let threshold = 10;
let stime = 10d;
let etime = 1d;
let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
_Im_Dns(starttime=ago(etime), domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
| summarize
StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated),
EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated),
DNSQueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery)
by SrcIpAddr
| where DNSQueryCount > threshold
| project StartTimeUtc, EndTimeUtc, SrcIpAddr, DNSQueryCount
| join kind=leftanti (_Im_Dns(starttime=ago(stime), endtime=ago(etime), domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
| summarize DNSQueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) by SrcIpAddr, bin(TimeGenerated, 1d)
| where DNSQueryCount > threshold
| project SrcIpAddr, DNSQueryCount
)
on SrcIpAddr
| join kind=inner (_Im_Dns(starttime=ago(etime), domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
| summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
on SrcIpAddr
| extend DNSQuerythreshold = threshold
| project-away SrcIpAddr1
eventGroupingSettings:
aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SrcIpAddr
requiredDataConnectors: []
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/DNS Essentials/Analytic Rules/RareClientObservedWithHighReverseDNSLookupCountStaticThresholdBased.yaml
customDetails:
DNSQueryCount: DNSQueryCount
DNSQueries: DNSQueries
DNSQuerythreshold: DNSQuerythreshold
tags:
- Schema: ASimDns
SchemaVersion: 0.1.6
name: Rare client observed with high reverse DNS lookup count - Static threshold based (ASIM DNS Solution)
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDisplayNameFormat: "[Static threshold] Rare client has been observed as making high reverse DNS lookup count - client IP: '{{SrcIpAddr}}'"
alertDescriptionFormat: |-
Client identified as making high reverse DNS counts which could be carrying out reconnaissance or discovery activity.
Reverse DNS lookup threshold is: '{{DNSQuerythreshold}}'
Current reverse DNS lookup count from this client is : '{{DNSQueryCount}}'
DNS queries requested by this client inlcude: '{{DNSQueries}}'
relevantTechniques:
- T1590
status: Available
version: 1.0.2
queryPeriod: 10d
kind: Scheduled
id: 77b7c820-5f60-4779-8bdb-f06e21add5f1
query: |
let threshold = 10;
let stime = 10d;
let etime = 1d;
let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
_Im_Dns(starttime=ago(etime), domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
| summarize
StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated),
EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated),
DNSQueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery)
by SrcIpAddr
| where DNSQueryCount > threshold
| project StartTimeUtc, EndTimeUtc, SrcIpAddr, DNSQueryCount
| join kind=leftanti (_Im_Dns(starttime=ago(stime), endtime=ago(etime), domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
| summarize DNSQueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) by SrcIpAddr, bin(TimeGenerated, 1d)
| where DNSQueryCount > threshold
| project SrcIpAddr, DNSQueryCount
)
on SrcIpAddr
| join kind=inner (_Im_Dns(starttime=ago(etime), domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
| summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
on SrcIpAddr
| extend DNSQuerythreshold = threshold
| project-away SrcIpAddr1
description: |
'This rule identifies clients with high reverse DNS counts, which could be carrying out reconnaissance or discovery activity. This helps in detecting the possible initial phases of an attack, like discovery and reconnaissance. It utilizes [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) normalization and is applied to any source that supports the ASIM DNS schema.'
queryFrequency: 1d
severity: Medium
triggerOperator: gt
tactics:
- Reconnaissance