Changes made to AWS CloudTrail logs
Id | 610d3850-c26f-4f20-8d86-f10fdf2425f5 |
Rulename | Changes made to AWS CloudTrail logs |
Description | Attackers often try to hide their steps by deleting or stopping the collection of logs that could show their activity. This alert identifies any manipulation of AWS CloudTrail, Cloudwatch/EventBridge or VPC Flow logs. More Information: AWS CloudTrail API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html AWS Cloudwatch/Eventbridge API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eventbridge/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html AWS DelteteFlowLogs API : https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html ' |
Severity | Low |
Tactics | DefenseEvasion |
Techniques | T1070 |
Required data connectors | AWS AWSS3 |
Kind | Scheduled |
Query frequency | 1d |
Query period | 1d |
Trigger threshold | 0 |
Trigger operator | gt |
Source Uri | https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ClearStopChangeTrailLogs.yaml |
Version | 1.0.4 |
Arm template | 610d3850-c26f-4f20-8d86-f10fdf2425f5.json |
let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in~ (EventNameList)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc
queryPeriod: 1d
version: 1.0.4
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
queryFrequency: 1d
id: 610d3850-c26f-4f20-8d86-f10fdf2425f5
triggerOperator: gt
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
connectorId: AWS
- dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
connectorId: AWSS3
severity: Low
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- columnName: AccountName
identifier: Name
- columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
identifier: UPNSuffix
- columnName: RecipientAccountId
identifier: CloudAppAccountId
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- columnName: SourceIpAddress
identifier: Address
triggerThreshold: 0
relevantTechniques:
- T1070
query: |
let EventNameList = dynamic(["UpdateTrail","DeleteTrail","StopLogging","DeleteFlowLogs","DeleteEventBus"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in~ (EventNameList)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource
| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc
kind: Scheduled
name: Changes made to AWS CloudTrail logs
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ClearStopChangeTrailLogs.yaml
description: |
'Attackers often try to hide their steps by deleting or stopping the collection of logs that could show their activity.
This alert identifies any manipulation of AWS CloudTrail, Cloudwatch/EventBridge or VPC Flow logs.
More Information: AWS CloudTrail API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html
AWS Cloudwatch/Eventbridge API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eventbridge/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html
AWS DelteteFlowLogs API : https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html '
status: Available
{
"$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
"contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
"parameters": {
"workspace": {
"type": "String"
}
},
"resources": [
{
"apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
"id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/610d3850-c26f-4f20-8d86-f10fdf2425f5')]",
"kind": "Scheduled",
"name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/610d3850-c26f-4f20-8d86-f10fdf2425f5')]",
"properties": {
"alertRuleTemplateName": "610d3850-c26f-4f20-8d86-f10fdf2425f5",
"customDetails": null,
"description": "'Attackers often try to hide their steps by deleting or stopping the collection of logs that could show their activity.\nThis alert identifies any manipulation of AWS CloudTrail, Cloudwatch/EventBridge or VPC Flow logs.\nMore Information: AWS CloudTrail API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html \nAWS Cloudwatch/Eventbridge API: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/eventbridge/latest/APIReference/API_Operations.html \nAWS DelteteFlowLogs API : https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html ' \n",
"displayName": "Changes made to AWS CloudTrail logs",
"enabled": true,
"entityMappings": [
{
"entityType": "Account",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "AccountName",
"identifier": "Name"
},
{
"columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
"identifier": "UPNSuffix"
},
{
"columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
"identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
}
]
},
{
"entityType": "IP",
"fieldMappings": [
{
"columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
"identifier": "Address"
}
]
}
],
"OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon Web Services/Analytic Rules/AWS_ClearStopChangeTrailLogs.yaml",
"query": "let EventNameList = dynamic([\"UpdateTrail\",\"DeleteTrail\",\"StopLogging\",\"DeleteFlowLogs\",\"DeleteEventBus\"]);\nAWSCloudTrail\n| where EventName in~ (EventNameList)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\")\n| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,\nUserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion, EventSource\n| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc\n",
"queryFrequency": "P1D",
"queryPeriod": "P1D",
"severity": "Low",
"status": "Available",
"subTechniques": [],
"suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
"suppressionEnabled": false,
"tactics": [
"DefenseEvasion"
],
"techniques": [
"T1070"
],
"templateVersion": "1.0.4",
"triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
"triggerThreshold": 0
},
"type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
}
]
}