AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs | Microsoft Sentinel Analytic Rules

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Id	633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559
Rulename	AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs
Description	Detects successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail, CloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction of incident visibility by an attacker.
Severity	High
Tactics	DefenseEvasion
Techniques	T1562.008
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml
Version	1.0.5
Arm template	633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559.json

KQL

let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus","DeleteLogGroup"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
 AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, 
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource

YAML

version: 1.0.5
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml
triggerThreshold: 0
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
  connectorId: AWS
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
- T1562.008
kind: Scheduled
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} in {{AWSRegion}} affecting account {{RecipientAccountId}} logging telemetry.
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS log tampering attempt: {{EventName}} by {{AccountName}}'
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
  entityType: IP
description: |
  Detects successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail,
  CloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction
  of incident visibility by an attacker.
triggerOperator: gt
status: Available
queryFrequency: 1d
id: 633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559
name: AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs
severity: High
query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus","DeleteLogGroup"]);
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
   AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, 
  UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
queryPeriod: 1d
customDetails:
  EventTypeName: EventTypeName
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
  EventName: EventName
  EventSource: EventSource

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected {{EventName}} in {{AWSRegion}} affecting account {{RecipientAccountId}} logging telemetry.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS log tampering attempt: {{EventName}} by {{AccountName}}"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559",
        "customDetails": {
          "AWSRegion": "AWSRegion",
          "EventName": "EventName",
          "EventSource": "EventSource",
          "EventTypeName": "EventTypeName"
        },
        "description": "Detects successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail,\nCloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction\nof incident visibility by an attacker.\n",
        "displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - Tampering to AWS CloudTrail logs",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml",
        "query": "let EventNameList = dynamic([\"UpdateTrail\",\"DeleteTrail\",\"StopLogging\",\"DeleteFlowLogs\",\"DeleteEventBus\",\"DeleteLogGroup\"]);\nAWSCloudTrail\n| where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == \"UpdateTrail\" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == \"UpdateTrail\" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, \nUserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1562.008"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1562"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.5",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}