AWSCloudTrail - Creation of DataPipeline policy and then privilege escalation

Back


Id	6009c632-94e9-4ffb-a11a-b4b99f457f88
Rulename	AWSCloudTrail - Creation of DataPipeline policy and then privilege escalation
Description	Identifies creation of IAM policies that combine AWS Data Pipeline permissions with IAM privileges such as iam:PassRole, followed by attachment activity to users, roles, or groups. This sequence can enable escalation paths and should be reviewed for unauthorized privilege assignment.
Severity	High
Tactics	DefenseEvasion PrivilegeEscalation Persistence
Techniques	T1484 T1098.003
Required data connectors	AWS
Kind	Scheduled
Query frequency	1d
Query period	1d
Trigger threshold	0
Trigger operator	gt
Source Uri	https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_CreatedDataPipelinePolicytoPrivilegeEscalation.yaml
Version	1.0.4
Arm template	6009c632-94e9-4ffb-a11a-b4b99f457f88.json

KQL

let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
let createPolicy =  dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 14d;
// Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance
let EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "");
//Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.
let FullAdminPolicyEvents =  materialize(  EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
| where EventName in (createPolicy)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
| mvexpand Statement
| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
| extend Action = tostring(Action)
| where Effect =~ "Allow" and (((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:CreatePipeline" and Action contains "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition" and Action contains "datapipeline:ActivatePipeline") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:Create*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Put*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Activate*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn,  RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
| project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated  );
let PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName,   UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
| extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType",   UserIdentityType, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn)
| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount
);
// Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.
// These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.
FullAdminPolicyEvents
| join kind=leftouter
(
    PolicyAttach
)
on PolicyName
| project-away PolicyName1

YAML

tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
name: AWSCloudTrail - Creation of DataPipeline policy and then privilege escalation
version: 1.0.4
queryFrequency: 1d
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
  dataTypes:
  - AWSCloudTrail
customDetails:
  EventName: EventName
  UserIdentityArn: UserIdentityArn
  RecipientAccountId: RecipientAccountId
  PolicyName: PolicyName
id: 6009c632-94e9-4ffb-a11a-b4b99f457f88
triggerThreshold: 0
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: AccountName
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
    columnName: RecipientAccountId
  entityType: Account
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: SourceIpAddress
  entityType: IP
queryPeriod: 1d
severity: High
relevantTechniques:
- T1484
- T1098.003
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDescriptionFormat: Detected {{EventName}} for policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'AWS Data Pipeline privilege escalation policy activity: {{PolicyName}} by {{AccountName}}'
description: |
  Identifies creation of IAM policies that combine AWS Data Pipeline permissions with IAM privileges such as
  iam:PassRole, followed by attachment activity to users, roles, or groups. This sequence can enable escalation
  paths and should be reviewed for unauthorized privilege assignment.
triggerOperator: gt
status: Available
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_CreatedDataPipelinePolicytoPrivilegeEscalation.yaml
kind: Scheduled
query: |
  let EventNameList = dynamic(["AttachUserPolicy","AttachRolePolicy","AttachGroupPolicy"]);
  let createPolicy =  dynamic(["CreatePolicy", "CreatePolicyVersion"]);
  let timeframe = 1d;
  let lookback = 14d;
  // Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance
  let EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "");
  //Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.
  let FullAdminPolicyEvents =  materialize(  EventInfo
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)
  | where EventName in (createPolicy)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)
  | extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement
  | mvexpand Statement
  | extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)
  | extend Action = tostring(Action)
  | where Effect =~ "Allow" and (((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:*") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:CreatePipeline" and Action contains "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition" and Action contains "datapipeline:ActivatePipeline") or ((Action contains "iam:*" or Action contains "iam:PassRole") and Action contains "datapipeline:Create*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Put*" and Action contains "datapipeline:Activate*")) and Resource == "*" and Condition == ""
  | distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn,  RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix
  | project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated  );
  let PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)
  | extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),"/")[1])
  | summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName,   UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName
  | extend AttachEvent = pack("StartTime", StartTime, "EndTime", EndTime, "EventName", EventName, "UserIdentityType",   UserIdentityType, "SourceIpAddress", SourceIpAddress, "AccountName", AccountName, "AccountUPNSuffix", AccountUPNSuffix, "RecipientAccountId", RecipientAccountId, "UserIdentityArn", UserIdentityArn)
  | project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount
  );
  // Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.
  // These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.
  FullAdminPolicyEvents
  | join kind=leftouter
  (
      PolicyAttach
  )
  on PolicyName
  | project-away PolicyName1

ARM

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/6009c632-94e9-4ffb-a11a-b4b99f457f88')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/6009c632-94e9-4ffb-a11a-b4b99f457f88')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": "Detected {{EventName}} for policy {{PolicyName}} in account {{RecipientAccountId}}.",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "AWS Data Pipeline privilege escalation policy activity: {{PolicyName}} by {{AccountName}}"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "6009c632-94e9-4ffb-a11a-b4b99f457f88",
        "customDetails": {
          "EventName": "EventName",
          "PolicyName": "PolicyName",
          "RecipientAccountId": "RecipientAccountId",
          "UserIdentityArn": "UserIdentityArn"
        },
        "description": "Identifies creation of IAM policies that combine AWS Data Pipeline permissions with IAM privileges such as\niam:PassRole, followed by attachment activity to users, roles, or groups. This sequence can enable escalation\npaths and should be reviewed for unauthorized privilege assignment.\n",
        "displayName": "AWSCloudTrail - Creation of DataPipeline policy and then privilege escalation",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "AccountName",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "AccountUPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "RecipientAccountId",
                "identifier": "CloudAppAccountId"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "SourceIpAddress",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_CreatedDataPipelinePolicytoPrivilegeEscalation.yaml",
        "query": "let EventNameList = dynamic([\"AttachUserPolicy\",\"AttachRolePolicy\",\"AttachGroupPolicy\"]);\nlet createPolicy =  dynamic([\"CreatePolicy\", \"CreatePolicyVersion\"]);\nlet timeframe = 1d;\nlet lookback = 14d;\n// Creating Master table with all the events to use with materialize for better performance\nlet EventInfo = AWSCloudTrail\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)\n| where EventName in (EventNameList) or EventName in (createPolicy)\n| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)\n| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])\n| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == \"Anonymous\", \"Anonymous\", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)\n| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),\n  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains \"@\", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), \"\");\n//Checking for Policy creation event with Full Admin Privileges since lookback period.\nlet FullAdminPolicyEvents =  materialize(  EventInfo\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(lookback)\n| where EventName in (createPolicy)\n| extend PolicyName = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyName)\n| extend Statement = parse_json(tostring((parse_json(RequestParameters).policyDocument))).Statement\n| mvexpand Statement\n| extend Action = parse_json(Statement).Action , Effect = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Effect), Resource = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Resource), Condition = tostring(parse_json(Statement).Condition)\n| extend Action = tostring(Action)\n| where Effect =~ \"Allow\" and (((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"datapipeline:*\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"datapipeline:CreatePipeline\" and Action contains \"datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition\" and Action contains \"datapipeline:ActivatePipeline\") or ((Action contains \"iam:*\" or Action contains \"iam:PassRole\") and Action contains \"datapipeline:Create*\" and Action contains \"datapipeline:Put*\" and Action contains \"datapipeline:Activate*\")) and Resource == \"*\" and Condition == \"\"\n| distinct TimeGenerated, EventName, PolicyName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn,  RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix\n| project-rename StartTime = TimeGenerated  );\nlet PolicyAttach = materialize(  EventInfo\n| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)\n| where EventName in (EventNameList) and isempty(ErrorCode) and isempty(ErrorMessage)\n| extend PolicyName = tostring(split(tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).policyArn),\"/\")[1])\n| summarize AttachEventCount=count(), StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventSource, EventName,   UserIdentityType , UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, PolicyName\n| extend AttachEvent = pack(\"StartTime\", StartTime, \"EndTime\", EndTime, \"EventName\", EventName, \"UserIdentityType\",   UserIdentityType, \"SourceIpAddress\", SourceIpAddress, \"AccountName\", AccountName, \"AccountUPNSuffix\", AccountUPNSuffix, \"RecipientAccountId\", RecipientAccountId, \"UserIdentityArn\", UserIdentityArn)\n| project EventSource, PolicyName, AttachEvent, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, AttachEventCount\n);\n// Joining the list of PolicyNames and checking if it has been attached to any Roles/Users/Groups.\n// These Roles/Users/Groups will be Privileged and can be used by adversaries as pivot point for privilege escalation via multiple ways.\nFullAdminPolicyEvents\n| join kind=leftouter\n(\n    PolicyAttach\n)\non PolicyName\n| project-away PolicyName1\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "High",
        "status": "Available",
        "subTechniques": [
          "T1098.003"
        ],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "DefenseEvasion",
          "Persistence",
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1098",
          "T1484"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.4",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}