Beacon Traffic Based on Common User Agents Visiting Limited Number of Domains
Id | 6345c923-99eb-4a83-b11d-7af0ffa75577 |
Rulename | Beacon Traffic Based on Common User Agents Visiting Limited Number of Domains |
Description | This query searches web proxy logs for a specific type of beaconing behavior by joining a number of sources together: - Traffic by actual web browsers - by looking at traffic generated by a UserAgent that looks like a browser and is used by multiple users to visit a large number of domains. - Users that make requests using one of these actual browsers, but only to a small set of domains, none of which are common domains. - The traffic is beacon-like; meaning that it occurs during many different hours of the day (i.e. periodic). |
Severity | Medium |
Tactics | CommandAndControl |
Techniques | T1071.001 |
Required data connectors | Zscaler |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 7d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/RecognizingBeaconingTraffic.yaml |
Version | 1.0.1 |
Arm template | 6345c923-99eb-4a83-b11d-7af0ffa75577.json |
let timeframe = 1d; // Timeframe during which to search for beaconing behavior.
let lookback = 7d; // Look back period to find if browser was used for other domains by user.
let min_requests=50; // Minimum number of requests to consider it beacon traffic.
let min_hours=8; // Minimum number of different hours during which connections were made to consider it beacon traffic.
let trusted_user_count=10; // If visited by this many users a domain is considered 'trusted'.
let max_sites=3; // Maximum number of different sites visited using this user-agent.
// Client-specific query to obtain 'browser-like' traffic from proxy logs.
let BrowserTraffic = (p:timespan) {
CommonSecurityLog
| where DeviceVendor == "Zscaler" and DeviceProduct == "NSSWeblog"
| where TimeGenerated >ago(p)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName, RequestClientApplication
| where (RequestClientApplication startswith "Mozilla/" and RequestClientApplication contains "Gecko")
};
let CommonDomains = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)
| summarize source_count=dcount(SourceUserName) by DestinationHostName
| where source_count>trusted_user_count
| project DestinationHostName;
let CommonUA = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)
| summarize source_count=dcount(SourceUserName), host_count=dcount(DestinationHostName) by RequestClientApplication
| where source_count>trusted_user_count and host_count > 100 // Normal browsers are browsers used by many people and visiting many different sites.
| project RequestClientApplication;
// Find browsers that are common, i.e. many users use them and they use them to visit many different sites,
// but some users only use the browser to visit a very limited set of sites.
// These are considered suspicious, since they might be an attacker masquerading a beacon as a legitimate browser.
let SuspiciousBrowers = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)
| where RequestClientApplication in(CommonUA)
| summarize BrowserHosts=make_set(DestinationHostName),request_count=count() by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName
| where array_length(BrowserHosts) <= max_sites and request_count >= min_requests
| project RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName,BrowserHosts;
// Just reporting on suspicious browsers gives too many false positives.
// For example, users that have the browser open on the login screen of 1 specific application.
// In the suspicious browsers we can search for 'beacon-like' behavior.
// Get all browser traffic by the suspicious browsers.
let PotentialAlerts=SuspiciousBrowers
| join BrowserTraffic(timeframe) on RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName
// Find beaconing-like traffic - i.e. contacting the same host in many different hours.
| summarize hour_count=dcount(bin(TimeGenerated,1h)), BrowserHosts=any(BrowserHosts), request_count=count() by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName
| where hour_count >= min_hours and request_count >= min_requests
// Remove common domains like login.microsoft.com.
| join kind=leftanti CommonDomains on DestinationHostName
| summarize RareHosts=make_set(DestinationHostName), TotalRequestCount=sum(request_count), BrowserHosts=any(BrowserHosts) by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName
// Remove browsers that visit any common domains.
| where array_length(RareHosts) == array_length(BrowserHosts);
// Look back for X days to see if the browser was not used to visit more hosts.
// This is to get rid of someone that started up the browser a long time ago, and left only a single tab open.
PotentialAlerts
| join BrowserTraffic(lookback) on SourceUserName, RequestClientApplication
| summarize RareHosts=any(RareHosts),BrowserHosts1d=any(BrowserHosts),BrowserHostsLookback=make_set(DestinationHostName) by SourceUserName, RequestClientApplication
| where array_length(RareHosts) == array_length(BrowserHostsLookback)
relevantTechniques:
- T1071.001
name: Beacon Traffic Based on Common User Agents Visiting Limited Number of Domains
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- CommonSecurityLog
connectorId: Zscaler
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: SourceUserName
entityType: Account
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 6345c923-99eb-4a83-b11d-7af0ffa75577
tactics:
- CommandAndControl
version: 1.0.1
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/RecognizingBeaconingTraffic.yaml
queryPeriod: 7d
kind: Scheduled
queryFrequency: 1d
severity: Medium
status: Available
description: |
This query searches web proxy logs for a specific type of beaconing behavior by joining a number of sources together:
- Traffic by actual web browsers - by looking at traffic generated by a UserAgent that looks like a browser and is used by multiple users to visit a large number of domains.
- Users that make requests using one of these actual browsers, but only to a small set of domains, none of which are common domains.
- The traffic is beacon-like; meaning that it occurs during many different hours of the day (i.e. periodic).
query: |
let timeframe = 1d; // Timeframe during which to search for beaconing behavior.
let lookback = 7d; // Look back period to find if browser was used for other domains by user.
let min_requests=50; // Minimum number of requests to consider it beacon traffic.
let min_hours=8; // Minimum number of different hours during which connections were made to consider it beacon traffic.
let trusted_user_count=10; // If visited by this many users a domain is considered 'trusted'.
let max_sites=3; // Maximum number of different sites visited using this user-agent.
// Client-specific query to obtain 'browser-like' traffic from proxy logs.
let BrowserTraffic = (p:timespan) {
CommonSecurityLog
| where DeviceVendor == "Zscaler" and DeviceProduct == "NSSWeblog"
| where TimeGenerated >ago(p)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName, RequestClientApplication
| where (RequestClientApplication startswith "Mozilla/" and RequestClientApplication contains "Gecko")
};
let CommonDomains = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)
| summarize source_count=dcount(SourceUserName) by DestinationHostName
| where source_count>trusted_user_count
| project DestinationHostName;
let CommonUA = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)
| summarize source_count=dcount(SourceUserName), host_count=dcount(DestinationHostName) by RequestClientApplication
| where source_count>trusted_user_count and host_count > 100 // Normal browsers are browsers used by many people and visiting many different sites.
| project RequestClientApplication;
// Find browsers that are common, i.e. many users use them and they use them to visit many different sites,
// but some users only use the browser to visit a very limited set of sites.
// These are considered suspicious, since they might be an attacker masquerading a beacon as a legitimate browser.
let SuspiciousBrowers = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)
| where RequestClientApplication in(CommonUA)
| summarize BrowserHosts=make_set(DestinationHostName),request_count=count() by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName
| where array_length(BrowserHosts) <= max_sites and request_count >= min_requests
| project RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName,BrowserHosts;
// Just reporting on suspicious browsers gives too many false positives.
// For example, users that have the browser open on the login screen of 1 specific application.
// In the suspicious browsers we can search for 'beacon-like' behavior.
// Get all browser traffic by the suspicious browsers.
let PotentialAlerts=SuspiciousBrowers
| join BrowserTraffic(timeframe) on RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName
// Find beaconing-like traffic - i.e. contacting the same host in many different hours.
| summarize hour_count=dcount(bin(TimeGenerated,1h)), BrowserHosts=any(BrowserHosts), request_count=count() by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName
| where hour_count >= min_hours and request_count >= min_requests
// Remove common domains like login.microsoft.com.
| join kind=leftanti CommonDomains on DestinationHostName
| summarize RareHosts=make_set(DestinationHostName), TotalRequestCount=sum(request_count), BrowserHosts=any(BrowserHosts) by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName
// Remove browsers that visit any common domains.
| where array_length(RareHosts) == array_length(BrowserHosts);
// Look back for X days to see if the browser was not used to visit more hosts.
// This is to get rid of someone that started up the browser a long time ago, and left only a single tab open.
PotentialAlerts
| join BrowserTraffic(lookback) on SourceUserName, RequestClientApplication
| summarize RareHosts=any(RareHosts),BrowserHosts1d=any(BrowserHosts),BrowserHostsLookback=make_set(DestinationHostName) by SourceUserName, RequestClientApplication
| where array_length(RareHosts) == array_length(BrowserHostsLookback)
triggerOperator: gt
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/6345c923-99eb-4a83-b11d-7af0ffa75577')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/6345c923-99eb-4a83-b11d-7af0ffa75577')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "6345c923-99eb-4a83-b11d-7af0ffa75577",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "This query searches web proxy logs for a specific type of beaconing behavior by joining a number of sources together: \n- Traffic by actual web browsers - by looking at traffic generated by a UserAgent that looks like a browser and is used by multiple users to visit a large number of domains.\n- Users that make requests using one of these actual browsers, but only to a small set of domains, none of which are common domains.\n- The traffic is beacon-like; meaning that it occurs during many different hours of the day (i.e. periodic). \n",
"displayName": "Beacon Traffic Based on Common User Agents Visiting Limited Number of Domains",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SourceUserName",
"identifier": "FullName"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/FalconFriday/Analytic Rules/RecognizingBeaconingTraffic.yaml",
"query": "let timeframe = 1d; // Timeframe during which to search for beaconing behavior.\nlet lookback = 7d; // Look back period to find if browser was used for other domains by user.\nlet min_requests=50; // Minimum number of requests to consider it beacon traffic.\nlet min_hours=8; // Minimum number of different hours during which connections were made to consider it beacon traffic.\nlet trusted_user_count=10; // If visited by this many users a domain is considered 'trusted'.\nlet max_sites=3; // Maximum number of different sites visited using this user-agent.\n// Client-specific query to obtain 'browser-like' traffic from proxy logs.\nlet BrowserTraffic = (p:timespan) {\nCommonSecurityLog\n| where DeviceVendor == \"Zscaler\" and DeviceProduct == \"NSSWeblog\"\n| where TimeGenerated >ago(p)\n| project TimeGenerated, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName, RequestClientApplication\n| where (RequestClientApplication startswith \"Mozilla/\" and RequestClientApplication contains \"Gecko\")\n};\nlet CommonDomains = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)\n| summarize source_count=dcount(SourceUserName) by DestinationHostName\n| where source_count>trusted_user_count\n| project DestinationHostName;\nlet CommonUA = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)\n| summarize source_count=dcount(SourceUserName), host_count=dcount(DestinationHostName) by RequestClientApplication\n| where source_count>trusted_user_count and host_count > 100 // Normal browsers are browsers used by many people and visiting many different sites.\n| project RequestClientApplication;\n// Find browsers that are common, i.e. many users use them and they use them to visit many different sites,\n// but some users only use the browser to visit a very limited set of sites.\n// These are considered suspicious, since they might be an attacker masquerading a beacon as a legitimate browser.\nlet SuspiciousBrowers = BrowserTraffic(timeframe)\n| where RequestClientApplication in(CommonUA)\n| summarize BrowserHosts=make_set(DestinationHostName),request_count=count() by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName\n| where array_length(BrowserHosts) <= max_sites and request_count >= min_requests\n| project RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName,BrowserHosts;\n// Just reporting on suspicious browsers gives too many false positives.\n// For example, users that have the browser open on the login screen of 1 specific application.\n// In the suspicious browsers we can search for 'beacon-like' behavior.\n// Get all browser traffic by the suspicious browsers.\nlet PotentialAlerts=SuspiciousBrowers\n| join BrowserTraffic(timeframe) on RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName\n// Find beaconing-like traffic - i.e. contacting the same host in many different hours.\n| summarize hour_count=dcount(bin(TimeGenerated,1h)), BrowserHosts=any(BrowserHosts), request_count=count() by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName, DestinationHostName\n| where hour_count >= min_hours and request_count >= min_requests\n// Remove common domains like login.microsoft.com.\n| join kind=leftanti CommonDomains on DestinationHostName\n| summarize RareHosts=make_set(DestinationHostName), TotalRequestCount=sum(request_count), BrowserHosts=any(BrowserHosts) by RequestClientApplication, SourceUserName\n// Remove browsers that visit any common domains.\n| where array_length(RareHosts) == array_length(BrowserHosts);\n// Look back for X days to see if the browser was not used to visit more hosts.\n// This is to get rid of someone that started up the browser a long time ago, and left only a single tab open.\nPotentialAlerts\n| join BrowserTraffic(lookback) on SourceUserName, RequestClientApplication\n| summarize RareHosts=any(RareHosts),BrowserHosts1d=any(BrowserHosts),BrowserHostsLookback=make_set(DestinationHostName) by SourceUserName, RequestClientApplication\n| where array_length(RareHosts) == array_length(BrowserHostsLookback)\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P7D",
"severity": "Medium",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [
"T1071.001"
],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"CommandAndControl"
],
"techniques": [
"T1071"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.1",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}