Cross-Cloud Suspicious Compute resource creation in GCP

// Materialize AWS GuardDuty findings
let AwsAlert = materialize (
    AWSGuardDuty
    // Filter for specific activity types in AWS GuardDuty
    | where ActivityType has_any (
        "Backdoor:EC2/DenialOfService.UnusualProtocol",
        "CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/MaliciousIPCaller",
        "CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/SuccessfulAnonymousAccess",
        "CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/TorIPCaller",
        "CredentialAccess:RDS/AnomalousBehavior.SuccessfulBruteForce",
        "CredentialAccess:RDS/TorIPCaller.FailedLogin",
        "CredentialAccess:RDS/TorIPCaller.SuccessfulLogin",
        "Discovery:Kubernetes/MaliciousIPCaller",
        "Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom",
        "UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/TorClient",
        "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/TorIPCaller",
        "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom",
        "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWS",
        "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS",
        "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B"
        )
    // Extract and transform AWS GuardDuty attributes
    | extend
        AWSAlertId = Id, 
        AWSAlertTitle = Title,
        AWSAlertDescription = Description,
        AWSresourceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).resourceType),
        AWSNetworkEntity = tostring(parse_json(ServiceDetails).action.awsApiCallAction.remoteIpDetails.ipAddressV4),
        AWSAlertUserNameEntity = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).accessKeyDetails.userName),
        InstanceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).instanceDetails.instanceType),
        AWSTargetingService = parse_json(ServiceDetails).additionalInfo.apiCalls,
        AWSAlertTime = TimeCreated,
        AWSAlertLink= tostring(strcat('https://us-east-1.console.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/home?region=us-east-1#/findings?macros=current&fId=', Id)),
        Severity = 
        case (
    Severity >= 7.0,
    "High",
    Severity between (4.0 .. 6.9),
    "Medium",
    Severity between (1.0 .. 3.9),
    "Low",
    "Unknown"
)
    // Extract API call details and count
    | mv-apply AIPCall = AWSTargetingService on 
        ( 
        where AIPCall has "name"    
        | extend APICallName = tostring(AIPCall.name), APICallCount = tostring(AIPCall["count"])
        ) 
    // Select distinct attributes for further analysis
    | distinct
        AWSAlertTime,
        ActivityType,
        Severity,
        AWSAlertId,
        AWSAlertTitle,
        AWSAlertDescription,
        AWSAlertLink,
        Arn,
        AWSresourceType,
        AWSNetworkEntity,
        AWSAlertUserNameEntity,
        InstanceType,
        APICallName,
        APICallCount      
    );
// Materialize GCP Audit Logs related to VM instance creation
let GCPVMActivity= materialize(
    GCPAuditLogs 
    // Filter for Compute Engine instances insertions
    | where ServiceName == "compute.googleapis.com" and MethodName endswith "instances.insert"
    // Extract and transform relevant GCP Audit Log attributes
    | extend
        GCPUserUPN= tostring(parse_json(AuthenticationInfo).principalEmail),
        GCPUserIp = tostring(parse_json(RequestMetadata).callerIp),
        GCPUserUA= tostring(parse_json(RequestMetadata).callerSuppliedUserAgent),
        VMDetails= parse_json(AuthorizationInfo),
        VMStatus =  tostring(parse_json(Response).status),
        VMOperation=tostring(parse_json(Response).operationType),
        VMName= tostring(parse_json(Request).name),
        VMDescription= tostring(parse_json(Request).description),
        VMType = tostring(split(parse_json(Request).machineType, "/")[-1]),
        Tags= tostring(parse_json(Request).tags),
        RequestJS = parse_json(Request)
    // Filter out service account-related activities and private IP addresses
    | where GCPUserUPN !has "gserviceaccount.com"
    | extend Name = tostring(split(GCPUserUPN, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GCPUserUPN, "@")[1])
    | where VMOperation == "insert" and isnotempty(GCPUserIp) and GCPUserIp != "private"
    // Select relevant attributes for further analysis
    | project
        GCPOperationTime=TimeGenerated,
        VMName,
        VMStatus,
        MethodName,
        GCPUserUPN,
        ProjectId,
        GCPUserIp,
        GCPUserUA,
        VMOperation,
        VMType,
        Name,
        UPNSuffix
    );
// Join AWS and GCP activities based on matching IP addresses
AwsAlert
| join kind= inner (GCPVMActivity)
    on
    $left.AWSNetworkEntity == $right.GCPUserIp

relevantTechniques:
- T1566
- T1059
- T1078
- T1547
- T1548
- T1069
- T1552
name: Cross-Cloud Suspicious Compute resource creation in GCP
requiredDataConnectors:
- dataTypes:
  - GCPAuditLogs
  connectorId: GCPAuditLogsDefinition
- dataTypes:
  - AWSGuardDuty
  connectorId: AWSS3
entityMappings:
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: Address
    columnName: GCPUserIp
  entityType: IP
- fieldMappings:
  - identifier: FullName
    columnName: GCPUserUPN
  - identifier: Name
    columnName: Name
  - identifier: UPNSuffix
    columnName: UPNSuffix
  entityType: Account
triggerThreshold: 0
id: 5c847e47-0a07-4c01-ab99-5817ad6cb11e
tactics:
- InitialAccess
- Execution
- Persistence
- PrivilegeEscalation
- CredentialAccess
- Discovery
- LateralMovement
version: 1.0.2
customDetails:
  AWSAPICallName: APICallName
  AWSInstanceType: InstanceType
  AWSArn: Arn
  GCPUserAgent: GCPUserUA
  CorrelationWith: GCPAuditLogs
  AWSresourceType: AWSresourceType
  GCPProjectId: ProjectId
  AWSAlertUserName: AWSAlertUserNameEntity
  GCPVMName: VMName
  AWSAPICallCount: APICallCount
  GCPVMType: VMType
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDynamicProperties:
  - alertProperty: AlertLink
    value: AWSAlertLink
  - alertProperty: ProviderName
    value: AWS
  - alertProperty: ProductComponentName
    value: AWSGuarduty
  alertDisplayNameFormat: '{{AWSNetworkEntity}} from {{AWSAlertTitle}} observed in GCP compute activity with {{GCPUserUPN}}'
  alertSeverityColumnName: Severity
  alertDescriptionFormat: |2-
     This detection compiles and correlates unauthorized user access alerts originating from AWS GuardDuty With Alert Description '{{AWSAlertDescription}}' assocated with GCP compute activities. It focuses on AWS GuardDuty alerts related to unauthorized user access, specifically targeting network IP associations tied to activities such as logins from malicious IP addresses or instance credential exfiltration attempts. The detection leverages these common network IP advisories to detect and pinpoint unauthorized users attempting to access both AWS and Azure resources.  

     AWS ALert Link : '{{AWSAlertLink}}' 

     Find More Details :https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-active.html
queryPeriod: 1d
kind: Scheduled
OriginalUri: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Multi Cloud Attack Coverage Essentials - Resource Abuse/Analytic Rules/Cross-CloudSuspiciousComputeResourcecreationinGCP.yaml
queryFrequency: 1d
severity: Low
description: |
    'This detection  identifies potential suspicious activity across multi-cloud environments by combining AWS GuardDuty findings with GCP Audit Logs. It focuses on AWS activities related to unauthorized access, credential abuse, and unusual behaviors, as well as GCP instances creation with non-Google service account users. The query aims to provide a comprehensive view of cross-cloud security incidents for proactive threat detection and response.'
query: |
  // Materialize AWS GuardDuty findings
  let AwsAlert = materialize (
      AWSGuardDuty
      // Filter for specific activity types in AWS GuardDuty
      | where ActivityType has_any (
          "Backdoor:EC2/DenialOfService.UnusualProtocol",
          "CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/MaliciousIPCaller",
          "CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/SuccessfulAnonymousAccess",
          "CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/TorIPCaller",
          "CredentialAccess:RDS/AnomalousBehavior.SuccessfulBruteForce",
          "CredentialAccess:RDS/TorIPCaller.FailedLogin",
          "CredentialAccess:RDS/TorIPCaller.SuccessfulLogin",
          "Discovery:Kubernetes/MaliciousIPCaller",
          "Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom",
          "UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/TorClient",
          "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/TorIPCaller",
          "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom",
          "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWS",
          "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS",
          "UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B"
          )
      // Extract and transform AWS GuardDuty attributes
      | extend
          AWSAlertId = Id, 
          AWSAlertTitle = Title,
          AWSAlertDescription = Description,
          AWSresourceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).resourceType),
          AWSNetworkEntity = tostring(parse_json(ServiceDetails).action.awsApiCallAction.remoteIpDetails.ipAddressV4),
          AWSAlertUserNameEntity = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).accessKeyDetails.userName),
          InstanceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).instanceDetails.instanceType),
          AWSTargetingService = parse_json(ServiceDetails).additionalInfo.apiCalls,
          AWSAlertTime = TimeCreated,
          AWSAlertLink= tostring(strcat('https://us-east-1.console.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/home?region=us-east-1#/findings?macros=current&fId=', Id)),
          Severity = 
          case (
      Severity >= 7.0,
      "High",
      Severity between (4.0 .. 6.9),
      "Medium",
      Severity between (1.0 .. 3.9),
      "Low",
      "Unknown"
  )
      // Extract API call details and count
      | mv-apply AIPCall = AWSTargetingService on 
          ( 
          where AIPCall has "name"    
          | extend APICallName = tostring(AIPCall.name), APICallCount = tostring(AIPCall["count"])
          ) 
      // Select distinct attributes for further analysis
      | distinct
          AWSAlertTime,
          ActivityType,
          Severity,
          AWSAlertId,
          AWSAlertTitle,
          AWSAlertDescription,
          AWSAlertLink,
          Arn,
          AWSresourceType,
          AWSNetworkEntity,
          AWSAlertUserNameEntity,
          InstanceType,
          APICallName,
          APICallCount      
      );
  // Materialize GCP Audit Logs related to VM instance creation
  let GCPVMActivity= materialize(
      GCPAuditLogs 
      // Filter for Compute Engine instances insertions
      | where ServiceName == "compute.googleapis.com" and MethodName endswith "instances.insert"
      // Extract and transform relevant GCP Audit Log attributes
      | extend
          GCPUserUPN= tostring(parse_json(AuthenticationInfo).principalEmail),
          GCPUserIp = tostring(parse_json(RequestMetadata).callerIp),
          GCPUserUA= tostring(parse_json(RequestMetadata).callerSuppliedUserAgent),
          VMDetails= parse_json(AuthorizationInfo),
          VMStatus =  tostring(parse_json(Response).status),
          VMOperation=tostring(parse_json(Response).operationType),
          VMName= tostring(parse_json(Request).name),
          VMDescription= tostring(parse_json(Request).description),
          VMType = tostring(split(parse_json(Request).machineType, "/")[-1]),
          Tags= tostring(parse_json(Request).tags),
          RequestJS = parse_json(Request)
      // Filter out service account-related activities and private IP addresses
      | where GCPUserUPN !has "gserviceaccount.com"
      | extend Name = tostring(split(GCPUserUPN, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GCPUserUPN, "@")[1])
      | where VMOperation == "insert" and isnotempty(GCPUserIp) and GCPUserIp != "private"
      // Select relevant attributes for further analysis
      | project
          GCPOperationTime=TimeGenerated,
          VMName,
          VMStatus,
          MethodName,
          GCPUserUPN,
          ProjectId,
          GCPUserIp,
          GCPUserUA,
          VMOperation,
          VMType,
          Name,
          UPNSuffix
      );
  // Join AWS and GCP activities based on matching IP addresses
  AwsAlert
  | join kind= inner (GCPVMActivity)
      on
      $left.AWSNetworkEntity == $right.GCPUserIp  
triggerOperator: gt

{
  "$schema": "https://schema.management.azure.com/schemas/2019-04-01/deploymentTemplate.json#",
  "contentVersion": "1.0.0.0",
  "parameters": {
    "workspace": {
      "type": "String"
    }
  },
  "resources": [
    {
      "apiVersion": "2024-01-01-preview",
      "id": "[concat(resourceId('Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers', parameters('workspace'), 'Microsoft.SecurityInsights'),'/alertRules/5c847e47-0a07-4c01-ab99-5817ad6cb11e')]",
      "kind": "Scheduled",
      "name": "[concat(parameters('workspace'),'/Microsoft.SecurityInsights/5c847e47-0a07-4c01-ab99-5817ad6cb11e')]",
      "properties": {
        "alertDetailsOverride": {
          "alertDescriptionFormat": " This detection compiles and correlates unauthorized user access alerts originating from AWS GuardDuty With Alert Description '{{AWSAlertDescription}}' assocated with GCP compute activities. It focuses on AWS GuardDuty alerts related to unauthorized user access, specifically targeting network IP associations tied to activities such as logins from malicious IP addresses or instance credential exfiltration attempts. The detection leverages these common network IP advisories to detect and pinpoint unauthorized users attempting to access both AWS and Azure resources.  \n\n AWS ALert Link : '{{AWSAlertLink}}' \n\n Find More Details :https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-active.html",
          "alertDisplayNameFormat": "{{AWSNetworkEntity}} from {{AWSAlertTitle}} observed in GCP compute activity with {{GCPUserUPN}}",
          "alertDynamicProperties": [
            {
              "alertProperty": "AlertLink",
              "value": "AWSAlertLink"
            },
            {
              "alertProperty": "ProviderName",
              "value": "AWS"
            },
            {
              "alertProperty": "ProductComponentName",
              "value": "AWSGuarduty"
            }
          ],
          "alertSeverityColumnName": "Severity"
        },
        "alertRuleTemplateName": "5c847e47-0a07-4c01-ab99-5817ad6cb11e",
        "customDetails": {
          "AWSAlertUserName": "AWSAlertUserNameEntity",
          "AWSAPICallCount": "APICallCount",
          "AWSAPICallName": "APICallName",
          "AWSArn": "Arn",
          "AWSInstanceType": "InstanceType",
          "AWSresourceType": "AWSresourceType",
          "CorrelationWith": "GCPAuditLogs",
          "GCPProjectId": "ProjectId",
          "GCPUserAgent": "GCPUserUA",
          "GCPVMName": "VMName",
          "GCPVMType": "VMType"
        },
        "description": "'This detection  identifies potential suspicious activity across multi-cloud environments by combining AWS GuardDuty findings with GCP Audit Logs. It focuses on AWS activities related to unauthorized access, credential abuse, and unusual behaviors, as well as GCP instances creation with non-Google service account users. The query aims to provide a comprehensive view of cross-cloud security incidents for proactive threat detection and response.'\n",
        "displayName": "Cross-Cloud Suspicious Compute resource creation in GCP",
        "enabled": true,
        "entityMappings": [
          {
            "entityType": "IP",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "GCPUserIp",
                "identifier": "Address"
              }
            ]
          },
          {
            "entityType": "Account",
            "fieldMappings": [
              {
                "columnName": "GCPUserUPN",
                "identifier": "FullName"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "Name",
                "identifier": "Name"
              },
              {
                "columnName": "UPNSuffix",
                "identifier": "UPNSuffix"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "OriginalUri": "https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Multi Cloud Attack Coverage Essentials - Resource Abuse/Analytic Rules/Cross-CloudSuspiciousComputeResourcecreationinGCP.yaml",
        "query": "// Materialize AWS GuardDuty findings\nlet AwsAlert = materialize (\n    AWSGuardDuty\n    // Filter for specific activity types in AWS GuardDuty\n    | where ActivityType has_any (\n        \"Backdoor:EC2/DenialOfService.UnusualProtocol\",\n        \"CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/MaliciousIPCaller\",\n        \"CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/SuccessfulAnonymousAccess\",\n        \"CredentialAccess:Kubernetes/TorIPCaller\",\n        \"CredentialAccess:RDS/AnomalousBehavior.SuccessfulBruteForce\",\n        \"CredentialAccess:RDS/TorIPCaller.FailedLogin\",\n        \"CredentialAccess:RDS/TorIPCaller.SuccessfulLogin\",\n        \"Discovery:Kubernetes/MaliciousIPCaller\",\n        \"Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom\",\n        \"UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/TorClient\",\n        \"UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/TorIPCaller\",\n        \"UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom\",\n        \"UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.OutsideAWS\",\n        \"UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration.InsideAWS\",\n        \"UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B\"\n        )\n    // Extract and transform AWS GuardDuty attributes\n    | extend\n        AWSAlertId = Id, \n        AWSAlertTitle = Title,\n        AWSAlertDescription = Description,\n        AWSresourceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).resourceType),\n        AWSNetworkEntity = tostring(parse_json(ServiceDetails).action.awsApiCallAction.remoteIpDetails.ipAddressV4),\n        AWSAlertUserNameEntity = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).accessKeyDetails.userName),\n        InstanceType = tostring(parse_json(ResourceDetails).instanceDetails.instanceType),\n        AWSTargetingService = parse_json(ServiceDetails).additionalInfo.apiCalls,\n        AWSAlertTime = TimeCreated,\n        AWSAlertLink= tostring(strcat('https://us-east-1.console.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/home?region=us-east-1#/findings?macros=current&fId=', Id)),\n        Severity = \n        case (\n    Severity >= 7.0,\n    \"High\",\n    Severity between (4.0 .. 6.9),\n    \"Medium\",\n    Severity between (1.0 .. 3.9),\n    \"Low\",\n    \"Unknown\"\n)\n    // Extract API call details and count\n    | mv-apply AIPCall = AWSTargetingService on \n        ( \n        where AIPCall has \"name\"    \n        | extend APICallName = tostring(AIPCall.name), APICallCount = tostring(AIPCall[\"count\"])\n        ) \n    // Select distinct attributes for further analysis\n    | distinct\n        AWSAlertTime,\n        ActivityType,\n        Severity,\n        AWSAlertId,\n        AWSAlertTitle,\n        AWSAlertDescription,\n        AWSAlertLink,\n        Arn,\n        AWSresourceType,\n        AWSNetworkEntity,\n        AWSAlertUserNameEntity,\n        InstanceType,\n        APICallName,\n        APICallCount      \n    );\n// Materialize GCP Audit Logs related to VM instance creation\nlet GCPVMActivity= materialize(\n    GCPAuditLogs \n    // Filter for Compute Engine instances insertions\n    | where ServiceName == \"compute.googleapis.com\" and MethodName endswith \"instances.insert\"\n    // Extract and transform relevant GCP Audit Log attributes\n    | extend\n        GCPUserUPN= tostring(parse_json(AuthenticationInfo).principalEmail),\n        GCPUserIp = tostring(parse_json(RequestMetadata).callerIp),\n        GCPUserUA= tostring(parse_json(RequestMetadata).callerSuppliedUserAgent),\n        VMDetails= parse_json(AuthorizationInfo),\n        VMStatus =  tostring(parse_json(Response).status),\n        VMOperation=tostring(parse_json(Response).operationType),\n        VMName= tostring(parse_json(Request).name),\n        VMDescription= tostring(parse_json(Request).description),\n        VMType = tostring(split(parse_json(Request).machineType, \"/\")[-1]),\n        Tags= tostring(parse_json(Request).tags),\n        RequestJS = parse_json(Request)\n    // Filter out service account-related activities and private IP addresses\n    | where GCPUserUPN !has \"gserviceaccount.com\"\n    | extend Name = tostring(split(GCPUserUPN, \"@\")[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(GCPUserUPN, \"@\")[1])\n    | where VMOperation == \"insert\" and isnotempty(GCPUserIp) and GCPUserIp != \"private\"\n    // Select relevant attributes for further analysis\n    | project\n        GCPOperationTime=TimeGenerated,\n        VMName,\n        VMStatus,\n        MethodName,\n        GCPUserUPN,\n        ProjectId,\n        GCPUserIp,\n        GCPUserUA,\n        VMOperation,\n        VMType,\n        Name,\n        UPNSuffix\n    );\n// Join AWS and GCP activities based on matching IP addresses\nAwsAlert\n| join kind= inner (GCPVMActivity)\n    on\n    $left.AWSNetworkEntity == $right.GCPUserIp\n",
        "queryFrequency": "P1D",
        "queryPeriod": "P1D",
        "severity": "Low",
        "subTechniques": [],
        "suppressionDuration": "PT1H",
        "suppressionEnabled": false,
        "tactics": [
          "CredentialAccess",
          "Discovery",
          "Execution",
          "InitialAccess",
          "LateralMovement",
          "Persistence",
          "PrivilegeEscalation"
        ],
        "techniques": [
          "T1059",
          "T1069",
          "T1078",
          "T1547",
          "T1548",
          "T1552",
          "T1566"
        ],
        "templateVersion": "1.0.2",
        "triggerOperator": "GreaterThan",
        "triggerThreshold": 0
      },
      "type": "Microsoft.OperationalInsights/workspaces/providers/alertRules"
    }
  ]
}