Syslog
| where ProcessName == 'gw-audit'
| extend
TenantName = extract("\"vportal\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage),
UserName = extract("user=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Operation = extract("op=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
EdgeFiler = extract("\"client\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage),
RootPath = extract("rootPath=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Share = extract("share=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
LocalPath = extract("path=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Timestamp = todatetime(extract("\"@timestamp\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage))
| where Operation in ('ACLAdded', 'ACLDeleted', 'ACLProtectionAdded','chown', 'setsd', 'ACLProtectionDeleted', 'ACEChanged', 'setdacl')
| summarize Count = count() by UserName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where Count > 5000
description: This analytic rule detects and alerts when access denied operations generated by the CTERA Edge Filer goes over a predefined threshold
kind: Scheduled
suppressionEnabled: false
queryFrequency: 5m
suppressionDuration: PT5H
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/CTERA/Analytic Rules/MassPermissionChanges.yaml
alertDetailsOverride:
alertnameFormat: CTERA Batch Access Denied Detection
alertDescriptionFormat: |
Detected {{Count}} denied access attempts by user {{UserName}} on Edge Filer {{EdgeFiler}} within 5 minutes. Please investigate unauthorized access attempts or misconfigurations.
status: Available
eventGroupingSettings:
aggregationKind: SingleAlert
severity: High
triggerOperator: GreaterThan
triggerThreshold: 5000
name: CTERA Mass Permissions Changes Detection Analytic
customDetails:
EdgeFiler: EdgeFiler
RootPath: RootPath
TenantName: TenantName
Share: Share
UserName: UserName
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: UserName
identifier: Name
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: EdgeFiler
identifier: Name
entityType: File
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: CTERA
dataTypes:
- Syslog
id: 90502ac9-19a2-41f0-ba81-e352de90b61b
queryPeriod: 5m
incidentConfiguration:
createIncident: true
groupingConfiguration:
enabled: false
matchingMethod: AllEntities
reopenClosedIncident: false
lookbackDuration: PT5H
relevantTechniques:
- T1068
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
version: 1.0.0
query: |
Syslog
| where ProcessName == 'gw-audit'
| extend
TenantName = extract("\"vportal\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage),
UserName = extract("user=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Operation = extract("op=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
EdgeFiler = extract("\"client\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage),
RootPath = extract("rootPath=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Share = extract("share=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
LocalPath = extract("path=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Timestamp = todatetime(extract("\"@timestamp\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage))
| where Operation in ('ACLAdded', 'ACLDeleted', 'ACLProtectionAdded','chown', 'setsd', 'ACLProtectionDeleted', 'ACEChanged', 'setdacl')
| summarize Count = count() by UserName, bin(Timestamp, 5m)
| where Count > 5000