S3 bucket exposed via ACL

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Id	6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44
Rulename	S3 bucket exposed via ACL
Description	Detected S3 bucket publicly exposed via ACL, which could lead for sensitive information leakage to the public. Verify the S3 object configurations.
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Exfiltration
Techniques	T1537
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1h
Query period	1h
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_S3BucketExposedviaACL.yaml
Version	1.0.1
Arm template	6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44.json

KQL

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName == "PutBucketAcl" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant
| mvexpand Grant
| extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))
| extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.["xsi:type"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).["x-amz-acl"]
| where (type == "Group" and (URI endswith "AllUsers" or URI endswith "AuthenticatedUsers"))
  or xamzacl in ("authenticated-read","public-read","public-read-write")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated

YAML

kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
description: |
    'Detected S3 bucket publicly exposed via ACL, which could lead for sensitive information leakage to the public. Verify the S3 object configurations.'
severity: Medium
queryFrequency: 1h
triggerThreshold: 0
relevantTechniques:
- T1537
status: Available
tactics:
- Exfiltration
name: S3 bucket exposed via ACL
id: 6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44
query: |
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where EventName == "PutBucketAcl" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant
  | mvexpand Grant
  | extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))
  | extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.["xsi:type"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).["x-amz-acl"]
  | where (type == "Group" and (URI endswith "AllUsers" or URI endswith "AuthenticatedUsers"))
    or xamzacl in ("authenticated-read","public-read","public-read-write")
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated  
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
version: 1.0.1
triggerOperator: gt
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_S3BucketExposedviaACL.yaml
queryPeriod: 1h

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "6b9b4ee6-f4c1-4b86-8c8c-beb0bb59ae44",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Detected S3 bucket publicly exposed via ACL, which could lead for sensitive information leakage to the public. Verify the S3 object configurations.'\n",
        "displayName": "S3 bucket exposed via ACL",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_S3BucketExposedviaACL.yaml",
        "query": "AWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName == \"PutBucketAcl\" and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| extend Grant = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).AccessControlPolicy))).AccessControlList.Grant\n| mvexpand Grant\n| extend cannedacl = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters))))\n| extend URI = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.URI, type = parse_json(Grant).Grantee.[\"xsi:type\"], xamzacl = parse_json(cannedacl).[\"x-amz-acl\"]\n| where (type == \"Group\" and (URI endswith \"AllUsers\" or URI endswith \"AuthenticatedUsers\"))\n  or xamzacl in (\"authenticated-read\",\"public-read\",\"public-read-write\")\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated\n",
        "queryFrequency": "PT1H",
        "queryPeriod": "PT1H",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Exfiltration"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1537"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.1",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}