Analytic rule catalog
AWSCloudTrail - S3 bucket exposed via ACL
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| Id | 6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44 |
| Rulename | AWSCloudTrail - S3 bucket exposed via ACL |
| Description | Detects S3 bucket ACL changes that grant public or broadly authenticated access. Overly permissive ACL assignments can expose bucket contents to unauthorized users. |
| Severity | Medium |
| Tactics | Exfiltration |
| Techniques | T1537 |
| Required data connectors | AWS |
| Kind | Scheduled |
| Query frequency | 1h |
| Query period | 1h |
| Trigger threshold | 0 |
| Trigger operator | gt |
| Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_S3BucketExposedviaACL.yaml |
| Version | 1.0.2 |
| Arm template | 6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44.json |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "PutBucketAcl" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant
| mvexpand Grant
| extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))
| extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.["xsi:type"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).["x-amz-acl"]
| where (type == "Group" and (URI endswith "AllUsers" or URI endswith "AuthenticatedUsers"))
or xamzacl in ("authenticated-read","public-read","public-read-write")
name: AWSCloudTrail - S3 bucket exposed via ACL
triggerOperator: gt
query: |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "PutBucketAcl" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant
| mvexpand Grant
| extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))
| extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.["xsi:type"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).["x-amz-acl"]
| where (type == "Group" and (URI endswith "AllUsers" or URI endswith "AuthenticatedUsers"))
or xamzacl in ("authenticated-read","public-read","public-read-write")
queryFrequency: 1h
description: |
Detects S3 bucket ACL changes that grant public or broadly authenticated access. Overly permissive ACL
assignments can expose bucket contents to unauthorized users.
id: 6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1h
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled
customDetails:
URI: URI
EventName: EventName
xamzacl: xamzacl
RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
status: Available
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_S3BucketExposedviaACL.yaml
alertDetailsOverride:
alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} from {{SourceIpAddress}} applying public or broad ACL on S3 bucket in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
alertDisplayNameFormat: AWS S3 bucket ACL exposure change by {{AccountName}}
relevantTechniques:
- T1537
tactics:
- Exfiltration
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
entityType: IP
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44')]",
"properties": {
"alertDetailsOverride": {
"alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected {{EventName}} from {{SourceIpAddress}} applying public or broad ACL on S3 bucket in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.",
"alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS S3 bucket ACL exposure change by {{AccountName}}"
},
"alertRuleTemplateName": "6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44",
"customDetails": {
"EventName": "EventName",
"RecipientAccountId": "RecipientAccountId",
"URI": "URI",
"xamzacl": "xamzacl"
},
"description": "Detects S3 bucket ACL changes that grant public or broadly authenticated access. Overly permissive ACL\nassignments can expose bucket contents to unauthorized users.\n",
"displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - S3 bucket exposed via ACL",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
},
{
"columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
"identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_S3BucketExposedviaACL.yaml",
"query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName == \"PutBucketAcl\" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant\n| mvexpand Grant\n| extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))\n| extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.[\"xsi:type\"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).[\"x-amz-acl\"]\n| where (type == \"Group\" and (URI endswith \"AllUsers\" or URI endswith \"AuthenticatedUsers\"))\n or xamzacl in (\"authenticated-read\",\"public-read\",\"public-read-write\")\n",
"queryFrequency": "PT1H",
"queryPeriod": "PT1H",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Exfiltration"
],
"techniques": [
"T1537"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.2",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}