Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs

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Id	633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559
Rulename	Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs
Description	Attackers often try to hide their steps by deleting or stopping the collection of logs that could show their activity. This alert identifies any manipulation of AWS CloudTrail, Cloudwatch/EventBridge or VPC Flow logs. More Information: AWS CloudTrail API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html AWS Cloudwatch/Eventbridge API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eventbridge/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html AWS DelteteFlowLogs API : https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html
Severity	High
Tactics	DefenseEvasion
Techniques	T1070
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559.json

KQL

let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus","DeleteLogGroup"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
 AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, 
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc

YAML

query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus","DeleteLogGroup"]);
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
   AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, 
  UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
  | extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc  
queryPeriod: 1d
queryFrequency: 1d
status: Available
id: 633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
relevantTechniques:
- T1070
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
name: Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs
description: |
  'Attackers often try to hide their steps by deleting or stopping the collection of logs that could show their activity. 
  This alert identifies any manipulation of AWS CloudTrail, Cloudwatch/EventBridge or VPC Flow logs.
  More Information: AWS CloudTrail API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html 
  AWS Cloudwatch/Eventbridge API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eventbridge/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html 
  AWS DelteteFlowLogs API : https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html '  
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
severity: High
triggerThreshold: 0
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled
triggerOperator: gt

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559",
        "customDetails": null,
        "description": "'Attackers often try to hide their steps by deleting or stopping the collection of logs that could show their activity. \nThis alert identifies any manipulation of AWS CloudTrail, Cloudwatch/EventBridge or VPC Flow logs.\nMore Information: AWS CloudTrail API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html \nAWS Cloudwatch/Eventbridge API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eventbridge/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html \nAWS DelteteFlowLogs API : https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html '\n",
        "displayName": "Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml",
        "query": "let EventNameList = dynamic([\"UpdateTrail\",\"DeleteTrail\",\"StopLogging\",\"DeleteFlowLogs\",\"DeleteEventBus\",\"DeleteLogGroup\"]);\nAWSCloudTrail\n| where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == \"UpdateTrail\" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == \"UpdateTrail\" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, \nUserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource\n| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1070"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.4",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}