High risk Office operation conducted by IP Address that recently attempted to log into a disabled account
| Id | 9adbd1c3-a4be-44ef-ac2f-503fd25692ee |
| Rulename | High risk Office operation conducted by IP Address that recently attempted to log into a disabled account |
| Description | It is possible that a disabled user account is compromised and another account on the same IP is used to perform operations that are not typical for that user. The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range. It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins. It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events. Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins. |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | InitialAccess Persistence Collection |
| Techniques | T1078 T1098 T1114 |
| Required data connectors | AzureActiveDirectory Office365 |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1d |
| Query period | 8d |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/DisabledAccIPSigninWithRareRiskyOps.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.1 |
| Arm template | 9adbd1c3-a4be-44ef-ac2f-503fd25692ee.json |
let threshold = 100;
let timeRange = ago(7d);
let timeBuffer = 1;
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > timeRange
| where ResultType == "50057"
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated), disabledAccountLoginAttempts = count(),
disabledAccountsTargeted = dcount(UserPrincipalName), applicationsTargeted = dcount(AppDisplayName), disabledAccountSet = make_set(UserPrincipalName),
applicationSet = make_set(AppDisplayName) by IPAddress, AppId
| order by disabledAccountLoginAttempts desc
| join kind=inner (
// IPs are considered suspicious - and any related successful sign-ins are detected
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > timeRange
| where ResultType == 0
| summarize successSigninStart = min(TimeGenerated), successSigninEnd = max(TimeGenerated), successfulAccountSigninCount = dcount(UserPrincipalName), successfulAccountSigninSet = make_set(UserPrincipalName, 15) by IPAddress
// Assume IPs associated with sign-ins from 100+ distinct user accounts are safe
| where successfulAccountSigninCount < threshold
) on IPAddress
// IPs where attempts to authenticate as disabled user accounts originated, and had a non-zero success rate for some other account
| where successfulAccountSigninCount != 0
// Successful Account Signins occur within the same lookback period as the failed
| extend SuccessBeforeFailure = iff(successSigninStart >= StartTime and successSigninEnd <= EndTime, true, false)
| project StartTime, EndTime, IPAddress, disabledAccountLoginAttempts, disabledAccountsTargeted, disabledAccountSet, applicationSet,
successfulAccountSigninCount, successfulAccountSigninSet, successSigninStart, successSigninEnd, AppId
| order by disabledAccountLoginAttempts
// Break up the string of Succesfully signed into accounts into individual events
| mvexpand successfulAccountSigninSet
| extend JoinedOnIp = IPAddress
| join kind = inner (
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > timeRange
| where Operation in~ ( "Add-MailboxPermission", "Add-MailboxFolderPermission", "Set-Mailbox", "New-ManagementRoleAssignment", "New-InboxRule", "Set-InboxRule", "Set-TransportRule") and not(UserId has_any ('NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM (Microsoft.Exchange.ServiceHost)', 'NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM (w3wp)', 'devilfish-applicationaccount'))
// Remove port from the end of the IP and/or square brackets around IP, if they exist
| extend JoinedOnIp = case(
ClientIP matches regex @'\[((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\]-\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('\\[([0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+)\\]-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'\[((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\]', tostring(extract('\\[([0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+)\\]', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'(((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))-\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('([0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+)-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)', ClientIP,
ClientIP matches regex @'\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})\]-\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('\\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})\\]-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})\]', tostring(extract('\\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})\\]', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})-\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})', ClientIP,
"")
| where isnotempty(JoinedOnIp)
| extend OfficeTimeStamp = ElevationTime, UserPrincipalName = UserId
) on JoinedOnIp
// Rare and risky operations only happen within a certain time range of the successful sign-in
| where OfficeTimeStamp >= successSigninStart and datetime_diff('day', OfficeTimeStamp, successSigninEnd) <= timeBuffer
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
queryPeriod: 8d
metadata:
source:
kind: Community
categories:
domains:
- Security - Threat Intelligence
- Security - Others
- Identity
support:
tier: Community
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: UserPrincipalName
identifier: FullName
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: JoinedOnIp
identifier: Address
entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: IPAddress
identifier: Address
entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: ClientIP
identifier: Address
entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: ApplicationId
identifier: AppId
entityType: CloudApplication
id: 9adbd1c3-a4be-44ef-ac2f-503fd25692ee
name: High risk Office operation conducted by IP Address that recently attempted to log into a disabled account
description: |
'It is possible that a disabled user account is compromised and another account on the same IP is used to perform operations that are not typical for that user.
The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range.
It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins.
It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events.
Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins.'
tactics:
- InitialAccess
- Persistence
- Collection
triggerOperator: gt
query: |
let threshold = 100;
let timeRange = ago(7d);
let timeBuffer = 1;
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > timeRange
| where ResultType == "50057"
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated), disabledAccountLoginAttempts = count(),
disabledAccountsTargeted = dcount(UserPrincipalName), applicationsTargeted = dcount(AppDisplayName), disabledAccountSet = make_set(UserPrincipalName),
applicationSet = make_set(AppDisplayName) by IPAddress, AppId
| order by disabledAccountLoginAttempts desc
| join kind=inner (
// IPs are considered suspicious - and any related successful sign-ins are detected
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > timeRange
| where ResultType == 0
| summarize successSigninStart = min(TimeGenerated), successSigninEnd = max(TimeGenerated), successfulAccountSigninCount = dcount(UserPrincipalName), successfulAccountSigninSet = make_set(UserPrincipalName, 15) by IPAddress
// Assume IPs associated with sign-ins from 100+ distinct user accounts are safe
| where successfulAccountSigninCount < threshold
) on IPAddress
// IPs where attempts to authenticate as disabled user accounts originated, and had a non-zero success rate for some other account
| where successfulAccountSigninCount != 0
// Successful Account Signins occur within the same lookback period as the failed
| extend SuccessBeforeFailure = iff(successSigninStart >= StartTime and successSigninEnd <= EndTime, true, false)
| project StartTime, EndTime, IPAddress, disabledAccountLoginAttempts, disabledAccountsTargeted, disabledAccountSet, applicationSet,
successfulAccountSigninCount, successfulAccountSigninSet, successSigninStart, successSigninEnd, AppId
| order by disabledAccountLoginAttempts
// Break up the string of Succesfully signed into accounts into individual events
| mvexpand successfulAccountSigninSet
| extend JoinedOnIp = IPAddress
| join kind = inner (
OfficeActivity
| where TimeGenerated > timeRange
| where Operation in~ ( "Add-MailboxPermission", "Add-MailboxFolderPermission", "Set-Mailbox", "New-ManagementRoleAssignment", "New-InboxRule", "Set-InboxRule", "Set-TransportRule") and not(UserId has_any ('NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM (Microsoft.Exchange.ServiceHost)', 'NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM (w3wp)', 'devilfish-applicationaccount'))
// Remove port from the end of the IP and/or square brackets around IP, if they exist
| extend JoinedOnIp = case(
ClientIP matches regex @'\[((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\]-\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('\\[([0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+)\\]-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'\[((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\]', tostring(extract('\\[([0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+)\\]', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'(((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))-\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('([0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+)-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)', ClientIP,
ClientIP matches regex @'\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})\]-\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('\\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})\\]-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})\]', tostring(extract('\\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})\\]', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})-\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),
ClientIP matches regex @'((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})', ClientIP,
"")
| where isnotempty(JoinedOnIp)
| extend OfficeTimeStamp = ElevationTime, UserPrincipalName = UserId
) on JoinedOnIp
// Rare and risky operations only happen within a certain time range of the successful sign-in
| where OfficeTimeStamp >= successSigninStart and datetime_diff('day', OfficeTimeStamp, successSigninEnd) <= timeBuffer
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerThreshold: 0
kind: Scheduled
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/DisabledAccIPSigninWithRareRiskyOps.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- SigninLogs
connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
- dataTypes:
- OfficeActivity
connectorId: Office365
version: 1.0.1
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
- T1098
- T1114
severity: Medium
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/9adbd1c3-a4be-44ef-ac2f-503fd25692ee')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/9adbd1c3-a4be-44ef-ac2f-503fd25692ee')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "9adbd1c3-a4be-44ef-ac2f-503fd25692ee",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'It is possible that a disabled user account is compromised and another account on the same IP is used to perform operations that are not typical for that user.\n The query filters the SigninLogs for entries where ResultType is indicates a disabled account and the TimeGenerated is within a defined time range.\n It then summarizes these entries by IPAddress and AppId, calculating various statistics such as number of login attempts, distinct UPNs, App IDs etc and joins these results with another set of results from SigninLogs, filtering for entries with less than normal number of successful sign-ins.\n It then filters out entries where there were no successful sign-ins or where successful sign-ins did not occur within the same lookback period as the failed sign-ins, later projecting relevant fields by the count of login attempts, and expands the set of successful sign-ins into individual events.\n Finally, it joins these results with entries from OfficeActivity where certain operations deemed rare and high risk have been performed, ensuring their occurrance within a certain time range of the successful sign-ins.'\n",
"displayName": "High risk Office operation conducted by IP Address that recently attempted to log into a disabled account",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "UserPrincipalName",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "JoinedOnIp",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "IPAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "ClientIP",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "CloudApplication",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "ApplicationId",
"identifier": "AppId"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/DisabledAccIPSigninWithRareRiskyOps.yaml",
"query": "let threshold = 100;\nlet timeRange = ago(7d);\nlet timeBuffer = 1;\nSigninLogs \n| where TimeGenerated > timeRange\n| where ResultType == \"50057\" \n| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated), disabledAccountLoginAttempts = count(), \ndisabledAccountsTargeted = dcount(UserPrincipalName), applicationsTargeted = dcount(AppDisplayName), disabledAccountSet = make_set(UserPrincipalName), \napplicationSet = make_set(AppDisplayName) by IPAddress, AppId\n| order by disabledAccountLoginAttempts desc\n| join kind=inner (\n // IPs are considered suspicious - and any related successful sign-ins are detected\n SigninLogs\n | where TimeGenerated > timeRange\n | where ResultType == 0\n | summarize successSigninStart = min(TimeGenerated), successSigninEnd = max(TimeGenerated), successfulAccountSigninCount = dcount(UserPrincipalName), successfulAccountSigninSet = make_set(UserPrincipalName, 15) by IPAddress\n // Assume IPs associated with sign-ins from 100+ distinct user accounts are safe\n | where successfulAccountSigninCount < threshold\n) on IPAddress \n// IPs where attempts to authenticate as disabled user accounts originated, and had a non-zero success rate for some other account\n| where successfulAccountSigninCount != 0\n// Successful Account Signins occur within the same lookback period as the failed \n| extend SuccessBeforeFailure = iff(successSigninStart >= StartTime and successSigninEnd <= EndTime, true, false) \n| project StartTime, EndTime, IPAddress, disabledAccountLoginAttempts, disabledAccountsTargeted, disabledAccountSet, applicationSet, \nsuccessfulAccountSigninCount, successfulAccountSigninSet, successSigninStart, successSigninEnd, AppId\n| order by disabledAccountLoginAttempts\n// Break up the string of Succesfully signed into accounts into individual events\n| mvexpand successfulAccountSigninSet\n| extend JoinedOnIp = IPAddress\n| join kind = inner (\n OfficeActivity\n | where TimeGenerated > timeRange\n | where Operation in~ ( \"Add-MailboxPermission\", \"Add-MailboxFolderPermission\", \"Set-Mailbox\", \"New-ManagementRoleAssignment\", \"New-InboxRule\", \"Set-InboxRule\", \"Set-TransportRule\") and not(UserId has_any ('NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM (Microsoft.Exchange.ServiceHost)', 'NT AUTHORITY\\\\SYSTEM (w3wp)', 'devilfish-applicationaccount'))\n // Remove port from the end of the IP and/or square brackets around IP, if they exist \n | extend JoinedOnIp = case(\n ClientIP matches regex @'\\[((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\]-\\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('\\\\[([0-9]+\\\\.[0-9]+\\\\.[0-9]+)\\\\]-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),\n ClientIP matches regex @'\\[((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\]', tostring(extract('\\\\[([0-9]+\\\\.[0-9]+\\\\.[0-9]+)\\\\]', 1, ClientIP)), \n ClientIP matches regex @'(((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?))-\\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('([0-9]+\\\\.[0-9]+\\\\.[0-9]+)-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),\n ClientIP matches regex @'((25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.){3}(25[0-5]2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)', ClientIP, \n ClientIP matches regex @'\\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})\\]-\\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('\\\\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\\\d{1,3}(?:\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}){3})\\\\]-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),\n ClientIP matches regex @'\\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})\\]', tostring(extract('\\\\[((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\\\d{1,3}(?:\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}){3})\\\\]', 1, ClientIP)), \n ClientIP matches regex @'((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})-\\d{1,5}', tostring(extract('((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\\\d{1,3}(?:\\\\.\\\\d{1,3}){3})-[0-9]+', 1, ClientIP)),\n ClientIP matches regex @'((?:[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}::?){1,8}[0-9a-fA-F]{1,4}|\\d{1,3}(?:\\.\\d{1,3}){3})', ClientIP,\n \"\")\n | where isnotempty(JoinedOnIp)\n | extend OfficeTimeStamp = ElevationTime, UserPrincipalName = UserId\n) on JoinedOnIp\n// Rare and risky operations only happen within a certain time range of the successful sign-in\n| where OfficeTimeStamp >= successSigninStart and datetime_diff('day', OfficeTimeStamp, successSigninEnd) <= timeBuffer\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, \"@\")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, \"@\")[1])\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P8D",
"severity": "Medium",
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Collection",
"InitialAccess",
"Persistence"
],
"techniques": [
"T1078",
"T1098",
"T1114"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.1",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}