Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility

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Id	66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1
Rulename	Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility
Description	This detects attempts to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command. This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks. The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it. Refer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol Refer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
Severity	Medium
Tactics	Execution
Techniques	T1204
Required data connectors	MicrosoftThreatProtection SecurityEvents
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/AuditPolicyManipulation_using_auditpol.yaml
Version	1.2.3
Arm template	66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1.json

KQL

let timeframe = 1d;
let AccountAllowList = dynamic(['SYSTEM']);
let SubCategoryList = dynamic(["Logoff", "Account Lockout", "User Account Management", "Authorization Policy Change"]); // Add any Category in the list to be allowed or disallowed
let tokens = dynamic(["clear", "remove", "success:disable","failure:disable"]); 
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
//| where Process =~ "auditpol.exe" 
| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where AccountType !~ "Machine" and Account !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse CommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountDomain = SubjectDomainName, DeviceName = Computer
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
// | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "auditpol.exe" 
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where AccountName !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName,  InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
),
(
Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
// | where OriginalFileName =~ "auditpol.exe"
| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where User !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse CommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, User, Process, ParentImage, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = tostring(split(User, @'\')[1]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(User, @'\')[0]), DeviceName = Computer
)
)
| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)

YAML

entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: Account
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: NTDomain
    columnName: AccountDomain
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
  - identifier: HostName
    columnName: DeviceName
queryFrequency: 1d
name: Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility
severity: Medium
kind: Scheduled
tactics:
- Execution
metadata:
  author:
    name: Microsoft Security Research
  source:
    kind: Community
  categories:
    domains:
    - Security - Others
  support:
    tier: Community
triggerThreshold: 0
query: |
  let timeframe = 1d;
  let AccountAllowList = dynamic(['SYSTEM']);
  let SubCategoryList = dynamic(["Logoff", "Account Lockout", "User Account Management", "Authorization Policy Change"]); // Add any Category in the list to be allowed or disallowed
  let tokens = dynamic(["clear", "remove", "success:disable","failure:disable"]); 
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  //| where Process =~ "auditpol.exe" 
  | where CommandLine has_any (tokens)
  | where AccountType !~ "Machine" and Account !in~ (AccountAllowList)
  | parse CommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
  | extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
  | where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
  | where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountDomain = SubjectDomainName, DeviceName = Computer
  ),
  (
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  // | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "auditpol.exe" 
  | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (tokens)
  | where AccountName !in~ (AccountAllowList)
  | parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
  | extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
  | where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
  | where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
  | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName,  InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
  ),
  (
  Event
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
  | where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 1
  | extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
  | mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
  | evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
  | extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
  | evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
  // | where OriginalFileName =~ "auditpol.exe"
  | where CommandLine has_any (tokens)
  | where User !in~ (AccountAllowList)
  | parse CommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
  | extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
  | where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
  | where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, User, Process, ParentImage, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = tostring(split(User, @'\')[1]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(User, @'\')[0]), DeviceName = Computer
  )
  )
  | extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)  
triggerOperator: gt
queryPeriod: 1d
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/AuditPolicyManipulation_using_auditpol.yaml
relevantTechniques:
- T1204
tags:
- Solorigate
- NOBELIUM
id: 66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
  dataTypes:
  - SecurityEvent
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
version: 1.2.3
description: |
  This detects attempts to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command.
  This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
  The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
  Refer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol  
  Refer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
  https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "This detects attempts to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command.\nThis technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.\nThe process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.\nRefer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol  \nRefer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/\n",
        "displayName": "Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "Account",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountDomain",
                "identifier": "NTDomain"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Host",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "DeviceName",
                "identifier": "HostName"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/AuditPolicyManipulation_using_auditpol.yaml",
        "query": "let timeframe = 1d;\nlet AccountAllowList = dynamic(['SYSTEM']);\nlet SubCategoryList = dynamic([\"Logoff\", \"Account Lockout\", \"User Account Management\", \"Authorization Policy Change\"]); // Add any Category in the list to be allowed or disallowed\nlet tokens = dynamic([\"clear\", \"remove\", \"success:disable\",\"failure:disable\"]); \n(union isfuzzy=true\n(\nSecurityEvent\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)\n//| where Process =~ \"auditpol.exe\" \n| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)\n| where AccountType !~ \"Machine\" and Account !in~ (AccountAllowList)\n| parse CommandLine with * \"/subcategory:\" subcategorytoken\n| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[2])\n| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion\n| where Toggle !in~ (\"/failure:disable\", \" /success:enable /failure:disable\") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = SubjectUserName, AccountDomain = SubjectDomainName, DeviceName = Computer\n),\n(\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)\n// | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"auditpol.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (tokens)\n| where AccountName !in~ (AccountAllowList)\n| parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * \"/subcategory:\" subcategorytoken\n| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[2])\n| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion\n| where Toggle !in~ (\"/failure:disable\", \" /success:enable /failure:disable\") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName,  InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain\n),\n(\nEvent\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n| where Source == \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n| where EventID == 1\n| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data\n| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData\n| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)\n| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']\n| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)\n// | where OriginalFileName =~ \"auditpol.exe\"\n| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)\n| where User !in~ (AccountAllowList)\n| parse CommandLine with * \"/subcategory:\" subcategorytoken\n| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[1]) , Toggle =  tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[2])\n| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion\n| where Toggle !in~ (\"/failure:disable\", \" /success:enable /failure:disable\") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, User, Process, ParentImage, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountName = tostring(split(User, @'\\')[1]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(User, @'\\')[0]), DeviceName = Computer\n)\n)\n| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, \"\\\\\", AccountName)\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Medium",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "Execution"
        ],
        "tags": [
          "Solorigate",
          "NOBELIUM"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1204"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.2.3",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}