deny-list of SHA1 processess OR are LOLBINs, are filtered out.
  // Additionally, we filter out msiexec, since that appears to come very often.
  serviceNetworkEvents
  | where SHA1 in ((serviceNetworkEventsWithSHA1 | project SHA1)) or FileName in~ (lolbins) 
  | where ProcessCommandLine !~ "msiexec.exe /V" 
  // This summarize is optional if you want to group similar stuff.
  //| summarize ActionType=make_set(ActionType), RemoteIPs=make_set(strcat(RemoteIP, ":", RemotePort, " (", RemoteUrl, ")")), LocalPort=make_set(LocalPort) by bin(TimestampNetworkAct, 1m), DeviceId, DeviceName, LocalIP, Protocol, AdditionalFields, bin(TimestampChild, 1m), FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine1, bin(TimestampServicesExe, 1m)   
description: |
  This query is based on detecting incoming RPC/TCP on the SCM, followed by the start of a child process of services.exe. Remotely interacting with the SCM triggers the RPC/TCP traffic on services.exe, and the creation of the child processes is a result of starting the service. 
  The query might look intimidating given its size. That's why we've commented the query per logic block to walk you through the details.  
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
queryFrequency: 1h
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: DeviceName
    identifier: FullName
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountSid
    identifier: Sid
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
    identifier: NTDomain
- entityType: Process
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: InitiatingProcessCommandLine
    identifier: CommandLine
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: RemoteIP
    identifier: Address
name: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
status: Available
id: 9da25366-2c77-41a5-a159-0da5e2f5fb90
tactics:
- LateralMovement
kind: Scheduled
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
  - DeviceNetworkEvents
  - DeviceFileCertificateInfo
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/SMBWindowsAdminShares.yaml
version: 1.0.0
severity: Medium
relevantTechniques:
- T1021.002