Analytic rule catalog
Service Principal Name SPN Assigned to User Account
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| Id | 875d0eb1-883a-4191-bd0e-dbfdeb95a464 |
| Rulename | Service Principal Name (SPN) Assigned to User Account |
| Description | This query identifies whether an Active Directory user object was assigned a service principal name which could indicate that an adversary is preparing for performing Kerberoasting. This query checks for event id 5136, that the Object Class field is “user” and the LDAP Display Name is “servicePrincipalName”. Ref: https://thevivi.net/assets/docs/2019/theVIVI-AD-Security-Workshop_AfricaHackon2019.pdf |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | PrivilegeEscalation |
| Techniques | T1134 |
| Required data connectors | SecurityEvents |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1h |
| Query period | 1h |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/UserPrincipalNameAssignedToUserAccount.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.4 |
| Arm template | 875d0eb1-883a-4191-bd0e-dbfdeb95a464.json |
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136
| parse EventData with * 'AttributeLDAPDisplayName">' AttributeLDAPDisplayName "<" *
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectClass">' ObjectClass "<" *
| where AttributeLDAPDisplayName == "servicePrincipalName" and ObjectClass == "user"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| parse EventData with * 'AttributeValue">' AttributeValue "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, ObjectDN, AttributeValue, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex
name: Service Principal Name (SPN) Assigned to User Account
triggerOperator: gt
query: |
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 5136
| parse EventData with * 'AttributeLDAPDisplayName">' AttributeLDAPDisplayName "<" *
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectClass">' ObjectClass "<" *
| where AttributeLDAPDisplayName == "servicePrincipalName" and ObjectClass == "user"
| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN">' ObjectDN "<" *
| parse EventData with * 'AttributeValue">' AttributeValue "<" *
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, ObjectDN, AttributeValue, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex
queryFrequency: 1h
description: |
'This query identifies whether an Active Directory user object was assigned a service principal name which could indicate that an adversary is preparing for performing Kerberoasting.
This query checks for event id 5136, that the Object Class field is "user" and the LDAP Display Name is "servicePrincipalName".
Ref: https://thevivi.net/assets/docs/2019/theVIVI-AD-Security-Workshop_AfricaHackon2019.pdf'
id: 875d0eb1-883a-4191-bd0e-dbfdeb95a464
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled
relevantTechniques:
- T1134
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
metadata:
categories:
domains:
- Security - Others
- Identity
support:
tier: Community
author:
name: Vasileios Paschalidis
source:
kind: Community
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/UserPrincipalNameAssignedToUserAccount.yaml
tactics:
- PrivilegeEscalation
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: SubjectAccount
- identifier: Name
columnName: SubjectUserName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: SubjectDomainName
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Sid
columnName: SubjectUserSid
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: Computer
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: NTDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
entityType: Host
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/875d0eb1-883a-4191-bd0e-dbfdeb95a464')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/875d0eb1-883a-4191-bd0e-dbfdeb95a464')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "875d0eb1-883a-4191-bd0e-dbfdeb95a464",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'This query identifies whether an Active Directory user object was assigned a service principal name which could indicate that an adversary is preparing for performing Kerberoasting. \nThis query checks for event id 5136, that the Object Class field is \"user\" and the LDAP Display Name is \"servicePrincipalName\".\nRef: https://thevivi.net/assets/docs/2019/theVIVI-AD-Security-Workshop_AfricaHackon2019.pdf'\n",
"displayName": "Service Principal Name (SPN) Assigned to User Account",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SubjectAccount",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "SubjectUserName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "SubjectDomainName",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SubjectUserSid",
"identifier": "Sid"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "Computer",
"identifier": "FullName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostName",
"identifier": "HostName"
},
{
"columnName": "HostNameDomain",
"identifier": "NTDomain"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/SecurityEvent/UserPrincipalNameAssignedToUserAccount.yaml",
"query": "SecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 5136 \n| parse EventData with * 'AttributeLDAPDisplayName\">' AttributeLDAPDisplayName \"<\" *\n| parse EventData with * 'ObjectClass\">' ObjectClass \"<\" *\n| where AttributeLDAPDisplayName == \"servicePrincipalName\" and ObjectClass == \"user\"\n| parse EventData with * 'ObjectDN\">' ObjectDN \"<\" *\n| parse EventData with * 'AttributeValue\">' AttributeValue \"<\" *\n| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by Computer, SubjectAccount, ObjectDN, AttributeValue, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserSid\n| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, \".\")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))\n| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)\n| project-away DomainIndex\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"PrivilegeEscalation"
],
"techniques": [
"T1134"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.4",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}