{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/719d5204-10ab-4b1f-aee1-da7326750260')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/719d5204-10ab-4b1f-aee1-da7326750260')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected {{EventName}} Event, updating inline CloudFormation escalation policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS CloudFormation privilege escalation policy update by {{AccountName}}"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "719d5204-10ab-4b1f-aee1-da7326750260",
        "customDetails": {
          "EventName": "EventName",
          "PolicyName": "PolicyName",
          "RecipientAccountId": "RecipientAccountId",
          "UserIdentityArn": "UserIdentityArn"
        },
        "description": "Detects creation of inline IAM policies with CloudFormation and IAM permissions associated with privilege\nescalation pathways, including iam:PassRole plus stack creation capabilities. This pattern can enable indirect\nelevation and should be investigated for unauthorized policy changes.\n",
        "displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - Privilege escalation via CloudFormation policy",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_PrivilegeEscalationViaCloudFormationPolicy.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n  | where EventName in (\"PutUserPolicy\",\"PutRolePolicy\",\"PutGroupPolicy\") and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)\n  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement\n  | mvexpand Statement\n  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)\n  | extend Action = tostring(Action)\n  | where Effect =~ \"Allow\" and (((Action has \"iam:*\" or Action has \"iam:PassRole\") and Action has \"cloudformation:*\") or ((Action has \"iam:*\" or Action has \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"cloudformation:DescribeStacks\" and Action contains \"cloudformation:CreateStack\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"cloudformation:Describe*\" and Action contains \"cloudformation:Create*\")) and Resource == \"*\" and Condition == \"\"\n  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityUserName\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1098.003"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1098"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}