Delinea - Bulk secret export access

let threshold = 10;
// Must stay <= queryPeriod. Wider than queryFrequency so a burst that straddles two runs
// still reaches the threshold.
let lookback = 1h;
// Must equal queryFrequency. A user is only evaluated when a secret event of theirs was
// ingested since the previous run, so the next run does not re-alert on a burst it has
// already counted - see 'Delinea - Failed authentication spike'.
let newSince = 30m;
let secretEventPattern = @"(?i)\.Secret\.(Viewed|Exported|Downloaded|Retrieved|Copied)";
let secretEvents =
    DelineaAuditEvents_CL
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
    | extend IngestedAt = ingestion_time()
    | extend d = parse_json(RawData)
    | extend EventName = tostring(d.eventType.name), SrcIP = tostring(d.source.host.network.ipAddress)
    | where EventName matches regex secretEventPattern;
let recentUsers = secretEvents | where IngestedAt > ago(newSince) | distinct User;
secretEvents
| where User in (recentUsers)
| extend IsExport = EventName has_any ("Exported", "Downloaded", "Retrieved", "Copied")
| summarize DistinctSecrets = dcount(SecretId), Secrets = make_set(SecretId, 50),
            TotalOperations = count(), Exports = countif(IsExport), Secret = take_any(SecretId),
            StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
        by User, SrcIP
| where DistinctSecrets >= threshold
| sort by DistinctSecrets desc

incidentConfiguration:
  groupingConfiguration:
    lookbackDuration: P1D
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    groupByEntities:
    - Account
    matchingMethod: Selected
    enabled: true
  createIncident: true
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Delinea%20Platform/Analytic%20Rules/DelineaMassSecretAccess.yaml
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 7ab54aed-f97e-4202-a624-3cbd496c3b68
kind: Scheduled
relevantTechniques:
- T1555
- T1212
version: 1.3.1
tactics:
- CredentialAccess
- Exfiltration
queryPeriod: 1h
queryFrequency: 30m
severity: Medium
name: Delinea - Bulk secret export / access
customDetails:
  DistinctSecrets: DistinctSecrets
  Exports: Exports
  TotalOperations: TotalOperations
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: DelineaPlatformConnector
  dataTypes:
  - DelineaAuditEvents_CL
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: User
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SrcIP
description: |
  Detects a single user accessing or exporting an unusually large number of distinct secrets in
  Delinea Secret Server within a short window. In addition to secret views, this rule also matches
  export / download / retrieve operations, which are a stronger signal of vault scraping prior to
  exfiltration ("secret hoarding"). Tune 'threshold' to your environment's normal access patterns.
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
status: Available
query: |
  let threshold = 10;
  // Must stay <= queryPeriod. Wider than queryFrequency so a burst that straddles two runs
  // still reaches the threshold.
  let lookback = 1h;
  // Must equal queryFrequency. A user is only evaluated when a secret event of theirs was
  // ingested since the previous run, so the next run does not re-alert on a burst it has
  // already counted - see 'Delinea - Failed authentication spike'.
  let newSince = 30m;
  let secretEventPattern = @"(?i)\.Secret\.(Viewed|Exported|Downloaded|Retrieved|Copied)";
  let secretEvents =
      DelineaAuditEvents_CL
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)
      | extend IngestedAt = ingestion_time()
      | extend d = parse_json(RawData)
      | extend EventName = tostring(d.eventType.name), SrcIP = tostring(d.source.host.network.ipAddress)
      | where EventName matches regex secretEventPattern;
  let recentUsers = secretEvents | where IngestedAt > ago(newSince) | distinct User;
  secretEvents
  | where User in (recentUsers)
  | extend IsExport = EventName has_any ("Exported", "Downloaded", "Retrieved", "Copied")
  | summarize DistinctSecrets = dcount(SecretId), Secrets = make_set(SecretId, 50),
              TotalOperations = count(), Exports = countif(IsExport), Secret = take_any(SecretId),
              StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)
          by User, SrcIP
  | where DistinctSecrets >= threshold
  | sort by DistinctSecrets desc

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/7ab54aed-f97e-4202-a624-3cbd496c3b68')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/7ab54aed-f97e-4202-a624-3cbd496c3b68')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "7ab54aed-f97e-4202-a624-3cbd496c3b68",
        "customDetails": {
          "DistinctSecrets": "DistinctSecrets",
          "Exports": "Exports",
          "TotalOperations": "TotalOperations"
        },
        "description": "Detects a single user accessing or exporting an unusually large number of distinct secrets in\nDelinea Secret Server within a short window. In addition to secret views, this rule also matches\nexport / download / retrieve operations, which are a stronger signal of vault scraping prior to\nexfiltration (\"secret hoarding\"). Tune 'threshold' to your environment's normal access patterns.\n",
        "displayName": "Delinea - Bulk secret export / access",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "User",
                "identifier": "Name"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SrcIP",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "eventGroupingSettings": {
          "aggregationKind": "AlertPerResult"
        },
        "incidentConfiguration": {
          "createIncident": true,
          "groupingConfiguration": {
            "enabled": true,
            "groupByEntities": [
              "Account"
            ],
            "lookbackDuration": "P1D",
            "matchingMethod": "Selected",
            "reopenClosedIncident": false
          }
        },
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Delinea%20Platform/Analytic%20Rules/DelineaMassSecretAccess.yaml",
        "query": "let threshold = 10;\n// Must stay <= queryPeriod. Wider than queryFrequency so a burst that straddles two runs\n// still reaches the threshold.\nlet lookback = 1h;\n// Must equal queryFrequency. A user is only evaluated when a secret event of theirs was\n// ingested since the previous run, so the next run does not re-alert on a burst it has\n// already counted - see 'Delinea - Failed authentication spike'.\nlet newSince = 30m;\nlet secretEventPattern = @\"(?i)\\.Secret\\.(Viewed|Exported|Downloaded|Retrieved|Copied)\";\nlet secretEvents =\n    DelineaAuditEvents_CL\n    | where TimeGenerated > ago(lookback)\n    | extend IngestedAt = ingestion_time()\n    | extend d = parse_json(RawData)\n    | extend EventName = tostring(d.eventType.name), SrcIP = tostring(d.source.host.network.ipAddress)\n    | where EventName matches regex secretEventPattern;\nlet recentUsers = secretEvents | where IngestedAt > ago(newSince) | distinct User;\nsecretEvents\n| where User in (recentUsers)\n| extend IsExport = EventName has_any (\"Exported\", \"Downloaded\", \"Retrieved\", \"Copied\")\n| summarize DistinctSecrets = dcount(SecretId), Secrets = make_set(SecretId, 50),\n            TotalOperations = count(), Exports = countif(IsExport), Secret = take_any(SecretId),\n            StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated)\n        by User, SrcIP\n| where DistinctSecrets >= threshold\n| sort by DistinctSecrets desc\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT30M",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CredentialAccess",
          "Exfiltration"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1212",
          "T1555"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.3.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}