Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server
Id | 88f453ff-7b9e-45bb-8c12-4058ca5e44ee |
Rulename | Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server |
Description | This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-prem AD FS server. This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. More information in this blog: https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/ |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | DefenseEvasion |
Techniques | T1578 |
Required data connectors | AzureActivity |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Azure Activity/Analytic Rules/AADHybridHealthADFSNewServer.yaml |
Version | 2.0.0 |
Arm template | 88f453ff-7b9e-45bb-8c12-4058ca5e44ee.json |
AzureActivity
| where CategoryValue == 'Administrative'
| where ResourceProviderValue =~ 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService'
| where _ResourceId contains 'AdFederationService'
| where OperationNameValue =~ 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action'
| extend claimsJson = parse_json(Claims)
| extend AppId = tostring(claimsJson.appid)
| extend AccountName = tostring(claimsJson.name)
| project-away claimsJson
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Caller, IPCustomEntity = CallerIpAddress
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
description: |
'This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service.
A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-prem AD FS server.
This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. More information in this blog: https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/'
status: Available
relevantTechniques:
- T1578
name: Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Azure Activity/Analytic Rules/AADHybridHealthADFSNewServer.yaml
severity: Medium
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 2.0.0
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: AccountCustomEntity
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: IPCustomEntity
tags:
- SimuLand
id: 88f453ff-7b9e-45bb-8c12-4058ca5e44ee
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AzureActivity
dataTypes:
- AzureActivity
kind: Scheduled
query: |
AzureActivity
| where CategoryValue == 'Administrative'
| where ResourceProviderValue =~ 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService'
| where _ResourceId contains 'AdFederationService'
| where OperationNameValue =~ 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action'
| extend claimsJson = parse_json(Claims)
| extend AppId = tostring(claimsJson.appid)
| extend AccountName = tostring(claimsJson.name)
| project-away claimsJson
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Caller, IPCustomEntity = CallerIpAddress
queryPeriod: 1d
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/88f453ff-7b9e-45bb-8c12-4058ca5e44ee')]",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/88f453ff-7b9e-45bb-8c12-4058ca5e44ee')]",
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"apiVersion": "2022-11-01",
"properties": {
"displayName": "Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server",
"description": "'This detection uses AzureActivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service.\nA threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-prem AD FS server.\nThis can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. More information in this blog: https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/'\n",
"severity": "Medium",
"enabled": true,
"query": "AzureActivity\n| where CategoryValue == 'Administrative'\n| where ResourceProviderValue =~ 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService'\n| where _ResourceId contains 'AdFederationService'\n| where OperationNameValue =~ 'Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action'\n| extend claimsJson = parse_json(Claims)\n| extend AppId = tostring(claimsJson.appid)\n| extend AccountName = tostring(claimsJson.name)\n| project-away claimsJson\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Caller, IPCustomEntity = CallerIpAddress\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0,
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"DefenseEvasion"
],
"techniques": [
"T1578"
],
"alertRuleTemplateName": "88f453ff-7b9e-45bb-8c12-4058ca5e44ee",
"customDetails": null,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"identifier": "FullName",
"columnName": "AccountCustomEntity"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"identifier": "Address",
"columnName": "IPCustomEntity"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Azure Activity/Analytic Rules/AADHybridHealthADFSNewServer.yaml",
"status": "Available",
"tags": [
"SimuLand"
],
"templateVersion": "2.0.0"
}
}
]
}