Privilege escalation via Lambda policy

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Id	8e01c41d-bd4c-4bbe-aed5-18592735052d
Rulename	Privilege escalation via Lambda policy
Description	Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Lambda policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	PrivilegeEscalation
Techniques	T1484
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaLambdaPolicy.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	8e01c41d-bd4c-4bbe-aed5-18592735052d.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:CreateFunction" and Action contains "lambda:InvokeFunction") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:Create*" and Action contains "lambda:Invoke*")) or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:*" and Action contains "dynamodb:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:CreateFunction" and Action contains "lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping" and Action contains "dynamodb:PutItem" and Action contains "dynamodb:CreateTable") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:Create*" and Action contains "dynamodb:Put*" and Action contains "dynamodb:Create*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

YAML

id: 8e01c41d-bd4c-4bbe-aed5-18592735052d
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaLambdaPolicy.yaml
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
kind: Scheduled
name: Privilege escalation via Lambda policy
queryFrequency: 1d
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
    | where EventName in ("PutUserPolicy","PutRolePolicy","PutGroupPolicy") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
    | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
    | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
    | mvexpand Statement
    | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
    | extend Action = tostring(Action)
    | where Effect =~ "Allow" and ((((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:CreateFunction" and Action contains "lambda:InvokeFunction") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:Create*" and Action contains "lambda:Invoke*")) or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:*" and Action contains "dynamodb:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:CreateFunction" and Action contains "lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping" and Action contains "dynamodb:PutItem" and Action contains "dynamodb:CreateTable") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "lambda:Create*" and Action contains "dynamodb:Put*" and Action contains "dynamodb:Create*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
    | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
    | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
    | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
    | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
      AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
    | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName
    | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
  entityType: IP
version: 1.0.1
queryPeriod: 1d
description: |
    'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Lambda policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'
status: Available

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2023-02-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/8e01c41d-bd4c-4bbe-aed5-18592735052d')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/8e01c41d-bd4c-4bbe-aed5-18592735052d')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "8e01c41d-bd4c-4bbe-aed5-18592735052d",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected usage of AttachUserPolicy/AttachGroupPolicy/AttachRolePolicy on Lambda policy. Attackers could use these operations for privilege escalation. Verify these actions with the user.'\n",
        "displayName": "Privilege escalation via Lambda policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaLambdaPolicy.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n  | where EventName in (\"PutUserPolicy\",\"PutRolePolicy\",\"PutGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)\n  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement\n  | mvexpand Statement\n  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)\n  | extend Action = tostring(Action)\n  | where Effect =~ \"Allow\" and ((((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"lambda:*\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"lambda:CreateFunction\" and Action contains \"lambda:InvokeFunction\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"lambda:Create*\" and Action contains \"lambda:Invoke*\")) or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"lambda:*\" and Action contains \"dynamodb:*\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"lambda:CreateFunction\" and Action contains \"lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping\" and Action contains \"dynamodb:PutItem\" and Action contains \"dynamodb:CreateTable\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"lambda:Create*\" and Action contains \"dynamodb:Put*\" and Action contains \"dynamodb:Create*\")) and Resource == \"*\" and Condition == \"\"\n  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName\n  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}