Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility
Id | 66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1 |
Rulename | Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility |
Description | This detects attempt to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command. This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks. The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it. Refer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol Refer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | Execution |
Techniques | T1204 |
Required data connectors | MicrosoftThreatProtection SecurityEvents |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/AuditPolicyManipulation_using_auditpol.yaml |
Version | 1.0.1 |
Arm template | 66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1.json |
let timeframe = 1d;
let AccountAllowList = dynamic(['SYSTEM']);
let SubCategoryList = dynamic(["Logoff", "Account Lockout", "User Account Management", "Authorization Policy Change"]); // Add any Category in the list to be allowed or disallowed
let tokens = dynamic(["clear", "remove", "success:disable","failure:disable"]);
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
//| where Process =~ "auditpol.exe"
| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where AccountType !~ "Machine" and Account !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse CommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
// | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "auditpol.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where AccountName !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = AccountName, HostCustomEntity = DeviceName
),
(
Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
// | where OriginalFileName =~ "auditpol.exe"
| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where User !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse CommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, User, Process, ParentImage, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = User, HostCustomEntity = Computer
)
)
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
support:
tier: Community
categories:
domains:
- Security - Others
source:
kind: Community
author:
name: jannieli
severity: Medium
tags:
- Solorigate
- NOBELIUM
name: Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: AccountCustomEntity
identifier: FullName
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- columnName: HostCustomEntity
identifier: FullName
relevantTechniques:
- T1204
queryFrequency: 1d
triggerThreshold: 0
queryPeriod: 1d
description: |
This detects attempt to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command.
This technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.
The process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but
if the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.
Refer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol
Refer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
id: 66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/AuditPolicyManipulation_using_auditpol.yaml
version: 1.0.1
tactics:
- Execution
query: |
let timeframe = 1d;
let AccountAllowList = dynamic(['SYSTEM']);
let SubCategoryList = dynamic(["Logoff", "Account Lockout", "User Account Management", "Authorization Policy Change"]); // Add any Category in the list to be allowed or disallowed
let tokens = dynamic(["clear", "remove", "success:disable","failure:disable"]);
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
//| where Process =~ "auditpol.exe"
| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where AccountType !~ "Machine" and Account !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse CommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer
),
(
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
// | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "auditpol.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where AccountName !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = AccountName, HostCustomEntity = DeviceName
),
(
Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
// | where OriginalFileName =~ "auditpol.exe"
| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)
| where User !in~ (AccountAllowList)
| parse CommandLine with * "/subcategory:" subcategorytoken
| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, "\"")[2])
| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion
| where Toggle !in~ ("/failure:disable", " /success:enable /failure:disable") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, User, Process, ParentImage, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = User, HostCustomEntity = Computer
)
)
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
connectorId: SecurityEvents
- dataTypes:
- DeviceProcessEvents
connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
triggerOperator: gt
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1')]",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1')]",
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"apiVersion": "2022-11-01-preview",
"properties": {
"displayName": "Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility",
"description": "This detects attempt to manipulate audit policies using auditpol command.\nThis technique was seen in relation to Solorigate attack but the results can indicate potential malicious activity used in different attacks.\nThe process name in each data source is commented out as an adversary could rename it. It is advisable to keep process name commented but \nif the results show unrelated false positives, users may want to uncomment it.\nRefer to auditpol syntax: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/auditpol \nRefer to our M365 blog for details on use during the Solorigate attack:\nhttps://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/\n",
"severity": "Medium",
"enabled": true,
"query": "let timeframe = 1d;\nlet AccountAllowList = dynamic(['SYSTEM']);\nlet SubCategoryList = dynamic([\"Logoff\", \"Account Lockout\", \"User Account Management\", \"Authorization Policy Change\"]); // Add any Category in the list to be allowed or disallowed\nlet tokens = dynamic([\"clear\", \"remove\", \"success:disable\",\"failure:disable\"]); \n(union isfuzzy=true\n(\nSecurityEvent\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)\n//| where Process =~ \"auditpol.exe\" \n| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)\n| where AccountType !~ \"Machine\" and Account !in~ (AccountAllowList)\n| parse CommandLine with * \"/subcategory:\" subcategorytoken\n| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[2])\n| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion\n| where Toggle !in~ (\"/failure:disable\", \" /success:enable /failure:disable\") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, SubjectDomainName, SubjectUserName, Process, ParentProcessName, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = Account, HostCustomEntity = Computer\n),\n(\nDeviceProcessEvents\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)\n// | where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ \"auditpol.exe\" \n| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (tokens)\n| where AccountName !in~ (AccountAllowList)\n| parse InitiatingProcessCommandLine with * \"/subcategory:\" subcategorytoken\n| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[2])\n| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion\n| where Toggle !in~ (\"/failure:disable\", \" /success:enable /failure:disable\") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles\n| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = AccountName, HostCustomEntity = DeviceName\n),\n(\nEvent\n| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)\n| where Source == \"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\"\n| where EventID == 1\n| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data\n| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData\n| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)\n| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']\n| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, EventID, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)\n// | where OriginalFileName =~ \"auditpol.exe\"\n| where CommandLine has_any (tokens)\n| where User !in~ (AccountAllowList)\n| parse CommandLine with * \"/subcategory:\" subcategorytoken\n| extend SubCategory = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[1]) , Toggle = tostring(split(subcategorytoken, \"\\\"\")[2])\n| where SubCategory in~ (SubCategoryList) //use in~ for inclusion or !in~ for exclusion\n| where Toggle !in~ (\"/failure:disable\", \" /success:enable /failure:disable\") // use this filter if required to exclude certain toggles\n| project TimeGenerated, Computer, User, Process, ParentImage, CommandLine, SubCategory, Toggle\n| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, AccountCustomEntity = User, HostCustomEntity = Computer\n)\n)\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0,
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"Execution"
],
"techniques": [
"T1204"
],
"alertRuleTemplateName": "66276b14-32c5-4226-88e3-080dacc31ce1",
"customDetails": null,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"identifier": "FullName",
"columnName": "AccountCustomEntity"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "Host",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"identifier": "FullName",
"columnName": "HostCustomEntity"
}
]
}
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.1",
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/AuditPolicyManipulation_using_auditpol.yaml",
"tags": [
"Solorigate",
"NOBELIUM"
]
}
}
]
}