Analytic rule catalog
AWSCloudTrail - RDS instance publicly exposed
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| Id | 8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d |
| Rulename | AWSCloudTrail - RDS instance publicly exposed |
| Description | Detects RDS instance creation or modification events where the database is configured as publicly accessible. Public exposure of database instances can increase the risk of unauthorized access and data leakage. |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | Exfiltration |
| Techniques | T1537 |
| Required data connectors | AWS |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1h |
| Query period | 1h |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_RDSInstancePubliclyExposed.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.3 |
| Arm template | 8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d.json |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in ("CreateDBInstance", "ModifyDBInstance") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).publiclyAccessible) == "true"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
triggerOperator: gt
status: Available
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 1.0.3
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: AWS RDS instance publicly exposed by {{AccountName}}
alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} event from {{SourceIpAddress}} setting RDS publicly accessible in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- columnName: RecipientAccountId
identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: SourceIpAddress
identifier: Address
name: AWSCloudTrail - RDS instance publicly exposed
kind: Scheduled
query: |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in ("CreateDBInstance", "ModifyDBInstance") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).publiclyAccessible) == "true"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
queryPeriod: 1h
relevantTechniques:
- T1537
id: 8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d
tactics:
- Exfiltration
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
connectorId: AWS
severity: Medium
description: |
Detects RDS instance creation or modification events where the database is configured as publicly accessible.
Public exposure of database instances can increase the risk of unauthorized access and data leakage.
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_RDSInstancePubliclyExposed.yaml
queryFrequency: 1h
customDetails:
UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
EventName: EventName
RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
AWSRegion: AWSRegion
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d')]",
"properties": {
"alertDetailsOverride": {
"alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected {{EventName}} event from {{SourceIpAddress}} setting RDS publicly accessible in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.",
"alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS RDS instance publicly exposed by {{AccountName}}"
},
"alertRuleTemplateName": "8f1630c2-2e45-4df2-be43-50fba90f601d",
"customDetails": {
"AWSRegion": "AWSRegion",
"EventName": "EventName",
"RecipientAccountId": "RecipientAccountId",
"UserIdentityArn": "UserIdentityArn"
},
"description": "Detects RDS instance creation or modification events where the database is configured as publicly accessible.\nPublic exposure of database instances can increase the risk of unauthorized access and data leakage.\n",
"displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - RDS instance publicly exposed",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
},
{
"columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
"identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_RDSInstancePubliclyExposed.yaml",
"query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName in (\"CreateDBInstance\", \"ModifyDBInstance\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| where tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).publiclyAccessible) == \"true\"\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Exfiltration"
],
"techniques": [
"T1537"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.3",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}