Exchange SSRF Autodiscover ProxyShell - Detection

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Id	968358d6-6af8-49bb-aaa4-187b3067fb95
Rulename	Exchange SSRF Autodiscover ProxyShell - Detection
Description	This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit patterns recently blogged about by PeterJson. This exploitation chain utilises an SSRF vulnerability in Exchange which eventually allows the attacker to execute arbitrary Powershell on the server. In the example powershell can be used to write an email to disk with an encoded attachment containing a shell. Reference: https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1
Severity	High
Tactics	InitialAccess
Techniques	T1190
Required data connectors	AzureMonitor(IIS)
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	12h
Query period	12h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/ProxyShellPwn2Own.yaml
Version	1.0.3
Arm template	968358d6-6af8-49bb-aaa4-187b3067fb95.json

KQL

let successCodes = dynamic([200, 302, 401]);
W3CIISLog
| where scStatus has_any (successCodes)
| where ipv4_is_private(cIP) == False
| where csUriStem hasprefix "/autodiscover/autodiscover.json"
| project TimeGenerated, cIP, sIP, sSiteName, csUriStem, csUriQuery, Computer, csUserName, _ResourceId, FileUri
| where (csUriQuery !has "Protocol" and isnotempty(csUriQuery))
or (csUriQuery has_any("/mapi/", "powershell"))
or (csUriQuery contains "@" and csUriQuery matches regex @"\.[a-zA-Z]{2,4}?(?:[a-zA-Z]{2,4}\/)")
or (csUriQuery contains ":" and csUriQuery matches regex @"\:[0-9]{2,4}\/")
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[1])

YAML

kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: csUserName
    identifier: FullName
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: Computer
    identifier: FullName
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: cIP
    identifier: Address
- entityType: AzureResource
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: _ResourceId
    identifier: ResourceId
description: |
  'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit patterns recently blogged about by PeterJson. This exploitation chain utilises an SSRF vulnerability in Exchange which eventually allows the attacker to execute arbitrary Powershell on the server.
  In the example powershell can be used to write an email to disk with an encoded attachment containing a shell.
  Reference: https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1'  
severity: High
queryFrequency: 12h
triggerThreshold: 0
relevantTechniques:
- T1190
metadata:
  support:
    tier: Community
  source:
    kind: Community
  author:
    name: Thomas McElroy
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
tactics:
- InitialAccess
name: Exchange SSRF Autodiscover ProxyShell - Detection
id: 968358d6-6af8-49bb-aaa4-187b3067fb95
query: |
  let successCodes = dynamic([200, 302, 401]);
  W3CIISLog
  | where scStatus has_any (successCodes)
  | where ipv4_is_private(cIP) == False
  | where csUriStem hasprefix "/autodiscover/autodiscover.json"
  | project TimeGenerated, cIP, sIP, sSiteName, csUriStem, csUriQuery, Computer, csUserName, _ResourceId, FileUri
  | where (csUriQuery !has "Protocol" and isnotempty(csUriQuery))
  or (csUriQuery has_any("/mapi/", "powershell"))
  or (csUriQuery contains "@" and csUriQuery matches regex @"\.[a-zA-Z]{2,4}?(?:[a-zA-Z]{2,4}\/)")
  or (csUriQuery contains ":" and csUriQuery matches regex @"\:[0-9]{2,4}\/")
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[1])  
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - W3CIISLog
  connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS)
version: 1.0.3
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/ProxyShellPwn2Own.yaml
queryPeriod: 12h

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/968358d6-6af8-49bb-aaa4-187b3067fb95')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/968358d6-6af8-49bb-aaa4-187b3067fb95')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "968358d6-6af8-49bb-aaa4-187b3067fb95",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit patterns recently blogged about by PeterJson. This exploitation chain utilises an SSRF vulnerability in Exchange which eventually allows the attacker to execute arbitrary Powershell on the server.\nIn the example powershell can be used to write an email to disk with an encoded attachment containing a shell.\nReference: https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1'\n",
        "displayName": "Exchange SSRF Autodiscover ProxyShell - Detection",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "csUserName",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Computer",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "cIP",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "AzureResource",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "_ResourceId",
                "identifier": "ResourceId"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/W3CIISLog/ProxyShellPwn2Own.yaml",
        "query": "let successCodes = dynamic([200, 302, 401]);\nW3CIISLog\n| where scStatus has_any (successCodes)\n| where ipv4_is_private(cIP) == False\n| where csUriStem hasprefix \"/autodiscover/autodiscover.json\"\n| project TimeGenerated, cIP, sIP, sSiteName, csUriStem, csUriQuery, Computer, csUserName, _ResourceId, FileUri\n| where (csUriQuery !has \"Protocol\" and isnotempty(csUriQuery))\nor (csUriQuery has_any(\"/mapi/\", \"powershell\"))\nor (csUriQuery contains \"@\" and csUriQuery matches regex @\"\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,4}?(?:[a-zA-Z]{2,4}\\/)\")\nor (csUriQuery contains \":\" and csUriQuery matches regex @\"\\:[0-9]{2,4}\\/\")\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, \"@\")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, \"@\")[1])\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT12H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT12H",
        "severity": "High",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "InitialAccess"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1190"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.3",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}