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AWSCloudTrail - Successful Tampering with AWS CloudTrail Logs

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Id633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559
RulenameAWSCloudTrail - Successful Tampering with AWS CloudTrail Logs
DescriptionIdentifies successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail,

CloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction

of incident visibility by an attacker.
SeverityHigh
TacticsDefenseEvasion
TechniquesT1562.008
Required data connectorsAWS
AWSS3
KindScheduled
Query frequency1d
Query period1d
Trigger threshold0
Trigger operatorgt
Source Urihttps://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml
Version1.0.6
Arm template633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559.json
Deploy To Azure
let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus","DeleteLogGroup"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
 AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, 
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource

queryPeriod: 1d
id: 633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
triggerOperator: gt
status: Available
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} in {{AWSRegion}} affecting account {{RecipientAccountId}} logging telemetry.
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS log tampering attempt: {{EventName}} by {{AccountName}}'
version: 1.0.6
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
- connectorId: AWSS3
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
kind: Scheduled
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: AccountName
    identifier: Name
  - columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
    identifier: UPNSuffix
  - columnName: RecipientAccountId
    identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
  fieldMappings:
  - columnName: SourceIpAddress
    identifier: Address
query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus","DeleteLogGroup"]);
  AWSCloudTrail
  | where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == "UpdateTrail" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
   AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, 
  UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
queryFrequency: 1d
customDetails:
  EventSource: EventSource
  AWSRegion: AWSRegion
  EventTypeName: EventTypeName
  UserAgent: UserAgent
  EventName: EventName
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml
relevantTechniques:
- T1562.008
name: AWSCloudTrail - Successful Tampering with AWS CloudTrail Logs
severity: High
description: |
  Identifies successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail,
  CloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction
  of incident visibility by an attacker.
triggerThreshold: 0

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected {{EventName}} in {{AWSRegion}} affecting account {{RecipientAccountId}} logging telemetry.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS log tampering attempt: {{EventName}} by {{AccountName}}"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "633a91df-d031-4b6e-a413-607a61540559",
        "customDetails": {
          "AWSRegion": "AWSRegion",
          "EventName": "EventName",
          "EventSource": "EventSource",
          "EventTypeName": "EventTypeName",
          "UserAgent": "UserAgent"
        },
        "description": "Identifies successful attempts to disable, delete, or weaken AWS logging telemetry, including CloudTrail,\nCloudWatch/EventBridge, and VPC flow logs. This behavior can indicate defense evasion and deliberate reduction\nof incident visibility by an attacker.\n",
        "displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - Successful Tampering with AWS CloudTrail Logs",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_LogTampering.yaml",
        "query": "let EventNameList = dynamic([\"UpdateTrail\",\"DeleteTrail\",\"StopLogging\",\"DeleteFlowLogs\",\"DeleteEventBus\",\"DeleteLogGroup\"]);\nAWSCloudTrail\n| where (EventName in~ (EventNameList) or (EventName == \"UpdateTrail\" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).enableLogFileValidation) == false) or (EventName == \"UpdateTrail\" and (parse_json(RequestParameters).isMultiRegionTrail) == false)) and isempty(ErrorMessage) and isempty(ErrorCode)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent, \nUserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1562.008"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1562"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.6",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}