Back
Id8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d
RulenameAWSCloudTrail - RDS instance publicly exposed
DescriptionDetects RDS instance creation or modification events where the database is configured as publicly accessible.

Public exposure of database instances can increase the risk of unauthorized access and data leakage.
SeverityMedium
TacticsExfiltration
TechniquesT1537
Required data connectorsAWS
KindScheduled
Query frequency1h
Query period1h
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_RDSInstancePubliclyExposed.yaml
Version1.0.3
Arm template8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d.json
Deploy To Azure
AWSCloudTrail
| where  EventName in ("CreateDBInstance", "ModifyDBInstance") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).publiclyAccessible) == "true"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
name: AWSCloudTrail - RDS instance publicly exposed
triggerOperator: gt
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where  EventName in ("CreateDBInstance", "ModifyDBInstance") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).publiclyAccessible) == "true"
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
queryFrequency: 1h
description: |
  Detects RDS instance creation or modification events where the database is configured as publicly accessible.
  Public exposure of database instances can increase the risk of unauthorized access and data leakage.
id: 8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled
customDetails:
  RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
  EventName: EventName
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
status: Available
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_RDSInstancePubliclyExposed.yaml
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} event from {{SourceIpAddress}} setting RDS publicly accessible in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
  alertDisplayNameFormat: AWS RDS instance publicly exposed by {{AccountName}}
relevantTechniques:
- T1537
tactics:
- Exfiltration
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
  entityType: IP
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected {{EventName}} event from {{SourceIpAddress}} setting RDS publicly accessible in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS RDS instance publicly exposed by {{AccountName}}"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d",
        "customDetails": {
          "AWSRegion": "AWSRegion",
          "EventName": "EventName",
          "RecipientAccountId": "RecipientAccountId",
          "UserIdentityArn": "UserIdentityArn"
        },
        "description": "Detects RDS instance creation or modification events where the database is configured as publicly accessible.\nPublic exposure of database instances can increase the risk of unauthorized access and data leakage.\n",
        "displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - RDS instance publicly exposed",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_RDSInstancePubliclyExposed.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where  EventName in (\"CreateDBInstance\", \"ModifyDBInstance\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).publiclyAccessible) == \"true\"\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Exfiltration"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1537"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.3",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}