Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules
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Creation of CRUD KMS policy and then privilege escalation

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Id8e15998e-1e32-4b6d-abd1-e8482e8f3def
RulenameCreation of CRUD KMS policy and then privilege escalation
DescriptionDetected creation of new CRUD KMS policy and usage of one of the attach policy operations (AttachUserPolicy/AttachRolePolicy/AttachGroupPolicy). This might indicate a privilege escalation technique that attackers could use.
SeverityMedium
TacticsPrivilegeEscalation
TechniquesT1484
Required data connectorsAWS
KindScheduled
Query frequency1d
Query period1d
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_CreatedCRUDKMSPolicytoPrivilegeEscalation.yaml
Version1.0.2
Arm template8e15998e-1e32-4b6d-abd1-e8482e8f3def.json
Deploy To Azure
let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
let createPolicy =  dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 14d;
// Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance
let EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "");
//Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.
let FullAdminPolicyEvents =  materialize(  EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where EventName in (createPolicy)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
| mvexpand Statement
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "kms:Create" and (Action contains "kms:Get" or Action contains "kms:Describe")  and (Action contains "kms:Disable" or Action contains "kms:Enable") and Action contains "kms:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn,  RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
| project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated  );
let PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName,   UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
| extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType",   UserIdentityType, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn)
| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount
);
// Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.
// These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.
FullAdminPolicyEvents
| join kind=leftouter
(
    PolicyAttach
)
on PolicyName
| project-away PolicyName1
| extend timestamp = StartTime
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerThreshold: 0
name: Creation of CRUD KMS policy and then privilege escalation
version: 1.0.2
id: 8e15998e-1e32-4b6d-abd1-e8482e8f3def
status: Available
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
queryPeriod: 1d
description: |
    'Detected creation of new CRUD KMS policy and usage of one of the attach policy operations (AttachUserPolicy/AttachRolePolicy/AttachGroupPolicy). This might indicate a privilege escalation technique that attackers could use.'
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
  let createPolicy =  dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
  let timeframe = 1d;
  let lookback = 14d;
  // Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance
  let EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "");
  //Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.
  let FullAdminPolicyEvents =  materialize(  EventInfo
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventName in (createPolicy)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (Action contains "kms:Create" and (Action contains "kms:Get" or Action contains "kms:Describe")  and (Action contains "kms:Disable" or Action contains "kms:Enable") and Action contains "kms:Delete") and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn,  RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  | project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated  );
  let PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
  | summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName,   UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
  | extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType",   UserIdentityType, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn)
  | project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount
  );
  // Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.
  // These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.
  FullAdminPolicyEvents
  | join kind=leftouter
  (
      PolicyAttach
  )
  on PolicyName
  | project-away PolicyName1
  | extend timestamp = StartTime  
kind: Scheduled
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_CreatedCRUDKMSPolicytoPrivilegeEscalation.yaml
triggerOperator: gt
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
severity: Medium
{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/8e15998e-1e32-4b6d-abd1-e8482e8f3def')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/8e15998e-1e32-4b6d-abd1-e8482e8f3def')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "8e15998e-1e32-4b6d-abd1-e8482e8f3def",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected creation of new CRUD KMS policy and usage of one of the attach policy operations (AttachUserPolicy/AttachRolePolicy/AttachGroupPolicy). This might indicate a privilege escalation technique that attackers could use.'\n",
        "displayName": "Creation of CRUD KMS policy and then privilege escalation",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_CreatedCRUDKMSPolicytoPrivilegeEscalation.yaml",
        "query": "let EventNameList = dynamic([\"AttachUserPolicy\",\"AttachRolePolicy\",\"AttachGroupPolicy\"]);\nlet createPolicy =  dynamic([\"CreatePolicy\", \"CreatePolicyVersion\"]);\nlet timeframe = 1d;\nlet lookback = 14d;\n// Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance\nlet EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)\n| where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\");\n//Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.\nlet FullAdminPolicyEvents =  materialize(  EventInfo\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)\n| where EventName in (createPolicy)\n| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)\n| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement\n| mvexpand Statement\n| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)\n| extend Action = tostring(Action)\n| where Effect =~ \"Allow\" and (Action contains \"kms:Create\" and (Action contains \"kms:Get\" or Action contains \"kms:Describe\")  and (Action contains \"kms:Disable\" or Action contains \"kms:Enable\") and Action contains \"kms:Delete\") and Resource == \"*\" and Condition == \"\"\n| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn,  RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix\n| project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated  );\nlet PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)\n| where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),\"/\")[1])\n| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName,   UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName\n| extend AttachEvent = pack(\"StartTime\", StartTime, \"EndTime\", EndTime, \"EventName\", EventName, \"UserIdentityType\",   UserIdentityType, \"SourceIpAddress\", SourceIpAddress, \"AccountName\", AccountName, \"AccountUPNSuffix\", AccountUPNSuffix, \"RecipientAccountId\", RecipientAccountId, \"UserIdentityArn\", UserIdentityArn)\n| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount\n);\n// Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.\n// These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.\nFullAdminPolicyEvents\n| join kind=leftouter\n(\n    PolicyAttach\n)\non PolicyName\n| project-away PolicyName1\n| extend timestamp = StartTime\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}