ADOAuditLogs
| where OperationName =~ "AuditLog.StreamDisabledByUser"
| extend StreamType = tostring(Data.ConsumerType)
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Details, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, StreamType
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])
version: 1.0.4
severity: High
name: NRT Azure DevOps Audit Stream Disabled
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: ActorUPN
identifier: FullName
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- columnName: IpAddress
identifier: Address
entityType: IP
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/AzureDevOpsAuditing/Analytic Rules/NRT_ADOAuditStreamDisabled.yaml
id: 74ed028d-e392-40b7-baef-e69627bf89d1
kind: NRT
status: Available
relevantTechniques:
- T1562.008
description: |
'Azure DevOps allow for audit logs to be streamed to external storage solutions such as SIEM solutions. An attacker looking to hide malicious Azure DevOps activity from defenders may look to disable data streams before conducting activity and then re-enabling the stream after (so as not to raise data threshold-based alarms). Looking for disabled audit streams can identify this activity, and due to the nature of the action its unlikely to have a high false positive rate.'
query: |
ADOAuditLogs
| where OperationName =~ "AuditLog.StreamDisabledByUser"
| extend StreamType = tostring(Data.ConsumerType)
| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Details, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, StreamType
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
requiredDataConnectors: []